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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation argues that theodicy was a predominant concern of early modern English 
literary culture, and that response to the so-called “problem of evil” was one of its major leitmotifs. 
With chapters spanning from the Elizabethan to the Restoration eras, its interpretations of 
canonical poetic and dramatic texts (by Spenser, Shakespeare, Lucy Hutchinson, and John Milton) 
shed light on the avidity of interest and diversity of approach early modern writers brought to 
questions of evil. Bringing philological evidence from the literary archive to bear on existing 
historical-theoretical theses regarding the relationship between early modern theodicy and the 
constitution of modernity (theodicy drives secularization; theodicy motivates the development of 
German Idealism from Leibniz to Kant), I argue that these existing theories tend to oversimplify 
the complexity of seventeenth century thinking about the origin and persistence of evil in the world 
and in human experience. I attend to the hybridity of early modern literary discourse, which speaks 
at the thresholds dividing secular and sacred, private and public spheres, in order to restore this 
sense of complexity and open up new avenues of inquiry regarding the imagination of evil in the 
modern age. Much early modern theodicy, I find, contributed to the constitution of the modern in 
a negative way, comprising directions not taken, forms of thought excluded in pursuit of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. “Theodicy” in Early Modern Literature? 
 
 In its broadest contours, this dissertation argues that theodicy and the problem of 
evil are formative concerns of early modern English literature, measured from roughly 
1600 to 1680.1 That claim is itself potentially controversial, because there is a tendency to 
regard theodicy as a product of modern philosophy. Odo Marquard’s statement of the case 
is lapidary: “Where there is theodicy, there is modernity, and where there is modernity, 
there is theodicy.”2 According to this restrictive view of how to talk about theodicy—one 
of the two major approaches to theodicy and the problem of evil I will describe in this 
introduction—the premise of this dissertation risks both category error and historical 
anachronism. So to begin I will introduce this restrictive sense of what theodicy means, 
which I will call the modernist view, and go on to show why the findings of this dissertation 
are nevertheless warranted and fruitful.  
 According to the modernist view of theodicy, the publication of Leibniz’s Essais 
de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal (1710) may be 
seen as a watershed dividing premodern from modern ways of thinking about and 
responding to evil in the domain of European intellectual history. Although the existence 
of evil has troubled thinkers across a wide variety of cultures, and although one sees in 
other philosophers nearly contemporary with Leibniz (i.e. Descartes, Pierre Bayle) similar 
																																																								
1 William Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 195, lends support: “[…] the reading of Genesis 1-3 was one of the defining acts of 
early-modernity, as was worrying about the problem of evil.”  
2 Odo Marquard, “Unburdenings: Theodicy Motives in Modern Philosophy,” in In Defense 
of the Accidental: Philosophical Studies, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 11.  
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approaches to the one found in the Essais de Théodicée, this work introduces the word 
“theodicy” into the philosophical lexicon and it is also serves as an important periodizing 
marker of real historical change. Marcel Sarot summarizes the modernist view of theodicy 
and its periodization as follows: 
The change in the reflection on evil, marked by the introduction of the term 
‘theodicy,’ allegedly took place in the eighteenth century. Leibniz, it is 
argued, was the first […] to approach God and evil in terms of a lawsuit, in 
which the question is to what extent God is ‘guilty’ of the evil in the world. 
The ‘defence’ of God thus acquires juridical overtones […]. Of all the 
changes in our thinking about evil that are associated with the introduction 
of the term ‘theodicy’, this is the one that is most intimately connected with 
Leibniz’ own thought, and also the one that is most difficult to trace in 
twentieth-century theodicies. Though the metaphor of a lawsuit is still 
sometimes used, the form of a lawsuit is seldom applied. Besides the 
introduction of juridical imagery, modernity is said to have affected our 
views on evil in at least four closely connected ways. (1) Before the 
eighteenth century the problem of evil was a problem within the Christian 
faith: the problem to account for the existence of evil, given the benevolent 
omnipotence of God. From Leibniz onwards, however, the problem of evil 
becomes a problem about the Christian faith. From then on, it is God’s 
justice, and even God’s existence, that is at stake in discussions of the 
problem of evil. (2) Before the 18th century, fathoming the problem of evil 
led man to doubt himself. It is the perversion of our will that introduced evil 
into the world, it is the perversion of our intellect that renders our 
endeavours to resolve the problem of evil futile. Only a God-given 
conversion can restore our will and cleanse our vision, and thus heal us and 
help us to attain blessedness. From Leibniz onwards, however, the intellect 
of the autonomous theodicist is no longer doubted, and this intellect leads 
him to doubt God and God’s justice instead. (3) Before the eighteenth 
century, the problem of evil had a practical focus: How can we attain 
happiness in spite of evil? From Leibniz onwards, however, the problem of 
evil became a theoretical enterprise: the rational attempt to show the 
compatibility of the existence of the Christian God with the presence of evil 
in the world. This theoretical project does not have any direct practical 
implications. (4) Before the eighteenth century, thinking about the problem 
of evil was aimed at winning over those within Christianity holding false 
beliefs, whereas from Leibniz onwards, theodicy is aimed at winning over 
non-believers.3 
																																																								
3 Marcel Sarot, “Theodicy and Modernity: An Inquiry into the Historicity of Theodicy,” in 
Theodicy in the World of the Bible, eds. Antti Laato and Johannes C. de Moor (Leiden: 
Brill, 2003). Sarot draws on several sources; the most important are Marquard’s essay cited 
	 3	
 
As Sarot admits, this is a broad generalization and a rough periodization; but both the 
generalizing and the periodizing are helpful in their way. For students of theodicy, the 
generalizations help to explore valid connections between such seemingly disparate forms 
of thought as Leibnizian metaphysics and the Menshevik view of history. 4  The 
periodization serves as a useful reminder to historicize, and take care with terminology that 
was born in a specific historical-cultural context. But the periodization also serves a 
limiting, territorial function; it allows the practitioner of philosophical, modern theodicy to 
claim discursive territory: preachers or poets may worry about evil in all kinds of ways, 
but if they abandon philosophical criteria of reason, if they refuse at the outset to question 
the tenets of their faith, if they focus on practical matters to do with suffering instead of 
dealing with the theoretical problem of evil, then they are not engaged in theodicy, they 
are engaged in something else: apologetics, pastoral care, or contemplation of providential 
mystery.  
 Clearly not all instances of theodicy across history are of the metaphysical / 
modernist / Leibnizian type, according to this schema. But that type, too, must have its 
history, and so some examples of thinking through and responding to evil that take place 
before the rise of optimistic rationalism and outside of the modern disciplinary boundaries 
of philosophy must bear a family resemblance to the modernist type—unless we want to 
suppose that Leibniz and friends invented the thing out of whole cloth. To illustrate, take 
Sarot’s second distinguishing point above: before ‘Leibniz’ our inability to come to terms 
																																																								
above and Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1986), esp. 1-28.  
4 As does Terry Eagleton, On Evil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 137.  
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with evil is a failure of intellect (perhaps wrought by original sin); whereas after ‘Leibniz’ 
confidence in our intellect leads us to doubt God, or the rationalizing stories told about 
God. Positive of the intellect’s witness to truth, we lodge legitimate complaints about the 
world as it is and may also try to move it toward how we humanly perceive that it ought to 
be. But from what quarter did this confidence in the human intellect come? In several books 
that trace (with exquisite clear-sightedness and care) the fortunes of theory from ancient 
times to modernity, Hans Blumenberg has tried to answer that question.5 And in one of 
them, he suggests that the history of modernist, metaphysical theodicy begins more than 
one hundred and fifty years prior to the publication of Leibniz’s foundational book. It is in 
fact the Copernican turn that inaugurates modern theodicy, “by relieving the Creator of the 
reproach that it is the object [i.e. the starry heavens] that confuses cognition, rather than 
cognition that fails when faced with its object.” Therefore after Copernicus, “we are called 
upon not to rest satisfied with a state of theory that renders questionable God's intentions 
with the world and with man.” Copernicus is hardly a brash freethinker willing to lodge 
charges against God based on his own intellect; yet at the same time he is not willing to 
submit meekly to the notion that intellect must fail when confronted with astronomical 
phenomena.  
 This brief example is meant to show that the modernist view is to some extent 
justified in trying to restrict the usage of the word “theodicy,” since there are real 
differences between, for example, the book of Job and Hegel’s philosophy of history. Yet 
																																																								
5 Hans Blumenberg, The Laughter of the Thracian Woman: A Protohistory of Theory, 
trans. Spencer Hawkins (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015); The Genesis of the Copernican 
World, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); The Legitimacy of the 
Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985).  
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the modernist view suffers from an overblown sense of its autonomy with respect to other 
forms of discourse about evil, and is burdened by an overconfidence in the purity of the 
philosopher’s reason. In this dissertation I use the word theodicy liberally, in a broad sense 
drawn from the sociology of religion (about which more shortly). But I will also frequently 
argue that the texts under consideration are responding to evil in ways that bear comparison 
with modern philosophical theodicies: as a metaphysical condition of the world as a whole 
(Two Cantos of Mutabilitie), as a theoretical problem to which theory can respond 
(Paradise Lost), as an occasion for doubting providence in toto (Measure for Measure). In 
short, these literary texts in many ways meet the criterion laid out by Susan Nieman for 
examining modern philosophical theodicies: they view the problem of evil as 
“fundamentally a problem about the intelligibility of the world as a whole,” rather than 
trying to deal in a pastoral way with suffering, or identifying evil simply as a cultural or 
religious other to be extirpated.6  
The modern philosophical theodicy has its history, and part of that history is written 
in and through the early modern literary theodicies under investigation here, and others like 
them. In their bold use of juridical metaphorics, in their attempts to place new discoveries 
in natural philosophy into renovated metaphysical frames, in rethinking the connections 
between ontology and ethics, in questioning the category of mystery and the political 
metaphors that depend on it, Spenser, Shakespeare, Hutchinson and Milton provide 
resources which the modernists draw upon, despite claims of autonomy and purity.   
2. Theodicy in the Sociology of Religion 
																																																								
6 Susan Nieman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 7-8.  
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A far less restrictive view of what theodicy can mean comes down to us from the sociology 
of religion. Beginning with Max Weber, and continuing on through Talcott Parsons, 
Clifford Geertz, Peter Berger, and others, sociologists have viewed theodicy as the single 
most important function of religion. In the words of John Milbank, such thinkers “have 
[…] suggested that while religion is not reducible to theodicy, or coping with anxiety, 
nonetheless its point of intersection with society can be primarily understood in these 
terms.”7 Put in slightly different terms, the sociological view of theodicy would claim that 
“the most primary function of religion is to cope with the chances and changes of this life, 
by providing us with a reflection on the problem of misfortune, suffering and evil.”8 
Although Milbank’s aim is to show that the sociological theory of religion is reducible to 
a “secular policing of the sublime,” I have in mind nothing so tendentious by citing his 
work here; his description of the sociological view of theodicy stands regardless of whether 
one agrees or not with his final analysis. 
 If we adopt this framework for thinking about what constitutes a theodicy, the fact 
that one finds theodicy in early modern literature will not be especially noteworthy. The 
texts discussed here deal with religious themes and were written in a society whose 
legitimating discourses depended upon religion in crucial ways. If religion is primarily 
about doling out theodical comforts, then these texts would be expected to have their 
theodical moments insofar as they are religious texts.  
 What is noteworthy is how fructifying the theodical approach happens to be in each 
individual case. When one reads carefully for theodicy in these texts, the wide diversity of 
																																																								
7 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Second Edition 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 123.  
8 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 126.  
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theodicies swims into our ken, despite the tendency of the sociologists to limit theodicy to 
a handful of basic forms.9 For example, in Spenser’s Fowre Hymnes, Protestant apologetics 
and Neoplatonic thought combine to produce a unique, hybridized approach to the problem 
of evil, one not reducible to Calvinist theology or Florentine philosophy, though having 
elements in common with both. Without attending to the specific question of evil, one 
might pass over the curious way that the word “mortal” is used in the poem to apply to 
unfallen human beings in Eden, or the ambivalent attitude toward matter which seems to 
depart from Plato. Thus the power of approaching these texts informed by the view of 
theodicy coming from the sociology of religion becomes evident primarily through the 
close readings of each individual text, and the chapter summaries adumbrate my findings.   
3. Chapter Summaries 
 My first chapter discusses theodicy in Spenser’s late verse, specifically the Fowre 
Hymnes and Two Cantos of Mutabilitie. I treat the two texts as if they were parts of a 
theodical whole: the Hymnes being mostly concerned with ethical issues, and the Cantos 
being mostly concerned with ontological or cosmological ones (though this is a matter of 
emphasis rather than choice and exclusion, given Spenser’s commitment to the idea of a 
connection between macrocosm and microcosm). Though differing in their mode of 
inquiring into the problem of evil, both texts resolve upon a common answer, putting 
forward a Sabbatarian vision of rest, of the cessation of desire, even and especially the 
																																																								
9 Weber posited only three such forms: dualistic theodicy in which good and evil are locked 
in perpetual war, karmic theodicy in which evil in the present is explained by evil done in 
a past beyond memory, and predestination, which rationalizes theodicy by putting the total 
distribution of goods and ills into the hands of an omniscient and supervening providence. 
In this he is followed by Berger and others. See Max Weber, “Religious Rejections of the 
World and Their Directions,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and eds. H. 
H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 2009), 323-59, esp. 358-9.  
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desire for intellectual satisfaction about the nagging problem of evil. They are not anti-
intellectual poems by any stretch; they both make bold claims to truth, and handle weighty 
philosophical, theological, and poetic themes. Yet in both poems the truths generated 
within the poem are shown to be inadequate with respect to the Real: in the Hymnes, the 
beatific vision of divine Sapience; in the Cantos, the arrival of the cosmic goddess Dame 
Nature. The encounter with an ineffable symbol of the Real effectively brackets the 
poetically generated truths the poems work to generate, and both poems conclude with 
images of stillness and rest which nevertheless harbor within them a textual restlessness 
and openness. In the Hymnes the openness stems from a cyclical overall structure; in the 
Cantos it stems from a fragmentary ending. In both cases this tension between stillness and 
openness defines the theodical resolution of the problem of evil the poems raise.  
 The next chapter addresses the discourse of “mysteries of state” in Shakespeare, 
primarily in the tragicomedy Measure for Measure. Here I argue that in this play and 
elsewhere the sense of “mystery” is suspended in a conflict between secular and sacred 
senses. It is ambiguously poised between a numinous substance, and a mundane but secret 
technique. Measure for Measure highlights this tension in the semantics of the word 
“mystery” and uses it to probe the limits of the metaphorics of the “mysteries of state”—
especially the metaphor connecting God’s providence to the Sovereign’s governance—in 
the early years of James I’s reign. James was a ruler fond of invoking “mystery” in order 
to defend his sovereign prerogatives, a trait echoed in the figure of Measure’s Duke 
Vincentio. But James’s kingly rhetoric was put under pressure by practitioners of law, who 
could and did also claim to have their own set of “mysteries,” secular in nature but still 
powerful in matters of state. I argue that the play demonstrates how sovereign mystery, 
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despite its claim to be tied in some way to the sovereign’s body-of-power, depends in 
crucial ways upon the intercession of governmental intermediaries. Measure thus cast’s a 
dubious light on the metaphorics of state mystery, and in so doing, cannot but create doubt 
around God’s providence as well. By making mystery an occasion for doubting the 
legitimating discourse of the mysteries of state, Measure for Measure emerges as a play 
with a remarkably modern view of political-theological evils.  
 The third chapter uses shipwreck metaphors as a way of investigating Lucy 
Hutchinson’s critique of Epicurean / Lucretian ethics. Epicurus was one of the primary 
conduits for the logical problem of evil from antiquity to the early modern period, a thinker 
whose questions still exercised Hume’s meditations on the possibility of natural religion. 
Thus Hutchinson’s rethinking of the ethical vision of De rerum natura involves her in 
theodicy, and in questions about ontology, ethics, and the relationship between the two. 
Hutchinson mounts a strong defense of the idea of Providence, bound up with a form of 
affective piety in which the “duties” of the faithful are construed in terms of emotional 
responses to ills. I describe Hutchinson’s approach to theodicy as “existential,” as opposed 
to Milton’s more “theoretical” approach; in doing so, my argument once again shows the 
diversity of dealing with the problem of evil even within a ‘narrow’ religious context of 
Restoration-era dissenters.  
 My final chapter, then, takes up Paradise Lost. It is here that I find the most affinity 
between an early modern literary theodicy and the modern philosophical theodicies 
discussed above, because Paradise Lost treats theodicy as, in part, a theoretical issue, one 
that can be responded to using the tools of philosophical rationality. Yet where Leibniz and 
the modern theodicists will insist upon the univocal rationality of theory, Paradise Lost 
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explores several distinct forms of theory, apparent in the way the poem uses the word 
“survey.” The poem also goes part of the way toward putting a positive valuation on 
curiosity; this bespeaks a confidence in the intellectual capacities of human beings 
characteristic of modernist theodicy. Yet it does not go all the way, and there remain good 
reasons for thinking that the prohibition on forbidden knowledge still ought to set limits on 
human thought, by the poem’s lights. Besides the complex use of the word “survey,” I 
attend to the way the poem deploys the image of Galileo and his telescope, which I read as 
an ambiguous emblem of the advancement of learning, holding out the possibility that the 
perfected human form of theory lost in the fall might be partially reconstructible by means 
of human technics. 
 In sum, these chapters show that by reading early modern literature through the lens 
of theodicy broadly construed (i.e., as it is understood by sociologists of religion), one can 
see the diverse ways that religion and poetry combine and recombine to give sense to ills 
that might appear senseless, to undeserved suffering, to metaphysical imperfections in the 
world order, and to the troubling propensities toward evil that reside in human nature. In 
addition to this, I show how many of these texts mount theodicies which, while not modern 
philosophical theodicies in the strict sense, nevertheless resemble them in some respects. 
Taken cumulatively, the dissertation shows that the problem of evil is a predominant 
concern of several canonical works of English literature, and that it is a productive 
problematic for thinking about the way that literature responds to the rolling crises of 
legitimacy in natural philosophy, in politics, and in religion that in many ways define the 
seventeenth century, and that early modern literature participated in giving form to the 









This chapter is about the forms of theodicy in Edmund Spenser’s Fowre Hymnes 
and Two Cantos of Mutabilitie.10 I argue that both poems reflect upon anxious questions 
affecting late Elizabethan intellectual life—questions having to do with good and evil, 
order and disorder, meaning and meaninglessness. The Cantos focus on metaphysics, 
raising issues emerging as a longstanding Aristotelian consensus about natural philosophy 
began to break apart in the latter half of the sixteenth century; the Hymnes raise questions 
of ethics, taking shape in response to the influx of Platonic ideas about love.11 Both sets of 
questions—ethical and metaphysical—concern the preservation-through-change of 
Renaissance England’s “sacred canopy,” the interleaved reason-giving ideas and 
legitimating frames of reference orienting the culture and giving meaning to lived 
experience. 12  I will show that in both these poems, Spenser responds to the anxiety 
produced by the forces of meaning-loss by appealing to a transcendental source of 
meaning, attained by contemplation, which in a sense supersedes worry about the problem 
of evil by promoting a cessation of desire, including and especially the desire for discursive 
																																																								
10 Citations of the Fowre Hymnes are drawn from Edmund Spenser, The Yale Edition of 
the Shorter Poems of Edmund Spenser, eds. William Oram et. al. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989). Citations of Two Cantos of Mutabilitie are drawn from Edmund 
Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton (Harlow: Longman, 2001).  
11 Definitions of what constitutes “Aristotelian” natural philosophy will vary. I follow 
Mary Hart Crane, Losing Touch With Nature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2014), with its useful description of early modern Aristotelianisms, and my argument is 
informed throughout by her contention that “the core of the ‘Aristotelian’ understanding of 
the natural world coincided with intuitive science, folk theories about the natural world that 
arise to provide commonsense explanations of ordinary experience” (20).  
12 The term “sacred canopy” is taken from Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of 
a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, Anchor Books, 1969), discussed briefly 





mastery of the vexing aspects of life and the world.13 The late works promote an ideal of 
fixity—a Sabbatarian vision of stillness—in response to the persistent interplay of good 
and evil that marks worldly existence, and open this fixity up as a consolation for, rather 
than an explanation of, the existence of evil. They aim to recover lost sources of 
permanence—figured forth by the personifications of Sapience and Nature—at a time 
when established ways of knowing were growing threadbare, an heirless monarch was 
advancing in years, and the poet himself was approaching the end of a self-fashioned, and 
rather tumultuous, laureate career.14 The Hymnes and Cantos put the goodness of Love and 
of Nature to the test, they enact trials that seek to answer the perennial question unde 
malum? They are poetic theodicies. And in the forms of the tests they enact, in the discourse 
in which they render their judgments, in the historically conditioned answers they give to 
the questions they raise, we see a snapshot of the Renaissance sacred canopy in the midst 
of a transition into early modernity. In this way they set the stage for the development of 
poetic theodicy that was brought to its most famous expression in Milton’s Paradise Lost, 
and they shed light on the poetic forms employed to justify the relationship of evil to good, 
and to God, in the early modern period. 
 In this introduction, I wish to lay out a theory of theodicy that captures the poetic 
aims of the Cantos of Mutabilitie and Fowre Hymnes, and to discuss some of the specific 
																																																								
13 Feisal Mohamed, In the Anteroom of Divinity: The Reformation of the Angels from Colet 
to Milton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), reads this gesture slightly 
differently, as suggesting the inability of the individual contemplator to penetrate divine 
mystery, and so endorsing “the implicit value of the mediating presence” of church and 
ecclesiastical hierarchy (33-54).  
14  Crane, Losing Touch, 1-18. On the historical and biographical circumstances 
surrounding the composition of the Fowre Hymnes and their reception, see Andrew 





historical contexts informing those poems’ justifications of evil. In using the term “sacred 
canopy,” I have already hinted at the theory I will employ: the term comes from the 
sociologist Peter Berger, who approaches the problem of evil as a perennial and universal 
problem, one especially prominent in societies legitimated in religious terms. This is the 
framework I will use, but I will also show how a reading of early modern poetry makes us 
reconsider this framework, showing its limitations as well as its potentials. In The Sacred 
Canopy (1967), Berger wrote that while religious legitimations define and defend the 
normative areas of social order and individual experience, the function of a given social 
order’s sacred canopy becomes most apparent in limit-cases: times of individual or social 
disarray. These can be rare, as in the unique case of approaching one’s own death, or 
common, as in the case of sleeping and dreaming. What unites them is that such 
experiences are inherently “denomizing” or “anomic”—they don’t seem to fit easily with 
the normative structure of one’s waking life or the social order. Of these limit-cases or 
“marginal situations,” Berger writes:  
Religion […] maintains the socially defined reality by legitimating marginal 
situations in terms of an all-encompassing sacred reality [i.e. the ‘sacred 
canopy]. This permits the individual who goes through these situations to 
continue to exist in the world of his society—not ‘as if nothing had 
happened,’ which is psychologically difficult in the more extreme marginal 
situations, but in the ‘knowledge’ that even these events or experiences have 
a place within a universe that makes sense.15 
 
It is here at the margins—in experiences of upheaval or meaning-loss, be they common or 
rare—that theodicy comes to shore up the religious legitimations that make a given social 
order appear coherent to those living in it. Religious legitimations work in such cases to 
incorporate marginal experience within the normative order—the “nomos”—of a given 
																																																								





society. Theodicy brings the abnormal into the domain of the nomos by justifying it, and 
thus gives the anomic or denomizing experience meaning. 
 Yet the repeated tendency of events that befall a society or an individual to 
challenge this nomos have a cumulative effect, combining together to challenge the 
legitimations themselves and the normative order they subtend. Berger elaborates: 
Every nomos is established, over and over again, against the threat of its 
destruction by the anomic forces endemic to the human condition. In 
religious terms, the sacred order of the cosmos is reaffirmed, over and over 
again, in the face of chaos. It is evident that this fact poses a problem on the 
level of human activity in society, inasmuch as this activity must be so 
institutionalized as to continue despite the recurrent intrusion into 
individual and collective experience of the anomic (or, if one prefers, 
denomizing) phenomena of suffering, evil and, above all, death. However, 
a problem is also posed on the level of legitimation. The anomic phenomena 
must not only be lived through, they must also be explained—to wit, 
explained in terms of the nomos established in the society in question. An 
explanation of these phenomena in terms of religious legitimations, of 
whatever degree of theoretical sophistication, may be called a theodicy.16 
 
For Berger, then, the task of theodicy is to explain anomic phenomena, guided by the lights 
of religious legitimations subtending a given society. The goal of the explanation is world-
maintenance, the preservation of bonds of meaning holding together a social reality, and 
linking individual lives to it. Another formulation clarifies what is at stake in the world-
maintaining activity: “The worlds that man constructs are forever threatened by the forces 
of chaos, finally by the inevitable fact of death. Unless anomy, chaos and death can be 
integrated within the nomos of human life, this nomos will be incapable of prevailing 
through the exigencies of both collective history and individual biography. To repeat: every 
																																																								





human order is a community in the face of death. Theodicy represents the attempt to make 
a pact with death.”17 
 The need for such a pact does not go away, despite the changing fortunes of given 
world religions or nomoi and forms of social order. This is the strength of Berger’s model: 
it gives to theodicy the proper breadth of scope, and views it as a social activity expressed 
in religious terms, rather than a narrowly theological activity. The weakness of the model, 
though, is that it fails to account for changes to the justificatory regimes within a given 
social order. That is, because it exists at the highest level of social abstraction and 
theorization, it does not do well at describing the modulations of theodicy, its variations, 
and the cumulative variations which, when observed, present evidence of some historical 
change. Here we begin to understand the importance of poetic theodicy: such texts are in a 
sense experimental forms of theodicy, ways of forging a “pact with death” anew, related 
to, but not always perfectly conforming to, social and religious norms, and responsive to 
the specificities of the historical moment and lived experience they witness. Further, as 
individualized expressions of collective belief, they reveal variations of the general 
problem of theodicy—they explain suffering not only in terms of social normativity, but 
also in terms of self-fashioning and the personal integration of anomic experience. 
Attending to such variations can reveal the specific forms of theodicy at a much finer-
grained level, and they show that literature can often succeed in capturing elusive, 
evanescent forms of meaning which other kinds of reason-giving—philosophical and 
theological—may miss, since those kinds of reason-giving are frequently more beholden 
to the normative rationality of a given social order. Spenser’s late poetry, read in terms of 
																																																								





theodicy, helps to see this depth-dimensions of theodicy which Berger’s approach 
overlooks.  
 In the Hymnes and Cantos we encounter specific anomic phenomena animating the 
need for social and individual theodicy in Spenser’s England. What were they? As 
indicated above, the first is concerned with the ontological status of the world; this is part 
of the subject matter of the Cantos. The second is taken up in Hymnes, which treat the 
“marginal situation” of love and erotic passion, attempting to set this experience within a 
metaphysical-religious order that stabilizes and orients it toward the good. Several 
historical and poetic motivations for both undertakings in poetic theodicy shape Spenser’s 
late poetry. 
 Historically, the Cantos respond to a crisis—really more of a succession of crises—
in the fundamental understanding of nature. As described in Mary Thomas Crane’s Losing 
Touch With Nature (2014), beginning about the middle of the sixteenth century natural 
philosophers began to lose confidence in the Aristotelian Synthesis—a self-reinforcing set 
of natural-philosophical assumptions which served to guide natural inquiry, and with them 
an epistemological attitude that held the truths of nature to be evidently and openly 
available to the senses.18 The propositions included a belief in the four terrestrial elements 
and a fifth (incorruptible) celestial element, the geocentric arrangement of the heavens, and 
the idea that motion could be understood with reference to its ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ 
kinds. 19  Yet at least as important as the philosophical framework provided by these 
																																																								
18 Crane, Losing Touch, 37-41.  
19 Crane, Losing Touch, 25-31. On geocentrism, and the intuitive, anthropocentric views 
of nature implied by it, see Hans Blumenberg, Genesis of the Copernican World, trans. 
Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987) 169-199.  On motion in Aristotle and 





propositions was the affective attitude they encouraged: an assuredness about sensory 
evidence, a faith that inquiry into natural processes could be a matter of deducing sound 
conclusions from evident premises.20 The dissolution of the Aristotelian Synthesis meant 
the intrusion of doubt, a loss of this assuredness. In this way the hunt for “secrets” of nature, 
for “tokens” of phenomenal significance hidden to the senses, moved out of the domain of 
occult or magical investigation and into the developing paradigm of the ‘new science.’21  
 The dissolution of the Aristotelian Synthesis was especially dramatic in the field of 
astronomy. The publication of De revolutionibus presented a theoretically and 
mathematically compelling heliocentric view of planetary arrangement that challenged 
Aristotle and Ptolemy. This theoretical innovation—a sun-centered universe—gave 
mathematical support to the solar mysticism urged by revivals of Platonism, studies in the 
prisca theologia, and hermetic philosophies of the Renaissance.22 More discretely, Tycho 
Brahe’s observation of a supernova in 1572 challenged the Aristotelian view of a two-story 
universe, divided into changeable sublunary and immutable superlunary realms.23 England 
																																																								
Theology and the Scientific Imagination From the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 152-78.  
20 Crane, Losing Touch, 20: “the core of the ‘Aristotelian’ understanding of the natural 
world coincided with intuitive science, folk theories about the natural world that arise to 
provide commonsense explanations of ordinary experience.” 
21 William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets in Medieval and 
Early Modern Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 269-300. Eamon 
makes the distinction between ‘intuitive’ science and the hunt for secrets clear: “The 
professors of secrets affirmed the superiority of experience over reason in the search for 
scientific knowledge. They believed that nature was permeated with ‘secrets’ and occult 
forces that lay hidden underneath the exterior appearances of things […] The ‘secrets of 
nature,’ which were inaccessible to the intellect, could be found out only by long 
experience in the ways of nature” (269).  
22 For a fulsome account of Copernicus’s early influence, see Blumenberg, Genesis of the 
Copernican World, 259-430.  
23  Sarah Powrie, “Spenser’s Mutabilitie and the Indeterminate Universe,” Studies in 





was an epicenter of this seismic shift in astronomical understanding: Thomas Digges was 
one of the first vernacular popularizers of Copernicus in Europe and an early proponent of 
a theory holding the universe to be ‘infinite.’24 Giordano Bruno’s stint in England from 
1583-85 brought the Italian firebrand into the orbit of Philip Sidney, and it was on English 
soil that Bruno wrote several of his most famous works, including the dialogues The Ash 
Wednesday Supper; Cause, Principle, and Unity; and The Expulsion of the Triumphant 
Beast.25 None of this necessarily argues for Spenser’s direct involvement in this change in 
thinking about the heavens, but it demonstrates that the intellectual climate of late sixteenth 
century England was one in which new astronomical ideas clashed with established 
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic views. The Cantos of Mutabilitie register the historical context of a 
dissolving Aristotelian synthesis; the destabilizing force driving the dissolution is figured 
in the poem as a Titan—Dame Mutabilitie—a bearer of original sin and the intrusion of 
death into the world. The poem itself, culminating in Nature’s paradoxical act of lawgiving, 
constitutes a theodical poetic response in the form of an allegorical trial in which the 
competing claims of evil / mutability and good / constancy are weighed. Its aim is to resolve 
the metaphysical problem of constancy amid ceaseless change via a figurative enactment 
of natural law as mystery.   
																																																								
Seventeenth-Century Melancholy,” English Literary History 2, no. 2, 123: “[…] the new 
astronomy introduced corruption and change into the most retired regions of the 
incorruptible and unchangeable heavens. And Tycho Brahe was instrumental in upsetting 
these received opinions, although (and even more because) he did not accept the 
Copernican theory but compromised with the Ptolemaic.” Williamson’s account links this 
with the fashionable melancholic pose of the seventeenth century, and usefully gives 
describes the affective charge attached to the crisis in astronomy.  
24 See Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1957), 36-39. 
25 Powrie, “Indeterminate Universe,” 72. See also Hillary Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno 





 The theodical context to which the Fowre Hymnes respond shares in some ways 
this sense of meaning-loss, carrying over the metaphysical concern with natural law and 
its discontents into the ethical domain, the law of human nature. We can deduce from the 
remarks of Berger above that the connection between ethics and metaphysics—between 
macrocosm and microcosm—is a central issue in theodicy; more recently Susan Neiman 
has confirmed and elaborated on this view.26  If the Cantos deal with the problem of 
locating Being within a world of unending becoming, the Hymnes take up the human 
manifestation of this problem, namely the question of grounding in some kind of 
permanence all the urgings and displacements of eros, and the cycle of birth, growth, 
decline and death that eros entails. Here we may note in a preliminary way the strange fact 
that this theme is largely absent from the Cantos of Mutabilitie. Strange, because the 
Cantos explicitly advertise their participation in the medieval tradition of poetry 
representing the Goddess Natura (claiming continuity with Chaucer’s Parlement of Foules 
and Alain de Lille De planctu naturae), a tradition in which the law of kind, that is, the 
norms governing human sexuality and reproduction, usually occupy a central position.27 
																																																								
26  Susan Nieman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 7-8: “The problem of evil can be expressed 
in theological or secular terms, but it is fundamentally a problem about the intelligibility 
of the world as a whole. Thus it belongs neither to ethics nor to metaphysics but forms a 
link between the two.” 
27 Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. 
Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953; 2013), 106-127. See also George 
Economou, The Goddess Natura in Medieval Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1972), 53-103; 125-150. Economou’s classic study outlines several roles Natura can 
play, among them: pronuba; procreatix; and vicaria Dei. The Cantos seem exclusively 
occupied with the latter role, the former two are scarcely present in the poem. On 
connections between Chaucer and the Cantos, see Glenn Steinberg, “Chaucer’s Mutability 
in Spenser’s ‘Mutabilitie Cantos,’” Studies in English Literature 46, no. 1 (2006), 27-42; 





Instead, Spenser reserves the ethical dimension of his theodicy for another poem. On this 
basis, I read the Hymnes and the Cantos as being related poetic enterprises: one dealing 
with the anomic or denomizing metaphysical situation of a loss of self-evidence in matters 
concerning macrocosmic phenomena, the other dealing with the ethical “marginal 
situation” of erotic desire, conceived in the poem as a species of Platonic mania (L. furore). 
The Cantos enact an allegorical trial, setting right the Law of Nature, whereas the Hymnes 
describe the successive tests and tribulations required to ascend the ladder of love, in which 
process the Law of Kind—human nature as expressed in human sexuality broadly 
considered—is guided to wisdom under the governance of ideal Love and ideal Beauty.  
 With these introductory remarks about theoretical and historical context in place, 
we can turn our attention to the poems themselves. I will start with the Fowre Hymnes, 
drawing out the theodical structure implicit in the palinodic form of the poems as a whole. 
Special attention will be given to the work’s engagement with the Phaedrus, specifically 
the theory of four forms of divine madness which, I will show, help to explain the sequence 
of the poems. I will then move on the Cantos of Mutabilitie, showing its divergence from 
previous entries in the Natura tradition and bringing to light its responses to the breakdown 
of the Aristotelian consensus, and demonstrating how these features of the poem inflect its 
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2. The Fowre Hymnes: A Platonic Theodicy of Love 
Scholars have long noted that the Fowre Hymnes contain Spenser’s most direct 
expression of Renaissance Neoplatonic philosophy. 28  Although other appearances of 
Neoplatonic ideas in the Spenserian corpus may be attributable to the diffusion of broadly 
Platonic notions in the syncretism of the Renaissance, the Fowre Hymnes make use of 
technical and specialized terms and concepts which indicate familiarity with technical 
Neoplatonic philosophy.29 In this section I will show that the pattern of Spenser’s theodicy 
of love in the Fowre Hymnes borrows from Marsilio Ficino’s commentary to the Phaedrus, 
and put forward some reasons for the borrowing.30 The suggestion of a direct association 
between the two texts will be somewhat controversial: having no record of Spenser’s 
library, we do not know whether he was acquainted with this specific Ficino commentary. 
																																																								
28 See Robert Ellrodt, Neoplatonism in the Poetry of Edmund Spenser (Folcroft: Folcroft 
Press), 1969; Elizabeth Biemann, Plato Baptized: Towards the Interpretation of Spenser’s 
Memetic Fictions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 152-62; Carol Kaske, 
“Neoplatonism in Spenser Once More,” Religion and Literature 32, no. 2 (2000), 162-7; 
Carol Kaske, “Hallmarks of Platonism and the Sons of Agape (Faerie Queene IV.ii-iv), 
Spenser Studies 24 (2009), 15-72; and in the same issue of Spenser Studies Ayesha 
Ramachandran, “Edmund Spenser, Lucretian Neoplatonist: Cosmology in the Fowre 
Hymnes,” 373-401. Biemann’s writes: “More systematically than any other Spenserian 
text, the Fowre Hymnes raise physical, moral, and metaphysical questions concerning love 
and creation, and offer in response, cryptically, the unmanifested ‘paterne’ which supports 
all attempts at hermeneusis” (163). The remark shows that even for scholars who see 
Spenser’s corpus in general as Neoplatonic (thus diverging from Ellrodt), the Hymnes stand 
out as an especially “systematic” exploration of Neoplatonic ideas.  
29 Ellrodt, Neoplatonism, makes this point in order to argue against widespread Ficinian 
Neoplatonism in the rest of the corpus.  
30 The influence upon the Hymnes of Ficino’s commentaries on the Symposium has already 
been noticed by, e.g., Kaske, “Neoplatonism in Spenser Once More,” 166. See also 
Kenneth Borris, Visionary Spenser and the Poetics of Early Modern Platonism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), 83-115. Borris argues for the pervasive influence of the 





Further, one wishes to avoid needlessly complicating an already elaborate poem by seeking 
out abstruse textual connections. 
 Recent scholarship by Valery Rees confirms the “accessibility of Ficinian 
Platonism” for readers in Spenser’s England. The very valuable appendix added to the 
essay “Ficinian Ideas in the Poetry of Edmund Spenser” (2009) shows the high probability 
that both Ficino’s translations of Plato’s texts (the Platonis Opera) as well as Ficino’s own 
Opera Omnia, containing the commentaries on Plato, would have been available to those 
seeking.31 Rees points, for example, to the connection between Spenser and Lancelot 
Andrews—a contemporary of Spenser’s at Pembroke college Cambridge, and a fellow-
student of his at Merchant Taylor’s school. Andrews bequeathed to Pembroke a copy of 
Ficino’s Iamblichus translation, and was “later a leading bishop and chief of the authorized 
translators of the Bible under King James.” Rees concludes that Spenser and Andrews 
likely “shared interest in such Platonic works.”32 Though without records nothing can be 
proven to a certainty, the cumulative data assembled by Rees amply supports her 
conclusions that “it was certainly possible for Spenser to read Plato and to have 
conversations about Ficinian Platonism from his student years onward.” Thus it is well 
within the realm of possibility that the Hymnes are patterned on Phaedrus, and that they 
take into account Ficino’s particular interpretation of that work. 
 To the second point about needless complication, I would reply that Ficino’s 
commentary on and translation of Phaedrus rather elucidates the Hymnes than obfuscates 
them. Although the Hymnes clearly reflect Platonic ideas about Love that could have been 
																																																								
31 Valery Rees, “Ficinian Ideas in the Poetry of Edmund Spenser,” Spenser Studies 24 
(2009), 100-25.  





gotten from the Symposium, for example, it is in the Phaedrus that we find clearly and 
forcefully delineated the fourfold division of love which, I will propose, provides a basis 
for Spenser’s division of his work into four distinct Hymnes. The rest of this section will, 
I hope, confirm the value of the critical decision to compare the two texts. The schematic 
overview reflected in Table 1 will be explored throughout what follows.  
 
Hymn Divinity Fury Cosmogony Remainder 
“An Hymne in 
Honor of Love” 
(HL) 
Cupid Amatory 
Love subdues the 
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The general argument in favor of the comparison is that, for Spenser as well as Ficino, the 
four divine frenzies—prophetic, priestly, poetic, and amatory—are related to each other so 
that any one can be said to be justified—aligned with the Good—by virtue of its place 
within the economy of divine passions, and that any one in the total absence of the others 
is incomplete or misaligned with the Good.33 This economy of divine furies is expressed 
by Spenser in terms of a four-stage ascent through degrees of love, beginning in amatory 
frenzy and ending in the prophetic. 
																																																								
33 See Marsilio Ficino, Commentaries on Plato, Vol. 1: Phaedrus and Ion, ed. and trans. 
Michael J. B. Allen (Florence: I Tatti, 2008), where Ficino declares: “In describing any 






 In suggesting the influence of Ficino’s Phaedrus commentaries on the Fowre 
Hymnes, I am gently pushing back against the editors of the Yale edition of Edmund 
Spenser’s shorter poems. In their headnote to the Hymnes, Bjorvand and Schell suggest 
that “[w]hatever unified vision there is in the poem is more likely to be found in the unity 
of Spenser’s artistic creation than any set of Neoplatonic and/or biblical ideas which have 
been “together linkt” by our eclectic author.”34 I agree with this in principle, and I would 
note that I am not suggesting dogged adherence to the model. Indeed, in the marked hiatus 
between amatory and poetic frenzies on the one hand, and hieratic and prophetic frenzies 
on the other, and in the careful counterpoising of one pair against the other, Spenser is 
charting his own, more dogmatically Protestant, way through the material he draws upon. 
Yet comparison with Phaedrus, and Ficino’s commentaries thereon, helps to make sense 
of why “furies” and “enragements” find distinct expression in each of the hymns, and also 
clarifies, by comparison and contrast, the global architecture of the work, and what to make 
of its palinodic structure. Overall, Spenser’s vision of the relationship between the four 
furies suggests that only the latter two are marked with the seal of Christian truths; Ficino’s 
vision is arguably more homogenizing than this, and quicker to see direct analogies 
between pagan and Christian versions of the priestly and prophetic furies.35 But here I 
anticipate somewhat the arguments that will follow.  
 At the beginning of the mythical hymn in Phaedrus [243E9-256A7] describing the 
soul as a chariot pulled by winged steeds, Socrates distinguishes between four types of 
“frenzy” (Gk. mania; L. furore), or divinely-inspired madness. The whole mythic hymn is 
																																																								
34 Oram ed., Shorter Poems, 683.  





steeped in mystery, and scholars debate its precise interpretation. Ficino’s commentary on 
this part of the text gives the four types of mania a somewhat more systematic treatment 
than what is provided in the dialogue itself. The commentary begins by asking why 
Socrates seems to devalue poetic frenzy in relation to the other kinds: 
Why did Socrates put poetry third in the degrees of frenzy—for he reminded 
us that prophecy was first, the hieratic art second, poetry third, and love 
fourth. It’s because prophecy pertains mainly to knowing, the hieratic art to 
affect and volition (so it succeeds prophecy), but poetry already declines to 
hearing besides. The ancient poets did not compose divine hymns until, 
admonished by the prophets and priests, they had first thought to celebrate 
the gods, to pray to them, to intercede and give thanks.36  
 
This passage shows us the four kinds of frenzy, and gives us something like a ranked order 
of them in terms of priority: the prophetic frenzy is highest, next hieratic (priestly), next 
poetic (in “the third degree”), and lowest amatory. Poetry is ‘lower’ than the other forms 
because it “declines to hearing,” influencing us through the sense of hearing; the amatory 
is in a sense the ‘lowest’ of all because “it is usually excited through sight, which we 
naturally use after hearing.”37 This passage shows the specific hierarchic arrangement of 
the furies which Ficino finds in the Phaedrus, which distinguishes it from other 
articulations in the Platonic corpus where the frenzies are discussed.  
 In the Phaedrus, Socrates also claims that the madness of love is the best form of 
divinely-inspired madness, even though viewed hierarchically it is the “lowest.” How can 
this be? In short, it is because the amatory frenzy, as “lowest,” stands at both the beginning 
and the end of the progression.38 Ficino’s gloss evokes the primacy of love several times. 
																																																								
36 Ficino, Commentaries, 51.  
37 Ficino, Commentaries, 51.  
38 For a visual representation of the kinds of circular economy to be found in Neoplatonic 





We read, for instance, that in order to be “disposed to the amatory frenzy” at all, we must 
already “have been purified to the utmost and carried off by the hieratic, by the Dionysian, 
frenzy.”39 In addition, we have the following:  
This amatory frenzy is more outstanding than the other three both because 
it comes from the best [fit ex optimis]—it is excited, that is, by beauty itself 
and wisdom and goodness, and is filled with our unity—and also because it 
unites us more effectively and firmly with God.40 
 
These observations help to understand why the four distinct furies or manias outlined in 
the Phaedrus are all treated by Spenser under the sign of love.41 There is evidently a sense 
in which love animates the whole vatic movement through the series or sequence of divine 
manias mentioned. The passage also elucidates what is at stake in the consideration of evil 
in matters of eros: it is of course possible to be possessed of something that looks like this 
divinely-inspired madness of love, but not to have been “purified to the utmost.” In such 
cases, apparent love is real evil, and the madness is not divine mania, but rather a 
destructive fit of passion (destructive, because it is not oriented toward the Good). The 
theodicy of love that inhabits the Fowre Hymnes undertakes a kind of trial of love through 
successive crises and discernments, an ordeal taking place in subjective consciousness (in 
the first and fourth Hymnes the speaker’s own, in the second and third a subject addressed 
by the speaker), which undergoes to a sequence of furores about which the poem asks 
																																																								
Biemann stipulates that: “The diagram must be set in motion imaginatively to make any 
sense: perceptions will be adjusted as elements move through any position.”  
39 Ficino, Commentaries, 151. 
40 Ficino, Commentaries, 151.  
41 I should note that Ficino also outlines the four frenzies in commentaries on Symposium 
and Ion. Ficino, Commentaries, 52: “In [commenting on] the Symposium and Ion I arranged 
the four frenzies in the order pertaining to the soul’s restoration; here I have arranged the 
order insofar as it looks to the actual origin of frenzy.” The “origin of frenzy” in the 
amatory, its progression through the prophetic, and the formal possibility—realized in the 





whether they are good or evil. It is this discerning of the four kinds of fury that organizes 
the problem of evil as presented in the Hymnes.42  
 Turning to the Hymnes themselves, we should begin with some words about their 
overall architecture (schematically suggested in Table 1). There are two pairs hymns; their 
successive titles are “An Hymne in Honor of Love,” “An Hymne in Honor of Beautie,” 
“An Hymne of Heavenlie Love,” and “An Hymne of Heavenlie Beautie.” All the poems 
share some similarities of construction. Each poem is written in honor of either a classical 
god or a personage of the Christian deity; each contains an inset cosmogony, a story about 
the creation of the world and the role of love and beauty (worldly or heavenly) play in 
creation; and each hymn ends with a beatific vision, a description of a locus amoenus 
governed by love.43 As noted in the table, each of these blissful endings leaves some latent 
tension unresolved, although in the course of reading the poems this may not be totally 
clear until the whole sequence is understood and reflected upon. These unresolved tensions 
are all dissolved in the final hymn, in a comprehensive vision of divine Sapience. 44 In an 
																																																								
42 Jon Quitslund, Spenser’s Supreme Fiction: Platonic Natural Philosophy and the Faerie 
Queene (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 178: “Prophecy, poetry, and the 
higher form of love all, according to Ficino and other followers of Plato, involve allied 
forms of furor, which is made good rather than destrictive by the flow of corresponding 
spirits in the cosmos and microcosm” (emphasis added).  
43 S. Enc., “Fowre Hymnes.” 
44 Mary Oates, “Fowre Hymnes: Spenser’s Retractations of Paradise,” Spenser Studies 4 
(1984), 148: “Each hymn ends with the hero contemplating an object of worship enshrined 
in a ‘paradise,’ but his first two objects meet with disappointing reverses, containing the 
seeds of their own decay. At the same time, however, each contains elements out of which 
the poet’s ‘high-conceipted spright’ can create new objects that will be more adequate […]. 
Only the last vision, of God with Sapience enshrined in his bosom, is ‘pretended’ as the 
most satisfying experience available to human beings on earth […]. On the way to each 
new image of completion, a series of confusing and demonic parodies of deity is proposed 
and partly left behind, although Spenser is slow to claim that any dragon is ever finally 





introductory epistle to the reader, Spenser crafts a story about the poems, explaining that 
the profane hymns were written in “greener times of youth,” and the heavenly hymns were 
written as a conscious reformation of the earlier texts.45 Spenserians debate the truth of the 
claim; for my purposes what is important is that the story prepares the reader to see the 
deficiencies in each individual part of the overall work, and to understand that the motive 
of the whole work is a proving or testing of love—an attempt to establish the boundaries 
of good and evil with respect to love, to set in proportion a vision of love in bono and in 
malo—via successive crises on progressively ‘higher’ orders of experience.46 In short: the 
dedicatory epistle discloses a (self-)justificatory intent at work in the poem as a whole.47  
 First in the sequence is “An Hymne in Honor of Love.” Written from the 
perspective of the lovelorn youth of Petrarchan convention, it is a song in praise of Cupid. 
The winged god is portrayed as a powerful demiurge, transforming a formless and 
preexistent chaos into order, dividing the four elements and harmonizing them by arranging 
their “contrary dislikes and loved meanes.”48 In the first poem’s cosmological beginning, 
the creation of the world is described in the following terms:  
The earth, the ayre, the water, and the fyre, 
Then gan to raunge them selves in huge array, 
And with contrary forces to conspyre, 
																																																								
45 Oram ed., Shorter Poems, 690.  
46  See Thomas Hyde, The Poetic Theology of Love: Cupid in Renaissance Literature 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1986), 132-142. 
47 Oates, “Retractations,” 143-69 presents an illuminating reading of the poem as a quest 
for individual psychic wholeness. Along the way, Oates gives an account in which ‘evils’ 
are integrated in a way that is clearly theodical. Given the isomorphic relationship between 
microcosm and macrocosm for Spenser, this argument can be transposed into the domain 
of metaphysics.   
48 See S. Enc., “Cupid.” The article acknowledges the theodical problems associated with 
a Cupid who appears sometimes good, and sometimes evil, and doubts the ultimate efficacy 
of the “two Cupids” solution: “Two opposed and irreconcilable gods of love make sense 





Each against other, by all meanes they may 
Threatning their owne confusion and decay: 
Ayre hated earth, and water hated fyre, 
Till Love relented their rebellious yre. (HL 78-84) 
 
Note the absence of creation ex nihilo in the passage. Being a version of the Ovidian 
creation myth, the poem presents a preexisting chaos of confused elements at war with one 
another. The elemental strife of the first matter brought forth nothing but “confusion and 
decay,” until Cupid “relented” the belligerent stasis of all-pervading conflict. Yet Love 
does not, in this version of the story, bring all things into concord by mutually agreed-upon 
peace; rather, the god’s intervention is presented as being heavy handed and tyrannical: 
He [Cupid] then them [the elements] tooke, and tempering goodly well 
Their contrary dislikes and loved meanes, 
Did place them all in order, and compell 
To keepe them selves within their sundrie raines, 
Together linkt with Adamantine chaines; 
Yet so, as that in every living wight 
They mixe themselves, and shew their kindly might. (HL 85-92) 
 
Love here captivates and compels the elements, setting the world to right by proscribing 
fixed bounds to the elements. The rhyme of “raines” and “chaines” evokes submission, 
servitude, the virtual enslavement of the elements by Love. (This chimes with the attitude 
of the Petrarchan conceit on which the hymn draws. This theme, as the editors of the Yale 
edition point out, views “Cupid as a cruel tyrant and the lover as his slave.”)49 The phrase 
“kindly might” deserves special attention, as it reflects the dual nature of Love as blending 
care and cruelty. The word “kindly” evokes both the now good-natured tendencies of the 
elements Love has subdued, whereas “might” suggests their potential for violent suasion—
a potential borne out by the suffering of the lovelorn youth who is the speaker of the poem. 
																																																								





“Kind” also evokes nature itself—the “law of kind” and “law of nature” being used 
somewhat interchangeably in the early modern period. In this context the play on “kind” 
means that while the “kindly might” may indicate affability or goodness, it can also just 
mean the power proper to the elements (the “kinds”). The ambiguity makes us wonder how 
far the order imposed on the elements by Love can be said to be good. Has the imposition 
of the law of kind, keeping elements within their “sundrie raines” and binding them all 
together in the great chain of being made the world good? Or has it only set a still 
fundamentally bad world into temporary good order by the imposition of force? Such 
questions, concerning the origin and extent of evil in the creation of the world, the etiology 
of evil relative to the good intentions of a demiurge, have a clear theodical bearing. The 
answers to these questions remain unresolved here, and it is the business of the later hymns 
to take them up again. 
Throughout the poem, in the exclamations of suffering spoken by the lovelorn 
poetic subject, we see that to live under the sway of love is to endure suffering that is only 
given meaning—is only justified—upon attainment of the object of erotic desire.50 Before 
that time, love is a “tyrant,” who “doest laugh and scorne” at the “complaints” of his 
“thrals,” “making their paine [his] play” (HL 134-135). Importantly, the speaker exclaims 
that Love “doest triumph in their [his servants’] decay,” suggesting that the good order 
Love imposed in his cosmogony—when he “relented” their war, stopping their “corruption 
and decay”—was at best incomplete. The reappearance of “decay” suggests that the war of 
																																																								
50  This account tallies with Gordon Teskey, Allegory and Violence (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 5: “Meaning exerts force by driving a wedge into some part of 






elements reemerges at higher levels in the warring passions.51 Surveying Cupid’s tyranny, 
the speaker complains against the god of Love.  
But if thou be indeede, as men the call, 
The world’s great Parent, the most kind preserver 
Of living wights, the soveraine Lord of all, 
How falles it then, that with thy furious fervour,  
Thou doest afflict as well the not deserver, 
As him that doeth thy lovely heasts despize, 
And on thy subjects most doest tyrannize? (HL 155-61) 
 
This stanza accords with the poem’s theme of Love’s tyranny, and raises it to its highest 
pitch. In this stanza the hymn is preparing the way for a parallel to Christ’s suffering, which 
we will see when we come to in the “Hymn of Heavenly Love.” Most important to note 
here is that the high point of the lovers’ complaint comes when he sees the essentially 
unjust character of Love’s tyranny. The pangs of love are undeserved, making them 
unbearable. In Berger’s terms, the speaker is undergoing a marginalizing experience not 
oriented by a compensating nomos or order. In the terms of the Renaissance theodicy of 
Cupid and the amatory frenzy, we are given to wonder whether the power of love over the 
human soul has its origins in the divine or the diabolical.  
 The poem ends with a partial theodicy, meant to assign meaning to the seeming 
cruelties of Cupid’s governance of the cosmos, while conspicuously leaving behind some 
unresolved tensions. 52  It is a theodicy of the soul-making type, in which evils and 
																																																								
51  Hyde, The Poetic Theology of Love, 109, observes that “the fundamental force of 
Empedoclean physics” lies beneath the myth of Cupid’s subduing the elements in many 
interpretations. That seems to be Spenser’s view here, and the macrocosmic problems 
emerge again in the microcosm.  
52 Hyde, Poetic Theology of Love, 98-110, makes clear that theodicy is a central issue in 
the mythographic and philosophical works on Cupid in the Renaissance. The trattatisti—
writers of treatises on love like Leone Ebreo and Castiglione—set out to justify eros and 
show Cupid to be a good god. Natale Conti swerves from this tradition, according to Hyde: 





afflictions are justified with reference to the ongoing growth of the spiritual seeker. The 
afflictions of the “not deserver,” we are told, teach patience and fidelity. Suffering in love 
produces virtue, because in order to escape from the fits of passion, the lover is lifted up to 
the contemplation of beauty. In this way, the true lover is ultimately reformed by the 
prolonged experience of unrequited love. As importantly, this training in virtue is, 
according to the poem’s speaking subject, not without its compensations: “Through paines 
of Purgatorie,” the blind God leads those devoted to him eventually “unto […] blisse, and 
heavens glory,” a heaven of guiltless amatory play (HL 278-9). Here desire is ennobled 
and freed from all compulsion, “a Paradize / Of all delight” (280-1) in which lovers “play 
/ Their hurtlesse Sports, without rebuke or blame” (287-8). Yet these compensations are, 
for now, all in the mind of the speaker, and remain at the level of unrealized and ultimately 
misguided hope, since they are the products of the very passion that has caused the 
suffering in the first place. The penultimate stanza reinforces the distance between the poet 
and this longed-for garden of delight. In it, the “wished scope” of desire remains out of 
reach (HL 296). The vision of a lovers’ paradise provides hope but no comfort, unable 
presently to transform the poet’s senseless “woe” into meaningful “penance” (300). Thus 
the first hymn ends with the poet-speaker still in a crisis of meaningless suffering.53 Its 
																																																								
himself embodies the problem of theodicy” (107). Hyde suggests that Spenser shares 
Conti’s view of Cupid, “except in the second pair of the Fowre Hymnes” (100). This is a 
big “except,” since it is in the Hymnes that the theodicy of love is treated with most 
seriousness and in the context of the Christian divinity. Hyde discusses the Hymnes in detail 
at 132-42, stressing the essential unity of the sequence despite the recantations in the 
heavenly hymns and in the dedicatory epistle.  
53 On the experience of one’s own suffering and the suffering of others in Spenser, and the 
theology of suffering in the Reformation, see Joseph Campana, The Pain of Reformation: 
Spenser, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Masculinity (New York: Fordham University 





theodicy remains at the level of wished-for compensations in the form of erotic union. The 
rest is deferred.  
The speaker also defers taking up the full mantle of the vates or divine poet, 
promising that when the “happie port” of satisfied desire would be secured, “Then would 
I sing of thine immortal praise / An heavenly Hymne, such as the Angels sing […] Till 
then, dred Lord, vouchsafe to take of me / This simple song, thus fram’d in praise of thee” 
(HL 301-7). At the conclusion of the first hymn we remain at the level of the amatory fury; 
the poetic frenzy has not yet been reached.  
 So when “An Hymne in Honor of Beautie” begins with the question: “Ah whither, 
Love, wilt thou now carrie me? / What wontlesse fury dost thou now inspire / Into my 
feeble breast, to full of thee?” we may propose a definite answer. It is the poetic fury that 
is reached in this hymn, as the poem’s concluding lines confirm. In those lines, the poet 
looks forward to the reign of Venus coming in a promised triumph: 
Then Iö triumph, ô great beauties Queene, 
Advance the banner of thy conquest hie, 
That all this world, the which thy vassals beene, 
May draw to thee, and with dew fealtie,  
Adore the powre of thy great Majestie,  
Singing this Hymne in honor of thy name, 
Compyld by me, which thy poore liegeman am. (HB 267-73) 
 
Though not yet able to sing the hymn of triumph, the speaker here has “compyld” it in 
advance of time, being more fully and confidently inspired than he was in the midst of the 
amatory frenzy. Throughout this hymn the speaker takes a poetic approach to beauty, using 
the hymn as a way of inspiring virtue in its audience (especially the two “noble ladies” to 
whom the sequence of hymns is dedicated, whom it addresses more or less directly). The 





in The Faerie Queene, described in the letter to Raleigh, “to fashion a gentleman or noble 
person in vertuous and gentle discipline.”54 We may note in passing that this stanza also 
shows the differences between Cupid’s governance of the world and Venus’s. The goddess 
is still defined by “powre,” but her reign is adored rather than endured, as seemed to be the 
case with Cupid’s enslavement of the elements above. 
 The cosmology in this poem reads as a reflection of Platonic themes, specifically 
the account in the Timaeus, which describes the Demiurge (Spenser’s “workmaister”) 
shaping a preexisting matter in an act of cosmic mimesis intended to copy off a pattern of 
ideal beauty into the order of things. In this account, the Demiurge’s activity is offset by 
the resistance of ananke or necessity, and Spenser includes a hint of this in his cosmogony 
as well: 
What time this world’s great workmaister did cast 
To make al things, such as we now behold, 
It seems that he before his eyes had plast 
A goodly Paterne, to whose perfect mould 
He fashiond them as comely as he could 
That now so faire and seemely they appeare, 
As nought may be amended any wheare.  (HB 29-35). 
 
The key phrase for us in what follows is “as comely as he could.” This suggests a certain 
amount of distance between this cosmogony and the Christian account, which will appear 
in the “Hymne of Heavenly Love,” since it implies a possible limit to the creator’s 
potency.55 This crucial, subtle qualification of Venus’s power will lead us to question 
																																																								
54 For a bravura analysis of the moral function of the poet in Spenser viewed from the 
perspective of Platonism, see Quitslund, Spenser’s Supreme Fiction, 78-102.  
55 See Enid Welsford, Fowre Hymnes and Epithalamion: A Study of Spenser’s Doctrine of 
Love (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 7: “When Spenser opened the Timaeus or some 
commentary on it, he found there an account of the origin of the universe very different 
from that given in the first chapter of the Bible […] where evil results not from the defects 





precisely whether the things of the created world ought not indeed “be amended any 
wheare.” That is, it will raise the problem of theodicy anew.  
Whereas the theodical problem in the last hymn was partly ontological (having to 
do with the “decay” of the lover and the beloved, a symptom of the initial nature of Cupid’s 
ordering of things) and partly ethical (having to do with the speaker’s response to 
apparently meaningless suffering and the derangement of the amatory frenzy), the 
theodical issue this hymn takes in hand is moral. When the world is viewed as being 
governed by the “goodly Paterne” of Beauty, we expect that the beauty of beings and their 
goodness will coincide. The hymn expresses this certitude as follows:  
Therefore where ever that thou doest behold 
A comely corpse, with beautie faire endewed, 
Know this for certaine, that the same doth hold 
A beauteous soule, with faire conditions thewed, 
Fit to receive the seede of virtue strewed. (HB 134-8) 
 
The speaker emphasizes the certainty and universality of the phenomenon he describes. 
And yet there are two related problems that arise, when experience of the world fails to 
conform with an expectation of consonance between the beautiful and the good: 
Yet oft it falles, that many a gentle mynd 
Dwels in deformed tabernacle drownd, 
Either by chaunce, against the course of kynd,  
Or through unaptnesse in the substance fownd, 
Which it assumed of some stubborne grownd, 
That will not yield unto her formes direction 




been given the power of choice. […] [T]he image [Plato] employs is that of a craftsman, 
who shapes his not wholly satisfactory material into as perfect a likeness as possible of a 
model which exists in his mind or before his eyes. So the divine Demiurge […] shapes 
what would otherwise be mere chaos into as close a likeness as possible of that ‘perfect 
living creature’ who exists eternally as a mental Form discernible by the Divine Reason. 





And oft it falles (ay me the more to rew) 
That goodly beautie, albe heavenly borne, 
Is foule abusd, and that celestiall hew, 
Which doth the world with her delight adorne, 
Made but the bait of sinne, and sinners scorne; 
Whilest every one doth seeke and sew to have it, 
But every one doth seeke, but to deprave it. (HB 141-54) 
 
Note here the reappearance of the word “falles,” which was used in the “Hymne in Honor 
of Love” at the same crucial point, the point at which the problem of evil emerges within 
the structural limits set by hymn’s cosmic vision (“But if thou be indeede, as men thee call, 
/ The world’s great Parent, the most kind preserver / […] How falles it then, that with thy 
furious fervour, / Thou doest afflict as well the not deserver” (HL 155-61)). The harkening 
back to the previous hymn indicates that we are once again witnessing the shortcomings of 
HB’s partial vision of good order, its theodical shortcomings.  
The theodical problems sketched out in “An Hymne in Honor of Beauty” are 
essentially a matter of unjust distribution: beauty is often granted to those who are inwardly 
corrupt; conversely, the virtuous, possessed of “a gentle mynd,” are often not given an 
outward shape that reflects this inner worth.56 Wondering about the reasons for this unjust 
distribution provoke reflection on the cosmology presented above, since the “unaptnesse 
in the substance,” or material body, which in turn is “assumed of some stubborne grownd” 
namely the material substrate of all creation, show that there was after all a limit to the 
																																																								
56 This emphasis on distribution pervades the Neoplatonic philosophy of how souls come 
into bodies, and how social order depends upon this metaphysical / planetary distributional 
nomos. See Welsford, Fowre Hymnes, 155-8n. Welsford quotes Pico to the effect that the 
“qualities of capacities” are distributed this way: “God first contains the capacity for these 
gifts in Himself. Then to the seven gods who move the seven planets and whom we call 
Angels, He distributes the power of these gifts so that each of the gods takes one in 
preference to the other.” Later in the same note, Welsford also cites Ficino, De Amore, a 
passage praising love because “he leads us back to heaven and there he arranges us in our 





demiurgic power of creation. The situation of outwardly ugly beings inwardly good is only 
an apparent problem, according to the poem, since the soul, the source of beauty, still 
maintains the unity of the beautiful and the good. The material body alone, in these cases, 
is froward and recalcitrant. This suggests a problem for belief in an omnipotent creator, but 
in this hymn celebrating the “workmaister,” omnipotence is not really at issue, since the 
world is admittedly only patterned “as comely as he could” make it. So this part of the 
theodicy, which may trouble a reader attuned to expect a Christian account of creation, is 
deferred until the pair of “heavenly” hymns.  
 The second problem, of beautiful people whose souls are deformed, presents a more 
serious challenge. But the hymn shifts the burden of the justification away from the creator 
and toward the creature; that is, it converts what might appear to be an ontological problem 
of evil into a moral problem:  
Yet nathemore is that faire beauties blame, 
But theirs that do abuse it unto ill: 
Nothing so good, but that through guilty shame 
May be corrupt, and wrested unto will. 
Natheless the soule is faire and beauteous still, 
How ever fleshes fault it filthy make: 
For things immortall no corruption take. (HB 155-61) 
 
The “blame” for the apparent evil in the case of deceptive beauty lands squarely on the 
beautiful deceivers themselves. The poet speaker insists that no matter how far gone in vice 
a person is, the soul remains patterned after beauty: its immortality ensures its resistance 
to corruption. Here again, a reader expecting a theodicy in keeping with dogmatic 
Christianity may be surprised, since the Christian vision of the world is filled with beings 





cosmology of HHL). Yet within the bounds of this cosmic vision, the conversion of the 
ontological problem of evil into a moral problem remains consistent. 
 “An Hymne of Heavenly Love” begins with a palinode retracting the previous two 
hymns’ subject matter and approach. In it the speaker regrets his previous “lewd layes […] 
/ In praise of that mad fit, which fooles call love” (HHL 8-9). Unlike “An Hymne in Honor 
of Beautie,” then, it does not begin by declaring its movement from one of the four divine 
frenzies (mentioned in the Phaedrus and commented on by Ficino) to another. Indeed, it 
seems to reject the notion of divine mania altogether. The priestly or hieratic intentions of 
this hymn are clear however, as the speaker sets out a form of Christian doctrine, and 
exhorts his reader to the imitatio Christi with priestly injunctions (“With all thy hart, with 
all thy soule and mind, / Thou must him love […] / All other loves, with which the world 
doth blind / Weake fancies […] / Thou must renounce” (HHL 660-4)). But is ascribing this 
to priestly frenzy, of the kind outlined in Ficino’s Phaedrus commentary, warranted? The 
final stanza suggests that it is. Once the reader is moved to true love of Christ, 
Then shall thy ravisht soule inspired bee 
With heavenly thoughts, farre above humane skill, 
And thy bright radiant eyes shall plainly see 
Th’Idee of his pure glorie present still, 
Before thy face, that all thy spirits fill 
With sweete enragement of celestiall love, 
Kindled through sight of those faire things above. (HHL 281-7).  
 
The “sweet enragement of celestiall love” guaranteed at the close of the hymn secures the 
connection to the fourfold divine manias I have been charting.57 Structurally, holding off 
the mention of “enragement” until the poem’s end beguiles the reader, who begins by 
taking in a forceful statement about the hiatus between the two sets of hymns, and ends up 
																																																								





seeing here a very deliberate echo. Another structurally important feature arises from the 
fact that this mania is promised to someone else, not undergone by the hieratic speaker 
himself. The poem’s speaking subject here is not himself undergoing the motion of the 
fury, but exhorts as one giving advice to another: he acts as priest overseeing an initiation 
into the divine furore of the love of Christ. This mirrors the poetic stance of “An Hymne 
in Honor of Beautie” (second in the sequence of four) in which the (masculine) poet 
moralizes about Love to his (feminine) audience. In the Hymnes’ final part, though, the 
“Hymne of Heavenly Beautie,” the speaker will return to the position of the one “[r]apt 
with the rage of mine owne ravist thought,” when he comes to the contemplation of divinity 
in the prophetic frenzy. Here then we have a clever inversion: in the first two hymns, the 
speaker moves from the one undergoing the frenzy to the one dispensing advice about it; 
in the second pair of hymns, the order is reversed, as the priestly speaker enjoining love is 
lifted at last to the heights of divinely inspired mania and takes up the mantle of the prophet 
as one directly experiencing a mystically infused vision.58 
 At the end of “An Hymne in Honor of Beautie,” we saw that there were several 
theodical problems left unresolved. First, there was the ontological problem of matter’s 
recalcitrance, suggesting a limit to the ability of the world’s creator to order things 
according to his will. This poses a problem insofar as the creator of the world is considered 
omnipotent. Second, there was the moral problem of outwardly beautiful creatures who act 
in ugly ways. This was explained away in HB, the explanation rested on the fact that the 
soul, being immortal, can in no way be corrupted, and such an account seems not to 
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comprehend fallenness or the propensity to sin. Finally, there remained the problem of 
compulsion, which ultimately re-raises the issue of suffering undergone while under purely 
arbitrary or illegitimate authority. Already present in “An Hymne in Honor of Love,” this 
problem returns at the end of the second hymn. I mentioned above that the poet-speaker of 
the second hymn has “compyld” a poem in honor of Venus. In return for that, he asks 
compensation from Venus: 
In lieu whereof graunt, ô great Soveraine, 
That she whose conquering beautie doth captive 
My trembling hart in her eternall chaine, 
One drop of grace at length will to me give, 
That I her bounded thrall by her may live, 
And this same life, which first fro me she reaved, 
May owe to her, of whom I it receaved. (HB 274-80) 
 
Throughout the first two hymns, then, the language of compulsion and bondage returns; 
though softened in the second poem by the adoration of Venusian beauty, it remains 
present. Ultimately the situation of the speaker in both poems makes no room for freedom, 
for a willing and conscious giving-over of all compulsive desire. This is the problem with 
all Neoplatonic manias: they profoundly alienate one from oneself; seen in one way, 
squaring freedom with the account of divinely inspired furors is the chief theodical task of 
the Fowre Hymnes. In the orthodox account of creation and of Christ’s love that fills “An 
Hymne of Heavenly Love,” Spenser sets out to rectify all three of these theodical 
remainders, and in that way the poem will attempt to demonstrate the advantages Christian 
ways of reckoning with the problem of evil, as manifested in the anomic experience of 
amatory, poetic, priestly and prophetic furies, have over their pagan (Platonic and 





 “An Hymne of Heavenly Love” solves the problem of compulsion—of suffering 
under illegitimate authority—by setting up, in place of the authority of Venus, the perfectly 
just authority of Christ. This authority is justified, and in turn justifies the suffering of those 
serving under it, not because of arbitrary power (as with Cupid) or because of affective 
compulsion (as with Venus), but because of shared suffering, the ability of the god-man to 
speak from within the experience of human pain. Whereas Cupid enthralls the lover and 
forces him to suffer while the aloof god takes delight in the proceedings, Christ suffers the 
utmost torment so as to spare those who serve him from the same. The hymn exhorts its 
readers to contemplate these aspects of the incarnate divinity: 
Beginne from first, where he encradled was 
In simple cratch, wrapt in a wad of hay, 
Betweene the toylefull Oxe and humble Asse, 
And in what rags, and in how base aray, 
The glory of our heavenly riches lay, 
When him the silly Shepheardes came to see, 
Whom greatest Princes sought on lowest knee. 
 
From thence reade on the storie of his life, 
His humble carriage, his unfaulty wayes, 
His cancred foes, his fights, his toyle, his strife, 
His paines, his povertie, his sharp assayes, 
Through which he past his miserable dayes, 
Offending none, and doing good to all, 
Yet being malist both of great and small. (HHL 225-38) 
 
A stanza on the Passion follows, securing the idea that in this poem it is Christ who takes 
on the role of the “not deserver” claimed in the “Hymne in Honor of Love” by the lovelorn 
youth suffering under Cupid. The meditation on Christ crucified leads, in the hymn, to the 
idea that human subjects do not suffer too much, but rather not enough:  
Then let thy flinty hart that feeles no paine, 
Empierced be with pitifull remorse, 
And let thy bowels bleede in every vaine,  





So torne and mangled with malicious forse, 
And let thy soule, whose sins his sorrows wrought, 
Melt into teares, and grone in grieved thought. (HHL 246-52) 
 
The masochistic dimension of Christian theodicy comes here to the forefront, as meditation 
on the cross leads to an affective piety of tears and groans, not for one’s own suffering, but 
for the suffering one’s sin has wrought on the divine body. At the end of the “Hymne in 
Honor of Love,” the lovelorn speaker says that if he was to achieve erotic union with the 
object of desire, “Then would I thinke these paines no paines at all, / And all my woes to 
be but penance small.” In this hymn, the wished-for unifying event has already occurred, 
although it must be revived by recollection and meditation, so that meaningful penance 
may take the place of mere arbitrary woe.  
 So much for the theodical remainder of suffering / compulsion. The other two 
theodical problems left outstanding by the first pair of hymns—that of mismatched souls 
and bodies, and the recalcitrance of matter—are solved by the creation myth inset in this 
hymn. Spenser’s version follows the account in the book of Genesis for the most part, 
though he includes some language about the emanative origins of the Trinity which appear 
to be out of step with Christian orthodoxy, and to veer into Neoplatonic ideas.59 His account 
includes the rebellion of the angels, led by Lucifer, and the subsequent creation of mankind. 
The story of war in heaven is brought to bear on the problem of matter’s recalcitrance, as 
the speaker, having recounted the tale, puts the question: “How then can sinfull flesh it 
																																																								
59 But see Welsford ed., Fowre Hymnes, 50: “It has been maintained that the account of 
the creation is Platonic rather than Christian because it suggests, heretically, that the Son 
and the Holy Spirit and the Cosmos all emanate from the Primal Deity. I do not think that 
Spenser’s words need be construed in this way; but, in any case, a poet can hardly be 
expected to speak with the precision of a trained theologian, and our knowledge of Spenser 
should be sufficient to assure us that any lapse from orthodoxy was quite inadvertent and 





selfe assure, / Sith purest Angels fell to be impure?” The answer in the poem, as in the 
biblical story it follows, is of course: it cannot. The fall of mankind is treated in a general 
way, with no mention given to Adam and Eve, or of Satan acting as tempter. Rather, the 
fall is seen as consequent in an indefinite way on the fall of the angels, and it is immediately 
followed in the poem by Christ’s redeeming intention: 
Such he [mankind] him [God] made, that he resemble might 
Himselfe, as mortall thing immortall could; 
Him to be Lord of every living wight, 
He made by love out of his owne like mould, 
In whom he might his mightie selfe behould: 
For love doth love the thing belov’d to see, 
That like it selfe in lovely shape may bee. 
 
But man forgetfull of his makers grace, 
No lesse then Angels, whom he did ensew, 
Fell from the hope of promist heavenly place, 
Into the mouth of death to sinners dew, 
And all his off-spring into thraldome threw: 
Where they for ever should in bonds remaine, 
Of never dead, yet ever living paine 
 
Till that great Lord of Love, which him at first 
Made of mere love, and after liked well, 
Seeing him lie like creature long accurst, 
In that deepe horror of despeyered hell, 
Him wretch in doole would let no longer dwell, 
But cast out of that bondage to redeeme, 
And pay the price, all were his debt extreme. (HHL 113-33) 
 
The generality of this story seems to turn the Biblical creation account into spiritual reality. 
Though the unique creation of the heavens and subsequent fall occurred but once in the 
cosmic pattern of divine history, the pattern of the event repeats itself within the psyches 
of individuals, in keeping with the isometric relationship of macrocosm to microcosm. The 
stanzas on Biblical cosmogony are richly folded into the hymns that have come before: 





with Cupid and Venus), but as a result of original sin, passed down generationally. Cupid’s 
act of creation began with his enthralling and enchaining the elements; here the creation 
begins in freedom, and only ends with thralldom as a perversion of the created order. Note 
also the reappearance of the word “could,” which I highlighted in the cosmogony of HB. 
In subtle contrast to that hymn, here the limitation of the creature is not due to the 
limitations of the creator, but those of the creatureliness of the creature himself. The 
problem is not the stubbornness of matter, but has something to do with the innate contrast 
between “mortall” and “immortall” being. The word “mortall” here needs to be probed, 
because it is clear from the following stanza that the fall of the unnamed primogenitor 
“threw” his posterity “[i]nto the mouth of death to sinners dew.” “Mortall” here must not, 
then, mean oriented toward that kind of death, since at the creation the horizon of death 
due to sin was not drawn around the life of humankind. In my reading, “mortall” here (and 
as we will see later, in the Cantos) means something like: created in such a way that the 
will and the body may become misaligned. Support for this lies in the line about “the hope 
of promist heavenly place,” which suggests that human beings would pass from the 
embodied state of existence into a heavenly state without the kind of “death to sinners dew” 
which came into the world at the fall. Moments like this make a psychological 
interpretation of the poem especially attractive, since the mortality of any individual 
precedes the individual’s fall into sin.60 Another way of looking at the same phenomenon 
theologically is that this hymn leaves the question of what original sin meant in a state of 
suspension; this is one reason why the theodical remainder at the end of the hymn has to 
do with the nature, origin, and etiology of sin itself. Finally the line brings to mind Milton’s 
																																																								





Adam and Eve, who in Paradise Lost look forward to a similar transformation or evolution 
of their state. The limitation of human beings’ resemblance to the divine, and their 
“mortall” being at their creation, is both temporary and probationary, a limit to be 
overcome through obedience. Unlike the limitation implied by “could” in “An Hymne in 
Honor of Beautie,” it is not a permanent state of things suggesting lack of skill in the 
world’s “workmaister,” but rather an intentional design feature. Material embodiment and 
all its problems, including the misalignment of divine spirit with the “base, vile” stuff of 
physical creation and the metaphysical constraint of being time-bound, having a beginning 
and an end, are not the cause or the result of imperfection. The hymn asserts that material 
embodiment is fully intentional, perfectly realized, and deliberate. In furtherance of this 
view, the fact that human beings “ensew” (i.e., follow) the angels into the rebellion 
suggests that materiality or immateriality is of no account when asking whether one is 
prone to fall. 
Crucially and curiously, the freedom of the will before the fall does not enter into 
Spenser’s account. The focus here is not so much upon the cause of the fall as on its 
consequences: the subjugation of humanity by death, and its (in the hymn, practically 
immediate) liberation through Christ’s sacrifice. The theodical framework here is 
compensatory rather than explanatory, so that explanation of the fall is not felt to be an 
imperative with respect to the origin of evil. (Here the distance between Spenser and Milton 
is keenly felt). The appearance of evil is described, it is lamented, and it is given its place 
within the cosmic pageant of redemptive history. But—unlike Paradise Lost—we find no 
attempts to explain the relationship between human freedom of will and divine 





The compensatory promise is fully made good in the beatific vision of “An Hymne 
of Heavenly Beautie,” the final hymn of the sequence. I have already noted how this hymn 
maps onto the background schema of the four divine furies, being an exploration of the 
prophetic fury, that species of mania that brings direct communication with the godhead. 
The theodical remainder left over from the previous hymn is fallenness or sin itself; and 
the previous hymn prepares for a final compensation for sin, rather than a satisfactory 
explanation of it. The vision of divine beauty compensates for the ugliness of sin in this 
hymn, which sweeps the reader along through contemplation of the earth, up through the 
heavens, to the empyreal heavens bedecked with angels and archangels, and finally to the 
mysterious heart of the hymn: its vision of Sapience, God’s “owne Beloved,” a veiled 
female figure seated in the “bosome” of divinity. The ascent from lowest to highest, 
originating (as Elizabeth Biemann notes) at the poem’s twenty-second line (“Beginning 
then below”) is essential to the theodical motive of this hymn, since it secures the 
connection between the absolute beauty of heavenly things and the earth.61 Yet at the same 
time, the affective movement of the hymn’s speaker manifests as a revaluation of all values, 
in which all worldly good seems vile in comparison to the true goodness beheld in this 
moment of rapture.  
Also like the Cantos of Mutabilitie, to which I will presently turn, the ultimate 
desire is not so much for satisfaction of the theodical demand as for rest and the cessation 
of all desire, including the desire to probe the mystery of iniquity.62 Rest is the last word of 
																																																								
61 S. Enc., “Fowre Hymnes.”  
62 Perhaps in the Fowre Hymnes the desire for rest is directly related to the succession of 
vatic manias which animate it. On the kinds of thinking in the Hymnes, see Jon Quitslund, 





the hymn, and the last word of the sequence, and markedly resembles the “Sabbaoth’s 
sight” wished for at the end of the Cantos.63 Working toward this desired end, we read of 
the blessed visionaries, overwhelmed with the radiant vision of Sapience, that: 
[…] they see such admirable things, 
As carries them into an extasy, 
And heare such heavenly notes, and carolings 
Of Gods high praise, that filles the brasen sky, 
And feele such joy and pleasure inwardly, 
That maketh them all worldly cares forget, 
And onely thinke on that before them set 
 
Ne from thenceforth doth any fleshly sense, 
Or idle thought of earthly things remains, 
But all that earst seemd sweet, seems now offense, 
And all that pleased earst, now seems to paine. 
Their joy, their comfort, their desire, their gaine, 
Is fixed all on that which now they see, 




So full their eyes are of that glorious sight, 
And senses fraught with such satietie, 
That in nought else on earth they can delight, 
But in th’aspect of that felicitie, 
Which they have written in their inward ey; 
On which they feed, and in their fastened mynd 
All happie joy and full contentment fynd. (HHB 260-287) 
 
The vision of Sapience brings with it a radical uncertainty about the goodness of the goods 
previously thought of as compensations, as all compensation is brought together into pure 
																																																								
Quitslund reads the end of the Hymnes and the Cantos less in terms of sabbatarian rest, and 
more in terms of an active renunciation.  
63 Biemann, Plato Baptized, 162: “Heavenly Beautie figures forth in universal rather than 
personal terms the vision invoked in the ‘sabbaoth’ prayer. […] In the overall structures, 
then, both of Fowre Hymnes and of the Spenserian canon as a whole, we find a sabbatarian 
vision in a final hymn. Both hymn and Cantos play the mind retrospectively over what has 
gone before, and point in contemplative wisdom beyond the poetic language that has served 





unity. This means an end to desire itself, as no earthly thing at all can offer delight. Only 
that singular source of beauty which is “written in” the “inward ey” of the contemplative 
seer can any longer be seen as good; the effect of this is to “fasten” the “mynd” upon the 
single object.64 In the final stanza of the poem, the speaker admonishes himself: 
And looke at last up to that soveraine light, 
From whose pure beams al perfect beauty springs, 
That kindleth love in every godly spright, 
Even the love of God, which loathing brings 
Of this vile world, and these gay seeming things; 
With whose sweete pleasures being so possest, 
Thy straying thoughts henceforth for ever rest. (HHB 295-301) 
 
I would reiterate the importance of this last word, which signifies the cessation of all desire 
and all struggle, even the struggle for (poetic) expression of truth, or the desire to 
understand goodness, or justify evil. In this state the desire for theodical satisfaction also 
fades away, as “worldly cares” are not so much made meaningful, but forgotten entirely by 
being exposed to the source of all meaning itself. In the pastoral/priestly theodicy 
occupying HHL, as we saw, suffering still required orientation, which it got by being 
aligned with the imitatio Christi. Yet here this need is no longer apparent, as there is no 
question of the relationship between good and evil as they appear within the world: even 
the goods of the world are in fact seen to be evils relative to the ultimate source of Good in 
divine Sapience.  
 What is this Sapience? Scholars have pointed to Cabbalistic influences, and have 
also noted the invocation of Pseudo-Dionysian notions in the poem as a whole. Others have 
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shied away from what they see as esoteric or out-of-the-way sources, in an effort to make 
a case for an orthodox Elizabethan, perhaps even Puritan, spirituality in Spenser’s work as 
a whole. 65  An equally direct, though somewhat less orthodox, source for Spenser’s 
Sapience is the scriptural Wisdom of Solomon, which was included among the apocryphal 
books of the 1560 version of the Geneva Bible. From this source, we learn that Sapience, 
or Wisdom, is not a piece of understanding among others, but includes all possible 
knowledge within it, including “the course of the yere, the situacion of the starres, The 
nature of liuing things, and the furiousnes beasts, the power of ye windes, and the 
imaginacions of men […] And all things bothe secret and knowen.”66 Sapience stands in 
relation to knowledge as Dame Nature stands to Mutabilitie in the Cantos: as a stable, 
unified, permanent original source and end. Not even the light of god, the very source of 
divine illumination itself, can be compared with this Sapience: For night cometh upon it 
[the light], but wickedness can not ouercome wisdome.” This verse situates wisdom—
Spenser’s Sapience—beyond the chiaroscuro of light and darkness, beyond the conflict 
between good and evil in the world. The “Hymne of Heavenly Beautie” does much the 
																																																								
65  The notion that Sapience represents Christ as Logos is proposed in Ellrodt, 
Neoplatonism, 178-192, and supported by Lewis, English Literature, 367ff, as well as 
Merritt Hughes, “Milton and the Symbol of Light,” Studies in English Literature 4, no. 1 
(1964), 14-18. Although Welsford, Fowre Hymnes, follows Ellrodt in many respects, she 
concludes: “In spite of Ellrodt’s ingenious arguments, I find it […] impossible to identify 
Sapience with Logos” (54). Instead, “Sapience is, there fore [sic], a personification of a 
Divine attribute, but an attribute particularly associated with the Second Person of the 
Trinity, and an attribute that tends to lose its distinctness for us, as we catch a partial 
transient glimpse of the beautiful and mysteriously rich simplicity of God” (56). For a 
contrasting view, and one that takes account of the wide difference of approaches to the 
question of Sapience, see Jon Quitslund, “Spenser’s Image of Sapience,” Studies in the 
Renaissance 16 (1969), 181-4.  





same, and suggests, in its description of an ascent “[b]eginning here below,” that access to 
such a place of rest beyond the problem of evil is attainable by means of contemplation. 
 Finally, both Sapience and Dame Nature act in a lawgiving capacity. As Edith 
Welsford has noted, the vision of sapience bears a striking resemblance to the First Eternal 
Law described in Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1594). “Hooker’s fundamental 
premise is that law is essentially not a sovereign decree but a rule made by which actions 
are framed so that a desired end may be achieved; that God Himself is not an Arbitrary 
Will; His Will and His Reason work together and the first Eternal Law is ‘that order which 
God before all ages hath set down with himself, for himself to do all 67  things by.’” 
Theodicy in Spenser’s late verse flows from the justificatory potentials of this First Eternal 
Law, bodied forth poetically in the images of Sapience and Nature. It is in these images 
that we can perceive the Goodness of things, and it is an utterly all-encompassing and all-
consuming Goodness. Crucially, though, the images of both Sapience and Nature are 
hidden behind veils, accessible only through various trials, and fleeting and impermanent 
when they do manage to appear.  
 I have claimed that the Fowre Hymnes and the Two Cantos of Mutabilitie are linked 
together by certain common theodical motifs, and have pointed already to the similarity 
between the “rest” that concludes the Hymnes, and the “Sabaoth sight” proposed at the end 
of the Cantos. More may be added. Both poems concern themselves with meaning: with 
the meaning of individual suffering in the Hymnes, and with the meaningfulness of the 
natural world in the Cantos. The Hymnes take rise from the ethical problem of love—its 
disorienting, or (in Berger’s terms) ‘denomizing’ force—seeking to put it into order by 
																																																								





moving readers from the diversity of experience to the unified origin of experience; in a 
similar way, the Cantos move from the bewildering diversity of natural forms and changes, 
to the changeless and unified source of all forms. The poetic characterization of these two 
sources is quite similar to one another: Sapience and Dame Nature are predominantly 
portrayed as feminine (the latter is also, paradoxically, androgynous), they are both 
mediating figures between divinity and the world, and they are both utterly ineffable.  
Perhaps the most salient and surprising similarity between them is the way that both 
poems both signal to, and yet resist, ultimate closure.68 Both poems end in the presence of 
an absolute Truth, with either the imminent promise of or the elusive experience of a total 
and unified significance bestowed on all things, they both destabilize the very permanence 
they project. If what is being sought in the Hymnes is rest, we are given to understand that 
such rest is only achieved by fully undergoing the restless textual energies directing the 
sequence from the passion of erotic love to the vision of divine beauty. We saw above that 
Ficino comments on the Phaedrus to say that the amatory frenzy is both the lowest and the 
highest of the four divine furies—it is the elemental point of origin, and this sense primary. 
The fact that the Hymnes are structured as they are—as a palinode, and as a sequence in 
which divine and worldly forms of love and beauty echo one another across the formal 
sequence-divisions of the text—may cause us to reopen all the questions of significance 
“An Hymne of Heavenly Beautie” sets out to answer. In other words, when we contemplate 
the whole work retrospectively, rather than experiencing it as a sequence, what becomes 
most meaningful are the dependencies linking the four individual hymns together, their 
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mutual enfolding into one another and circling back upon each other.69 And it is precisely 
this kind of vision—taking in the cosmic totality of things, stilling through recollection the 
headlong rush of time—that the experience of Sapience in the Hymnes, as of Dame Nature 
in the Cantos—encourages us to adopt. Finally, these poems seem to teach us, nothing is 
final; in plumbing the depths of meaningless suffering, we may find meaning; but in 
seeking to proscribe that meaning and give it closure—perhaps to reify it as the basis of a 
political program, a social order, a church—we err and so fall away from the elusive point 
of fixity.  
3. Two Cantos of Mutabilitie: The Dilation of Being 
The Two Cantos of Mutabilitie as a whole register the late-fifteenth century’s 
epistemological experience of “losing touch with nature,” as Mary Thomas Crane has 
conclusively shown. No longer available as an aggregate of self-evident propositions, the 
domain of nature came to be defined by secrecy; from the world of hermeticism and natural 
magic, the idea of a nature who loves to hide behind glyphs and veils moved into the 
mainstream of empirical natural philosophy. And as Sarah Powrie notes, the issues raised 
in the Cantos pertain especially to the foundational assumptions of astronomy:  
Mutabilitie tells us that Spenser […] was attuned to the debates shaping 
sixteenth-century scientific discourse and, indeed, sensitively appreciative 
of their implications. Through the voice of [the character] Mutabilitie, he 
considers the ways in which early modern astronomy challenged 
Aristotelian hierarchies and opened up a homogenous universe of 
measureless space. He enters the ambiguity of an indeterminate, post-
Copernican, post-Brunian universe, where empty spaces defuse 
transcendent aspirations and elude closure.70 
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These observations lay before us the theodical situation—the crisis in the nomos of natural 
law, the erosion of fundamental explanatory frameworks—to which the Cantos form a 
response. If the irruption of evil in the Hymnes was conceived as an ethical crisis, the 
destabilization of the subject in the passion of disorienting and disoriented eros, then here 
in the Cantos the denomizing force appears as a metaphysical problem, personified in the 
Titan Mutabilitie who embodies the deranging force of temporal becoming untethered from 
eternal being. The poem is motivated by a theodical desire to recouple time and eternity, 
immanence and transcendence, and in this way to mount a defense of the physical ordering 
of the heavens and the metaphysical underpinnings of that order—a quite literal 
manifestation of the sacred canopy. 
 The poem’s first lines announce the theme of the Cantos, which will inform all that 
is to follow: 
What man that sees the euer-whirling wheele 
Of Change, the which all mortall things doth sway, 
But that thereby doth find, and plainly feele, 
How MVTABILITIE in them doth play 
Her cruell sports, to many mens decay?  
Which that to all may better yet appeare, 
I will rehearse that whylome I heard say, 
How she at first her selfe began to reare, 
Gainst all the Gods, and th’empire sought from them to beare. (VII.vi.1) 
 
Several points should be raised here at the outset. At her first appearance in the poem, we 
perceive certain points of comparison between Mutabilitie and Cupid in the Hymnes: both 
are presented as “cruell” tyrants, whose force is felt in every life, and whose “sports” lead 
inevitably to “decay” and loss. We also see the word “mortall” used again here, as it was 
in “An Hymne of Heavenly Love,” to mean changeful or inconstant. This special sense of 





suggests a metaphysical problem of evil inhering in worldly creation as such even in the 
absence of death. The condition of being in time and the potential disordering force of 
change present a problem for creatures whether or not death is their horizon, and it is this 
anomalous tendency of things that the Cantos seek, in their way, to justify. Finally, this 
stanza introduces the idea that the poem’s speaker is not inventing but repeating an old 
story, a passing point here that deepens when Spenser later names the specific precursors 
to whom he is responding: Chaucer and Alanus de Insulis. I will argue below that Spenser 
is consciously revising earlier conceptions of the Goddess of Nature in response to the 
theodical pressures outlined above; for now, I wish only to call attention to the gesture. 
 After this introduction of Dame Mutabilitie, there follows a description of her 
lineage. We read that she is “a daughter by descent / Of those old Titans,” the old gods who 
ruled the world before the establishment of the Jovian order. In referring to this genealogy, 
the poem sets out the terms of the allegorical trial that occupies the plot of the Cantos: 
Mutabilitie will assert her claim to sovereignty over the entire universe, including the 
supposedly unchanging sphere of ‘fixed’ stars. She contests the rule of the established gods 
on two bases: first, her genealogical inheritance; and second, her de facto (if not de jure) 
governance of things, manifested in the fact that (as Nature later admits) “all things 
stedfastnes doe hate / And changed be.” Mutabilitie presses her claim of sovereignty 
through more and more capacious levels of order, and the poem figures this progress as an 
ascent up from earth through the heavens.  
The first figure the Titan challenges is Cynthia, who reigns over all the earth from 
the position of the moon: 
Thence to the Circle of the Moone she clambe,  





To whose bright shining palace straight she came, 
All fairely deckt with heauens goodly story; 
Whose siluer gates (by which there sate an hory 
Old aged Sire, with hower-glasse in hand, 
Hight Tyme) she entred, were he liefe or sory: 
Ne staide till she the highest stage had scand, 
Where Cynthia did sit, that never still did stand. (VII.vi.8) 
 
At one level, the palace of Cynthia figures forth the political state of Elizabeth I, construed 
as an Imperial sovereign ruling over the entire world. In the natural-philosophical register, 
this stanza refers to the sphere of the moon as the way station between the changing 
sublunar, and the changeless supralunar realms demarcated in what has been called 
Aristotle’s “two-story Universe.” Since it is a midway point between the eternal heavens 
and the “mortall” earth, the allegorical figure of “Tyme” is appropriately stationed here in 
this state of constant and uniform motion, where he can oversee all temporal things below 
but not yet be fixed in eternity. Cynthia, enthroned upon the moon, is attended by “tenne-
thousand starres” and also by her Page “Vesper,” called the “Euening-starre.” This celestial 
court orients itself around Cynthia who, though represented as being always in motion, is 
nevertheless the fixed center organizing the stars and other heavenly bodies around her.  
When Mutabilitie has taken in the lustrous surroundings of Cynthia’s palace, she 
proceeds to confront the lunar goddess: 
Yet nathemore the Giantesse forbare: 
But boldly preacing-on, raught forth her hand 
To pluck her downe perforce from off her chaire; 
And there-with lifting up her golden wand, 
Threatned to strike her if she did with-stand. 
Where-at the starres, which round about her blazed, 
And eke the Moones bright wagon, still did stand, 
All beeing with so bold attempt amazed, 
And on her vncouth habit and sterne look still gazed.  
 
Mean-while the lower World, which nothing knew 





And eke the heauens, and all the heauenly crew 
Of happy wights, now vnpurvaide of light, 
Were much afraid, and wondred at that sight; 
Fearing lest Chaos broken had his chaine, 
And brought againe on them eternall night: 
But chiefly Mercury, that next doth raigne, 
Ran forth in haste, vnto the king of Gods to plaine. (VII.vi.13-14) 
 
Mutabilitie’s “attempt” on Cynthia’s throne proceeds by force and violence rather than by 
law. The clash results in absolute stasis in the heavens, and a stilling of the perpetual, 
circular motion that is the hallmark of celestial perfection and a legitimating seal of 
Cynthia’s rule. The violent stasis of the moon in the sky manifests on earth as a lunar 
eclipse, in a passage that seems to describe a real celestial event taking place on 14 April 
1595. Such details confirm that part of what is at stake in the allegory of the Cantos are 
questions of a natural-philosophical kind, and lend credence to the notion that when Dame 
Nature engages in her act of jurisdiction over Mutabilitie’s case, the Cantos are through 
her judgment grappling with a set of questions that threaten the very fabric of the 
unchanging heavens, a symbol of natural order which could no longer, by the late sixteenth 
century, be taken as self-evident or unchanging in its essential meaning. 
 Mutabilitie’s violent, headlong challenge to Cynthia’s sedate rule produces 
confusion in the heavens, and the Titan resolves to take advantage of the moment to move 
up the chain of celestial command, to the demense of Jove, King of the Gods: 
Eftsoones she thus resolv’d; that whil’st the Gods 
(After returne of Hermes Embassie) 
Were troubled, and amongst themselues at ods, 
Before they could new counsels re-allie, 
To set vpon them in that extasie; 
And take what fortune time and place would lend: 
So, forth she rose, and through the purest sky 
To Ioues high Palace straight cast to ascend, 






Mutabilitie seems to be attuned to the vicissitudes of fortune on account of her affinity with 
all change; but the irony of the last lines, together with the fact that the reader already 
knows (from the second stanza of the Cantos) that Nature will eventually rule against 
Mutabilitie, suggests otherwise. The final line may intimate that providence is already at 
work, a depth-dimension of “fortune time and place” to which Mutabilite cannot but be 
blind, especially because she is so confident of her ability to perceive it. In any case, this 
stanza contains further details of astronomical significance: the “purest sky” through which 
Mutabilitie journeys is the empyrean heaven, and the lines where this phrase appears 
indicate that she has left behind the sphere of the moon, penetrating into the highest heaven. 
It was the supposedly unchanging essence of this sphere above the moon, traditionally 
believed exempt from change, which recent astronomical observations had challenged. 
Mutabilitie’s ascent through the heavens looks forward to the astral surveys of Satan in 
Paradise Lost, the subject of my last chapter.  
 When Mutabilitie reaches Jove’s palace, she puts forward her legal claim to power, 
based on her lineage as the last of the original (Saturnine, Titanic) rulers of the world, 
whose sovereignty predates the ascendancy of the new (Jovian) gods. Jove responds to the 
complaint by exhorting Mutabilitie to be content with her sway over the chthonic forces of 
the earth, remain within the rightful scope of her authority, and submit to his authority. But 
Mutabilitie is characteristically discontent with this answer, so she makes a formal appeal 
based on Jove’s conflict of interest: 
But thee, ô Ioue, no equall Iudge I deeme 
Of my desert, or of my dewfull Right; 
That in thine owne behalf maist partiall seeme: 
But to the highest him, that is behight 
Father of Gods and men by equall might; 





There-at Ioue wexed wroth, and in his spright 
Did inly grudge, yet did it well conceale; 
And bade Dan Phoebus Scribe her Appellation seale. 
 
Eftsoones the time and place appointed were, 
Where all, both heauenly Powers, and earthly wights, 
Before great Natures presence should appeare, 
For triall of their Titles and best Rights: 
That was, to weet, vpon the highest hights 
Of Arlo-hill (Who knows not Arlo-hill?) 
That is the highest head (in all mens sights) 
Of my old father Mole, whom Shepheards quill 
Renowmed hath with hymnes fit for a rural skill. (VII.vi.35-36) 
 
Of interest in these two stanzas is the specificity of the juridical language used, and the 
place to be taken by Dame Nature within these cosmic proceedings. The use of legal 
language encodes the warrantability of Mutabilitie’s suit against Jove—it signals that what 
Mutabilitie is bringing to light by dredging up her genealogical claim is a real problem 
within the justitial framework of the Jovian order. The case strikes at the root of Jove’s 
sovereignty, contesting its legitimacy by bringing to light his usurpation of proper laws of 
succession. What is this moment allegorizing? One of its referents would seem to be the 
Elizabethan succession and the fate of the Tudor line. At a more general level, the poem 
seems to me to be contrasting pagan/polytheistic and Christian/monotheistic dispensations 
of cosmic justice—much as did the Fowre Hymnes. When Mutabilitie appeals to the 
Goddess Natura (here styled the God of Nature), she is appealing to a power that 
superintends the whole play of powers characterizing the Jovian order. While Jove may lay 
claim to being the King of the Gods, this kingship originates in “Conquest of our soueraine 
might” (i.e., Jove’s parricidal defeat of his father Saturn) and the “eternall doome of Fates 
decree” (i.e., the prophecy foretelling of said defeat) (VII.vi.33.5-6). Mutabilitie’s suit 





problem is that Jove’s victory was not complete—it must be renewed, as the examples he 
lists of other Titanic uprisings (of Typhon, Ixion, Procrustes, and Bellona) show. As for 
the fatal prophecy, this is precisely what Mutabilitie brings forth for interpretation, and she 
makes an effective claim that Jove ought not to be the final arbiter of meaning concerning 
a prophecy about himself. What is needful here is a higher authority with jurisdiction over 
matters of contested sovereignty, and for that Mutabilitie appeals to Nature, who is not the 
“king” of the gods, but rather (here) the “Father” of all gods, and all things. Transcending 
the whole history of gigantomachy that Mutabilitie represents, Nature as source and origin 
can alone rule over all things. Much like Sapience in the Hymnes, Nature’s power flows 
from its ultimate unification of all things.  
 After the appeal, the time and place are set for the hearing of the suit Mutabilitie 
has brought against the Jovian order. The trial is to be conducted on Arlo hill, and after a 
description of Arlo’s history and downfall, all the creatures of the earth and all the gods 
are gathered at the spot. Once all the creatures and Powers have gathered, and Nature’s 
sergeant Order has established them in their proper places, Nature appears on the scene: 
Then forth issewed (great goddesse) great dame Nature, 
With goodly port and gracious Maiesty;  
Being far greater and more tall of stature  
Then any of the gods or Powers on hie: 
Yet certes by her face and physnomy, 
Whether she man or woman inly were, 
That could not any creature well descry: 
For, with a veile that wimpled euery where, 
Her head and face was hid, that mote to none appeare. 
 
Nature is hidden, and is hermaphroditic here: as the origin of all natural kinds, Nature’s 
own inward kind—its gender—is concealed from view. At once god and goddess, the 





and hiddenness. Here we recall the fact that this poem speaks to the late-sixteenth century’s 
crisis in natural philosophy, a process of “losing touch with nature” which intensified the 
sense of hiddenness, secrecy, and cyphers concealed beneath the appearance of 
phenomena. Spenser goes on to project this hiddenness backward through poetic history:  
So hard is it for any liuing wight,  
All her array and vestiments to tell, 
That old Dan Geffrey (in whose gentle spright 
The pure well head of Poesie did dwell_ 
In his Foules parley durst not with it mel, 
But it transferd to Alane, who he thought 
Had in his Plaint of kindes describ’d it well: 
Which who will read set forth so as it ought, 
Go seek he out that Alane where he may be sought. 
 
The two references here are to Chaucer’s Parlement of Foules, and to Alanus de Insulis’s 
De planctu naturae. As Maureen Quilligan points out, Alanus’s description of Dame 
Nature’s garment is indeed fulsome, “representing all of physical creation.”71 By figuring 
Alanus’s description as a kind of lost wisdom, the Cantos emphasize the remoteness of 
Nature, and amplify a nostalgic sense of lost immediacy. But Spenser here is also signaling 
the differences between his text and these two precursor texts, most importantly the lack 
of attention given to eroticism and sexual union in this book, as compared to Chaucer, 
Alanus, and other allegorical works featuring the Goddess Natura. Spenser’s Nature is by 
comparison aloof and chaste. What is at issue for Spenser’s Dame Nature is not (as in 
Alanus) the proper ordering of love-matches and metaphysically charged condemnations 
of sodomy as a wrenching of the grammar of creation; the scope of Nature’s authority has 
expanded beyond the domain of kind. Here I would argue the Cantos reach toward a sense 
of “natural law” or “laws of nature” more capaciously natural-philosophical than those 
																																																								





reflected in Alanus and Chaucer. Indeed, the ordering of erotic desires under the sign of 
divine Love was, as we saw, given a full treatment in the Fowre Hymnes, as it is in other 
places in The Faerie Queene, notably in the description of the Garden of Adonis. Nor is 
erotic desire wholly absent in the Cantos, but it is shunted away into the digressive art-
myth of Faunus, Molanna, and Diana, and regarded as a sort of farce or anti-masque. Its 
inclusion there makes the lack of sexual motifs in Spenser’s treatment of Dame Nature all 
the more noticeable. I would argue that this lack gives us a clue as to what the problem of 
evil or anomy in the Cantos is, and what it is not: it is to do with the erosion of a 
metaphysical grounding for reading the book of nature, and it is not to do with the 
denomizing potential of illicit desire as treated in the Hymnes. 
 Thus when Mutabilitie makes her case before Dame Nature, she brings forth 
evidence that the heavens themselves do change, asserting against the metaphysical pieties 
of Aristotle and Ptolemy that even the sphere of fixed stars is swayed by the force of 
change: 
Then are ye mortall borne, and thrall to me, 
Vnlesse the kingdome of the sky yee make 
Immortall, and vnchangeable to be; 
Besides, that power and virtue which ye spake, 
That ye here worke, doth many changes take, 
And your owne natures change: for, each of you 
That vertue haue, or this, or that to make, 
Is checkt and changed from his nature trew, 
By other opposition or obliquid view. 
 
Besides, the sundry motions of your Spheares 
So sundry waies and fashions as clerkes faine, 
Some in short space, and some in longer yeares;  
What is the same but alteration plaine? 
Only the starrie skie doth still remaine: 
Yet do the Starres and Signes therein still moue, 





But all that moueth doth mutation loue: 
Therefore both you and them to me I subiect proue. 
 
Then since with this wide great Vniuerse 
Nothing doth firme and permanent appeare, 
But all things tost and turned by transuerse: 
What then should let, but I aloft should reare 
My Trophee, and from all, the triumph beare? 
Now iudge then (ô thou greatest goddesse trew!) 
According as thy selfe doest see and heare, 
And vnto mee addoom that is my dew; 
That is the rule of all, all being rul’d by you. (VII.vii.54-56) 
 
Mutabilitie’s claims here reach their most daring pitch, as she asserts that even the 
seemingly stable heavens are subject to her sway. In the whole material world, Mutabilitie 
contends, even in the region of the fifth element, there is no fixity, no identity, no stability 
of mind: all things are turned inside-out, all things become other by “tranuerse” and 
“obliquid” forces wrenching them from themselves, so that nothing remains. Mutabilitie 
rests her case here, with the theodical problem fully articulated. In this version of the 
problem of evil, meaninglessness is imputed at the level of metaphysics itself, as time and 
change are seen to destroy Being. For a sacred canopy so thoroughly dependent upon 
transcendence as was that of Spenser’s England, such a destruction would result in nothing 
shy of a pervasive cosmic pessimism. And poetically, it would suggest that the vicissitudes 
and trials that make up the allegorical fabric of The Faerie Queene do not terminate in 
fixity. Allegory, as Gordon Teskey has noted, seems to mandate that the polysemic 
elements be corralled under the sign of one sure meaning, that transcendence be 





that the final two books of The Faerie Queene may be read as a coda to or retrospective 
commentary upon the work.72  
 Nature’s final judgment—her “doome”—follows immediately on Mutabilitie’s 
presentation of her evidence regarding the changefulness of the heavens. In it, the Goddess 
is not dismissive of Mutabilitie’s basic charges, but seeks to inscribe them within a wider 
circle of meaningfulness:  
I well consider all that ye haue sayd, 
And find that all things steadfastnes doe hate 
And changed be: yet being rightly wayd 
They are not changed from their first estate; 
But by their change their being doe dilate: 
And turning to themselves at length againe, 
Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate: 
Then ouer them Change doth not rule and raigne; 
But they raigne over change, and doe their states maintaine. 
 
Cease therefore daughter further to aspire, 
And thee content thus to be rul’d by me: 
For thy decay thou seekst by thy desire; 
But time shall come that all shall changed bee, 
And from thenceforth, none no more change shall see. 
So was the Titaness put downe and whist, 
An Ioue confirm’d in his imperiall see, 
Then was that whole assembly quite dismist, 
And Natur’s selfe did vanish, whither no man wist. (VII.vii.57-59) 
 
What, exactly, is being asserted here? Note that Nature’s judgment on Mutabilitie is not 
quite cognate with Jove’s earlier admonition that she “seeke by grace and goodnesse to 
obtaine / That place from which by folly Titan fell” (VII.vi.34.2-3). Instead, Nature goes 
further, claiming that all of Mutabilitie’s power is in some sense illusory, that even in those 
																																																								
72 Teskey, Allegory and Violence, 168-88. Teskey sees in this poem the final failure of 
stable, metaphysically guaranteed meaning to claim its supposed position of superiority: 
the Cantos are not “the culmination of Spenser’s metaphysics,” but rather the “undoing” 






things that “stedfastnes doe hate,” there is a return to being and instead of erosion of being 
and identity a dilation, or productive expansion, of same.73 Thus what appears as change is 
actually the working of perfection. In the Hymnes, the vision of Sapience also revealed 
earthly goods and ills to be all one, all in a sense derivative or illusory; and here again in 
the Cantos the presence of a primary, orienting axis of truth seems to suggest that the 
theodical problems Mutabilitie brings to bear are all illusory of themselves. There is no 
problem with the sacred canopy, Nature’s judgment intimates: what looks like disorder is 
order; what appears to be anomy is just the persistence of an elusive nomos. Again, this is 
not so much what one might think of as explanation or rationalization of the metaphysical 
problem of evil; instead the defense of goodness proceeds by an appeal to transcendent 
principles cloaked in mystery—to Sapience resting in the bosom of the Godhead, to Nature 
hiding her visage behind the appearance of all that is. In this way we can see the patterns 
of theodicy in Spenser’s late verse.  
 Yet at the same time there persists a poetic reopening of all that the appeal to 
transcendent nomos seeks to draw finally to a close. For Nature’s judgment is not the last 
word of the Cantos. Instead, the poet reflects, in the “unperfite” (imperfect, unfinished, 
fragmentary) eighth canto, upon the whole drama of the allegorical trial: 
																																																								
73 The language of “dilation” here echoes Psalm 119:32 KJV: “I will run the way of thy 
commandments, when thou shalt enlarge my heart.” The verb for “thou shalt enlarge” is 
dilatasti. For a reading of this in terms of militant Protestantism, see Anthea Hume, 
Edmund Spenser: Protestant Poet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 184: 
“The Protestant poet’s profound and unselfconscious assumptions give an underlying 
certainty of direction to a work [The Faerie Queene] of extraordinary scale and variety. 
[…] [The Cantos] finally reveals that Change, for all ‘her cruell sports,’ is to be understood 
as the necessary condition of the process by which creatures move towards their 
perfection.” For a contrasting account, approached from the standpoint of Neoplatonism, 
of the relationship between The Faerie Queene and the ending of the Cantos, see Valery 






When I bethink me on that speech whyleare, 
Of Mutability, and well it way: 
Me seems, that though she all vnworthy were 
Of the Heav’ns Rule; yet very sooth to say, 
In all things else she beares the greatest sway. 
Which makes me loath this state of life so tickle, 
And loue of things so vaine to cast away; 
Whose flowring pride, so fading and so fickle, 
Short Time shall soon cut down with his consuming sickle. 
 
Then gin I thinke on that which Nature sayd, 
Of that same time when no more Change shall be, 
But stedfast rest of all things firmely stayd 
Vpon the pillours of Eternity, 
That is contrayr to Mutabilitie: 
For, all that moueth, doth in Change delight: 
But thence-forth all shall rest eternally 
With Him that is the God of Sabbaoth hight: 
O that great Sabbaoth God, graunt me that Sabaoths sight. (VII.viii.1-2) 
 
Even more clearly than in the Hymnes, we see that the watchword for compensation in 
Spenser’s theodicy is rest: the problem of evil produces in these poems a desire for fixity 
as the guarantor of good governance. Yet the very gesture of retrospection seems to resist 
closure, and the resistance is amplified by the fragmentary nature of this poetic coda (a 
decision that was out of Spenser’s hands, but still impresses one as profoundly fitting). 
Though Nature’s judgment suggested that in “turning to themselves at length againe,” 
creatures demonstrate their mastery over change, their tendency to grow more perfect 
through all the dilations of soul and changes of mind and vicissitudes of body that 
characterize life. Yet here, when the poet turns back to himself again, he does so in an 
“vnperfite” Canto, which gives equal space again to rehearsing Mutabilitie’s claim and 
Nature’s counter-claim. The two articulations stand there side by side; the resolution is 
once more hoped-for rather than reached, here in the tenor of an apocalyptic wish. This 





for the ultimate security of closure—to put evil to rest once and for all—and yet to hold 
out such a state of being as the only one in which theodical satisfaction becomes possible. 
The poem as poem breathes with an awareness of itself, and is permanently fraught with 
its own potential to reopen the questions to which it seeks answers. The Cantos and the 
Hymns do not conceive of evil, senselessness, and meaning-loss as something that can be 
explained away via appeals to orthodoxy; nor do they conceive of the desire for the good, 
the meaningful, and the true as able to be satisfied by the attainment of the objects proper 
to them. In both poems rest, the cessation of desire, even the cessation of the desire for 
knowledge of the good, is the only solution to the conundrum of anomy. And the attainment 
of this rest is complicated by the fact of being “mortall” in the special sense discussed 
above—subject to change including and beyond death itself. 
 Spenserians have rightly drawn attention to the poet’s worldmaking qualities; by 
focusing attention on theodicy, I hope to have shown what is involved in Spenserian world-
maintenance, that is, the acts of poesis within Spenser’s worlds meant to preserve their 
goodness while still attending to evils.74 I would argue, in closing, that Spenserian theodicy 
remains relevant in the world of late modernity. What both the Hymnes and the Cantos 
help us to understand, and where they find commonality especially with the poetic theodicy 
of Paradise Lost, is the extent to which the early modern period understood evil and good 
to be twins rather than opposites, or rather to be intensified in their opposition through their 
																																																								
74 Roland Greene, “A Primer of Spenser’s Worldmaking: Alterity in the Bower of Bliss,” 
in Worldmaking Spenser: Explorations in the Early Modern Age, eds. Patrick Cheney and 
Laren Silberman (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2015), 16, outlines an 
approach to “Spenser’s disposition of worlds and his recoverable theory of worldmaking,” 
and suggests that “what we call Spenserian poetics is in some measure the visible result” 





similitude with one another. Familiar images of good and evil suggest patent and palpable 
difference: darkness and light, life and death, order and chaos. This dichotomized way of 
looking at good and evil is especially useful in service of ideologies—political, religious, 
and cultural—which solicit partisan participation. (In my third chapter, I will show 
precisely this way of making theodicy a matter of partisanship at work in Lucy 
Hutchinson’s biblical epic Order and Disorder). A far more vexing vision appears in the 
works of Spenser above, and in Paradise Lost. These poems seem to say that evil and good 
are as close to one another as Mutabilitie is to Nature: so near that their operations and 
manifestations may hardly be differentiable upon superficial inspection. The deeper 





CHAPTER 3: MEASURE FOR MEASURE AND THE MYSTERIES OF STATE 
 
1. Prologue 
 In some respects this chapter, which was developed as an article for publication 
before the rest of the project had taken shape, may appear to be an outlier. It is the only 
drama; it is not explicitly cosmological as are the other literary texts considered; it is more 
clearly tied to a determinate topical reference point in the newly crowned King James I. 
But in fact this chapter is of central importance, is the seed from which much else in this 
dissertation grew, and it bears directly on the question of theodicy. In this brief foreward I 
will outline several ways in which the argument I advance here about Measure for Measure 
relates to the other chapters in this project, and to early modern literary theodicy in general.  
 In the first place, Measure for Measure deals directly with questions of providence 
and governance, it inquires into the political-theological patterning of good and evil—“the 
strong and swelling evil / Of my conception,” as Angelo puts it. Louise Schneider has 
called Measure for Measure “Shakespeare’s most theological play;” Debora Shuger used 
the play as a starting point for a wide-ranging investigation into early modern political 
theology. Not only is the play in a sense about the relationship between good and evil, it is 
also a play that puts goodness to the test, one that tribunalizes the good, in the manner of 
other theodicies discussed here. This is true both of Isabella, whose virtue is tested and 
tried by Angelo’s indecent proposal, and of the Duke, whose actions in service of (what he 
takes to be) the greater good are put on display for an audience who may judge for 
themselves whether his application of “craft against vice” is licit or not. Given that at the 
heart of the play is the metaphor connecting God’s governance with political sovereignty, 





providential God by inference.  
 Second, like the other works presented here, the occasion for this instance of 
Shakespearean theodicy is a crisis of legitimacy. In the first chapter on Spenser and the last 
on Milton, the crisis was to do with the legitimating discourses of natural philosophy; in 
the chapter on Hutchinson, the crisis was to do with the political fortunes of the English 
revolution after the restoration. Here, the crisis involves the end of the Tudor line and the 
beginning of the Stuart regime, and with that the introduction of a ‘foreign’ ruler with a 
governmental style markedly different from that of Elizabeth. That crisis put into question 
the legitimating discourse of political theology, and it is this discourse the play probes. 
 In probing that discourse, the play repeatedly raises the problem of intelligibility, 
which is the third point of connection between my reading of Measure and the other 
chapters here. While the other texts, being cosmological in scope, take up intelligibility at 
the macro level, Measure for Measure works out the small-scale political and forensic 
implications of a restless search for intelligibility. For example, in the dialogue between 
the wise counselor Escalus and the bumbling sheriff Elbow (discussed in the body of this 
chapter), a series of catachrestic errors in the latter’s speech make the enacting of justice 
impossible. Similarly, when Angelo tells Isabella “your sense pursues not mine,” the line 
is playing on a series of puns around the word sense that highlights and amplifies the 
meditation on meaning and intelligibility: of subject to subject, of subject to self, and of 
subject to sovereign.  
 Related to this is the fourth and final point of connection, epitomized in the keyword 
of this chapter: “mystery.” The substance of my argument in what follows is that in this 





substance, and a secreted but mundane technique. When applied to the sovereign, the 
semantic difference brought to light by the hangman Abhorson opens up the whole question 
of the fundamental metaphor connecting divine providence to the sovereign’s governance. 
The most salient point of connection between this play and the other texts considered, what 
makes it a key example of an early modern literary theodicy and so demand inclusion here, 
and what marks it as perhaps the most ‘modern’ of all the texts under examination, is that 
in it “mystery” is explicitly an occasion for doubt. The play details how the Duke—aided 
in crucially important ways by his apparatchiks, principally the Provost—plots and 
schemes to produce a mystery-effect at the level of plot. Spying, mumming, head tricks 
and bed tricks blend together in what appears to be a mockery of providential ordering. But 
the presumed strength of credence in the idea that the whole business of providence is to 
bring good from evident evil, the hermetic qualities of the Duke as a character whose 
intentions remain obscure, and the generic bent of the tragicomic mode, work to 
counterbalance the parody, make plausible an interpretation of the Duke as a figure sacred 
rather than profane, and create the sense of double-vision for which this play is famous. 
Now to the show. 
2. Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I hope to contribute to the ongoing discussion of political theology 
in Measure for Measure by reconsidering the play’s representation of the ‘mysteries of 
state’—a phrase that translates into English the Latin arcana imperii, and which served as 
a centerpiece of King James VI/I’s royalist religion.75 I will show that in its language and 
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Crispius is said to be “partner in the imperial secrets [arcana imperii]” on account of his 





structure, Measure for Measure reflects an essential, constitutive ambiguity in the concept 
of ‘mysteries of state’, one that has gone generally unremarked in discussions of the play’s 
theologico-political significance.76 The constitutive ambiguity depends upon the semantic 
plasticity of the word mystery itself, and can be stated as follows: at times ‘mysteries of 
state’ means the substance of sovereignty, an attribute or power directly and inalienably 
invested in the person of the sovereign through the mystical fusion of body politic with 
body natural. At other times, the phrase seems to refer to a set of administrative skills and 
techniques acquired through experience and education, and distributed among an 
administrative body containing the sovereign, but including also a political class of 
secretaries, councilors, officers and magistrates. 
 Measure for Measure dramatizes the constitutive ambiguity in the mysteries of state 
idea, and at a crucial point interrogates the meaning of the keyword ‘mystery’. The 
continuing fascination of the play is due in no small part to its deft handling of this and 
other ambiguities, and its refusal to decide finally between sacred or secular interpretations 
of the mystery it invokes. Thus by the end of the play there is good reason for Angelo to 
feel that the Duke, reassuming his sovereign position, appears somewhat mystical, “like 
																																																								
a certain proposal “trespassed upon the arcana of sovereignty [arcana imperii],” but that 
Tiberius Nero cleverly “replied by treating it as an extension of his own prerogative.” For 
a survey of the concept in the Machiavellian literature of the northern Renaissance, see 
Peter Donaldson, Machiavelli and the Mystery of State (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988).  
76 My sense of what ‘political theology’ means in the early modern context is guided by 
Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton eds., Political Theology and Early Modernity 
(Chicago: Chicago UP, 2012), especially the introduction to that volume. The editors point 
out that political theology is not reducible to religious politics or politicized religion; rather, 
political theology names a complex ideological and historical situation arising in conditions 





power Divine” (5.1.367);77 and there is also good reason to feel the comparison absurd, as 
many modern interpreters have done.78 In order to tease out the full range of possibilities 
active in Measure’s handling of the mysteries of state idea, my argument will turn away 
from the characters that usually occupy theologico-political criticism of the play—the 
Duke, Angelo, and Isabella—and toward its large cast of government functionaries.79 
Though characters like the Provost, Abhorson, and Elbow may not seem crucially 
important to the play, it is only by attending to them that we can fully grasp the interplay 
of sovereign substance and administrative technique that structures the play’s depiction of 
a confrontation between practical governance and theological principle. In other words, the 
theologico-political questions at the heart of the play are not solely focused on the nature 
or essence of sovereignty. Measure for Measure no doubt confronts questions about the 
																																																								
77 Parenthetical references to Measure for Measure correspond to the Arden edition, edited 
by J. W. Lever (London: Bloomsbury, 2008). References to other of Shakespeare’s plays 
correspond to the information at Open Source Shakespeare 
(www.opensourceshakespeare.org), which is in turn based upon the 1864 Globe Edition. 
78 Many critics have commented on the pronounced double vision at work in Measure for 
Measure, especially concerning the figure of the Duke, which allows for such contrasting 
interpretations as those of William Empson and G. Wilson Knight. Empson famously 
remarked that the Duke cruelly “treat[s] his subjects like puppets for the fun of making 
them twitch.” See The Structure of Complex Words (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989), 285. 
Knight rather viewed the Duke’s control as benign and even divine, his acts suffused by an 
“enigmatic, otherworldly mystery.” See The Wheel of Fire: Interpretations of 
Shakespearean Tragedy (London: Routledge, 1989), 80. Empson and Knight’s books are 
by now more than 50 years old; for a more recent, and less tendentious approach to similar 
subject matter, see Louise Schleiner, “Providential Improvisation in Measure for 
Measure,” PMLA 97.2 (1982), 227-236.   
79 The first major study of political theology in the play is Debora Kuller Shuger, Political 
Theologies in Shakespeare’s England: The Sacred and the State in Measure for Measure 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). Shuger’s approach focuses on the Duke and the law, 
and borrows from Carl Schmitt the notion that sovereignty is primarily marked by the 
ability to decide upon exceptions to the legal order (Schmitt, Political Theology: Four 
Theses on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: Chicago UP, 
1985)). On Isabella’s theologico-political significance, see Julia Reinhardt Lupton, Citizen 





‘what’ of sovereignty: Is the sovereign above or within the law? Can she or he be resisted? 
Is sovereignty structured hierarchically, or has it a contractual, communal dimension? But 
equally important are questions about the ‘how’ of sovereignty: How can the sovereign 
sway recalcitrant subjects? By what techniques can a threatened sovereign regain 
legitimacy? How can governmental techniques be morally evaluated? Within the ideology 
of divine right, it is somewhat important to separate the substance of sovereignty from the 
techniques of governance—the sovereign is supposed to be sovereign by divine fiat and 
regardless of the techniques employed. But in practice, the two are always intertwined, not 
only in matters of practical governance, but also with regard to the perceived legitimacy of 
the sovereign substance itself. The ‘mysteries of state’ denotes precisely the intersection of 
the sovereign ‘what’ and the sovereign ‘how’, and it is at this intersection that I find 
Measure for Measure’s theologico-political significance.  
3. Between Substance and Technique 
 Let us begin with two intellectual frameworks for understanding the mysteries of 
state in early modern England, the first drawn by J. G. A. Pocock, and the second by Ernst 
Kantorowicz. The opening chapter of Pocock’s influential The Machiavellian Moment 
aligns the mysteries of state with practical political prudence:  
In matters of policy, the king and his counselors must proceed with nothing 
but their own prudence and experience to guide them. It was their profession 
to do so; their lives were one long training in it; God, who had laid this task 
on them, might of his grace assist them to perform it; and they might develop 
a marvelous skill in the exercise of what was essentially a professional 
“mystery” or art. It was on their expertise in statecraft, in the arcana imperii 
or secrets of power, in judging the fluctuations of times and seasons, events, 





Philip II of Spain—El Prudente—or Elizabeth I of England, based their 
claim to a mysterious and quasi-divine authority.80 
 
The passage relies heavily on the sense of mystery as a professional secret, a trick of the 
trade known only to its duly initiated practitioners—an appropriately Machiavellian sense, 
given the book’s aims. Pocock perceives the connection between the exercise of a 
seemingly preternatural sagacity, one gained through experience and training, and the 
substantive claims to a divinely authored sovereignty. It is important to note, however, that 
the mysteriousness of the sovereign’s power, in Pocock’s reading of the historical record, 
arises from the fact that the techniques by which that authority is demonstrated are not 
communicable in terms of general principles. The judge at common law makes decisions 
based on precedent and principle, together with a set of established rules for how precedent 
is to be applied to new cases. The king, on the other hand, decides when and how to act 
based on intuition, insight, or the possession of some specific and closely guarded 
information. 81  The common law’s techniques are rational in the sense of being 
generalizable; the king’s techniques remain firmly within the domain of the particular, the 
accidental, the personal and circumstantial. The sovereign’s techniques, idiosyncratically 
acquired and in principle available only to those whose lives have been a long education in 
																																																								
80 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975), 28.  
81 As the passage quoted above goes on to explain, “the [kingly] statecraft of pure policy 
[…] had nothing to do with the establishment and maintenance of rules of law. It was a 
mysterious, in a sense an irrational, art of coping with the unique, the contingent, and the 
unforeseen, at the point where all hope must be abandoned of bringing things under legal 
control. But where experience could be mobilized in the form of custom or consent, and 
general rules could be established and interpreted, government became much less an arcane 
and mysterious art and […] much more a rational method or science” (Pocock, 
Machiavellian Moment, 28). The latter conditions pertain to the common law. Note also 





rulership, may thus be passed off as pure charism. In order for Pocock’s comparative logic 
between sovereign power and legal authority to hold, it is important that the king’s 
‘mysteries of state’ and the common law’s ‘artificial reason’ both be understood as skills 
or arts, that ‘mystery’ not be elevated to a spiritual plane above the reach of artifice. Thus 
for Pocock, the mysteries of state may be non-rational, but they are not therefore mystical, 
even—so it is claimed—for early modern theorists of sovereignty as fervently committed 
to the idea of divine right as Jean Bodin.82  
 In contrast to this predominantly secular-technical portrayal, Ernst Kantorowicz 
seeks to show how the mysteries of state came to denote or describe the theologically 
infused, mystical substance of sovereignty itself. In a 1956 essay called “Mysteries of State: 
An Absolutist Concept and its Late Medieval Origins,” Kantorowicz locates the origins of 
the concept not in Machiavelli’s vision of the prince, but in the domain of the law itself—
not the common law, but rather the “brackish waters” in which ecclesial and civil jurists of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries mingled metaphors of throne and altar.83 In course of 
																																																								
82 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 30: “As the roaring of a lion, the king spoke with the 
authority that descended to him from God; his authority therefore became inscrutable, 
mysterious, and not to be resisted. But the gift of authority added nothing to the faculties 
of his time-bound intelligence; it was a hierocratic rather than a secular phenomenon; and 
this is why Jean Bodin, like many another theorist of ‘absolute monarchy’, is to be found 
saying both that as a matter of authority, the king may set aside custom whenever he so 
wills, and that as a matter of prudence and even wisdom, he should will to do so only on 
the rarest occasions.” But as Ernst Kantorowicz demonstrates decisively in The King’s Two 
Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957), the 
demarcation between ‘hierocratic’ and ‘secular’ aspects of sovereignty was blurry by 
design, and a great deal of political theology indeed suggests that sovereignty supplements 
and strengthens the king’s “time-bound intelligence” with preternatural abilities and/or 
knowledges. King James was especially fond of emphasizing the special intellectual 
competencies of the sovereign. 
83 Ernst Kantorowicz’s “Mysteries of State: An Absolutist Concept and Its Late Mediaeval 
Origins,” Harvard Theological Review 48.1 (1955), 56-91. Some of the same points are 





time what emerged from this metaphoric soup was a new and caesaropapistic view of 
political sovereignty, a “Royal Pontificalism” of which James I—often seen as the 
inspiration for Measure for Measure’s Duke-cum-Friar Vincentio—stands as paragon. For 
Kantorowicz, Jacobean royal theology and the Royal Pontificalism of divine right 
monarchy in general “seems to be resting in the legally settled belief that government is a 
mysterium administered alone by the king-highpriest and his indisputable officers, and that 
all actions committed in the name of those ‘Mysteries of State’ are valid ipso facto or ex 
opera operato, regardless even of the personal worthiness of the king and his henchmen.” 
Kantorowicz goes so far as to equate ‘Mysteries of State’ with ‘Political Theology’ in 
general, suggesting that the former is a regional variety of the latter.84 
Note two differences between this intellectual framework and Pocock’s above. 
Most obviously, Kantorowicz does not shy away from acknowledging that those invested 
in the ideology of divine right had occasion to speak of the mysteries of state as patently 
mystical—even (or perhaps especially) the lawyers. 85  More subtly, there is a shift in 
emphasis from a technical interpretation of mysteries as trade secrets, to a substantive 
understanding of mysteries of state as pertaining to the core of sovereign power. It is not 
that the mysteries of state simply are the prudent techniques of governance; rather, in the 
																																																								
84 Kantorowicz, “Mysteries,” 67: “Under the impact of those exchanges between canon 
and civilian glossators and commentators—all but non-existent in the earlier Middle 
Ages—something came into being which then was called ‘Mysteries of State,’ and which 
today in a more generalizing sense is often termed ‘Political Theology.’” 
85  Kantorowicz recognizes, but does not emphasize, that King James used the word 
‘mysteries’ ambiguously: “It should be noted, however, that the king says also: ‘For though 
the Common Law be a mystery and skill best knowen vnto your selues ...’ Here the word 
‘mystery’ certainly has the meaning of handicraft or trade—in the sense of ‘arts and 
mysteries’ […] which perhaps would allow the suggestion that ‘mysteries of state’ are the 
handicraft or trade of kings” (“Mysteries” 68n.10). What Kantorowicz regards as an 





heart of the state, lodged in turn in the breast of the sovereign, there lies a mysterium that 
then needs to be attended by a set of techniques appropriate to it, i.e., an administration. 
The techniques, no matter how secreted they may be, are not the mystery itself; it is rather 
the mystery itself that gives shape, impetus, and legitimacy to the administrative techniques 
of the king and the governors. This mystery is the mystery of state, which is to say the 
mystical core of divinely authored sovereignty. 
 Holding these two intellectual frameworks side by side we can more clearly see 
what I have called the constitutive ambiguity in the mysteries of state concept, and how it 
is rooted in the semantic plasticity of the keyword ‘mystery’. It is ambiguous, because it 
refers at once to substance and technique; it is constitutive, because both substance and 
technique are needful, even though the secular or even amoral nature of the latter 
potentially threatens perceptions of the former’s divine significance. This point about 
‘mystery’ is clearly evident in the OED, which gives two separate entries for the word, 
with one skewing toward the secular sphere, and the other toward the religious. In the 
religious sense, the word mystery most frequently pertains to substance and/or body: the 
mystery of Incarnation, the mystery of the Eucharist, the mystical body of the church (L. 
corpus mysticum), and so on.86 In the secular sense the word most frequently applies to the 
technical know-how of guilds, the skills that an apprentice gleans from a master 
craftsman. 87  Thus we can identify for the lexeme ‘mystery’ a religious-substantive 
semantic axis as well as a secular-technical semantic axis. Relatively pure examples of 
																																																								
86 “mystery, n.1,”OED Online, June 2016. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com 
(accessed July 21, 2016). 
87 “mystery, n.2,”OED Online, June 2016. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com 
(accessed July 21, 2016). See also the Statue of Artificers (1561), which uses the language 





each sense are given in the OED from ca. 1600, so we can conclude that in Elizabethan and 
Jacobean England the distinction between the two senses was recognizable—while 
hastening to add that this does not preclude and may positively invite various shadings, 
amalgams, and overlaps in actual usage—and that both were available to Shakespeare. It 
will therefore be helpful to survey briefly the Jacobean political discourse of mystery, as 
well as how the word is used in the Shakespearean corpus, before turning to Measure for 
Measure’s political theology.  
4. The Mysteries of State in Jacobean Political Discourse 
 King James I took a pronounced interest in the mysteries of state, understood both 
as the arts of statecraft and as the theological grounds of divinely authored sovereignty. A 
king from his nonage and a scholar by inclination, James’s speculations about the nature 
of sovereignty, and his unprecedented willingness to print those opinions and quarrel over 
them publicly, earned him the sobriquet “the wisest fool in Christendom.” Even before his 
English coronation, James announced this ponderous aspect of his personality and style of 
rule by reprinting and circulating his two treatises of divine kingship, A Trew Lawe of Free 
Monarchies and the Basilikon Doron. Throughout these two books, and especially in a 
preface addressing his new English subjects, James hints at his abiding concern with the 
play of secrecy and transparency that would characterize his entire reign:  
Charitable Reader; it is one of the golden Sentences, which Christ our 
Saviour vttered to his Apostles, that there is nothing so couered that shal not 
be reuealed, neither so hidde, that shall not be knowen; and whatsoeuer they 
have spoken in darknesse, should be heard in the light: and that which they 
had spoken in the care in secret place, should, be publikely preached on the 
tops of the houses […] But as this is generally trew in the actions of all men, 
so is it more specially trew in the affaires of Kings: for Kings being publike 
persons, by reason of their office and authority, are as it were set (as it was 





beholders eyes are attentiuely bent to looke and pry in the least circumstance 
of their secretest drifts.88 
 
James goes on to portray the publication of his book as creating a window into his own 
heart, by means of which his “secretest drifts” could be known—a knowledge dispensed, 
of course, on his own terms, without the unseemly voyeurism of “the beholders eyes.” Here 
and throughout the Basilikon Doron we see connections between England’s new monarch 
and Vienna’s Duke: both are deeply concerned with secrecy and transparency, both are 
emphatically moralistic about wielding political power, both present themselves as rulers 
whose knowledge outstrips the common run of men and even of other kings. We know that 
Measure for Measure was very likely the first of Shakespeare’s works to be played before 
James, at Whitehall in 1604.89 It is no surprise, then, that Shakespeare would have read and 
absorbed passages of the Basilikon Doron while preparing the play, and that parts of 
Measure would echo the Doron.90 While the above passage’s concern with secret things 
coming to light may be thought most closely related to Angelo, it is equally applicable to 
Measure’s “fantastical Duke of dark corners,” whose stratagems and applications of “craft 
against vice” are never fully revealed to the characters most affected by them. Although 
the phrase “mysteries of state” does not appear in the Basilikon Doron or in Trew Lawe of 
Free Monarchies, all the major elements of the idea are present—rumination on the 
																																																								
88 King James VI/I, Basilikon Doron, in Johann Sommerville ed., King James VI and I: 
The Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), 3-4.  
89 See J. W. Lever’s introduction to the Arden edition of Measure for Measure.  
90  On the close connections between James’s personality, the Basilikon Doron, and 
Measure for Measure, see Jonathan Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature: 
Jonson, Shakespeare, Donne and Their Contemporaries (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1989) 





theological basis of sovereignty, learned interest in the arcana imperii, and a willingness 
to employ secrecy and the theatrics of revelation for political ends.91  
 James’s concern with secrecy and transparency, his abiding interest in theological 
theories of kingship, and his lifelong apprenticeship in governmental arcana, led him to 
emphasize the transcendent inviolability of his mysteries of state more and more as his 
reign continued. In a 1616 speech before the Star Chamber, for instance, James warned the 
assembled justices: 
First, Incroach not vpon the Prerogatiue of the Crowne: If there fall out a 
question that concernes my Prerogatiue or mystery of State, deale not with 
it, till you consult with the King or his Councell, or both: for they are 
transcendent matters, and must not be sliberely caried with ouer-rash 
wilfulnesse; for so you may wound the King through the sides of a priuate 
person […] That which concernes the mysterie of the Kings power, is not 
lawfull to be disputed; for that is to wade into the weaknesse of Princes, and 
to take away the mysticall reuerence, that belongs vnto them that sit in the 
Throne of God.92 
 
This is James sounding maximally hieratical; when he invokes the ‘mysteries of state’ here 
it seems clear that we’re dealing with authentically mystical mysteries of a substantial and 
theological kind. Kantorowicz relies heavily on this passage when he assesses James as the 
most “genuinely pontifical” king of the 16th and 17th centuries, surpassing “even Louis 
XIV.”93 Yet just before this high-flown discussion of sovereign mystery we find the king 
referring to the Common Law also as a “mystery,” one “best known” by the members of 
																																																								
91  On James’s ambivalent appropriation of the arcana imperii, see Curtis Perry, The 
Making of Jacobean Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 93-94: “It is undoubtedly 
true that the inscrutability of state secrets is an important element of James’s absolutist 
rhetoric, [but] a few caveats are in order. First, there is a difference between claiming 
inscrutability and actually being inscrutable. There is a paradoxical quality to James’s own 
discourse on the subject: it clarifies and describes its own supposed opacity.” 
92 King James VI/I, “A Speech in the Starre Chamber,” in King James VI and I: Political 
Writings, ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge UP: 1994), 212-213 





the Star Chamber, with no obvious allusion to a theological basis.94  Or consider this 
passage, from a speech before Parliament in 1604:  
For albeit trew, that at the first Session of my first Parliament, which was 
not long after mine Entrie into this Kingdome, It could not become me to 
informe you of any thing belonging to Law or State heere: (for all 
knowledge must either bee infused or acquired, and seeing the former sort 
thereof is now with Prophecie ceased in the world, it could not be possible 
for me at my first Entry here, before Experience had taught it me, to be able 
to vnderstand the particular mysteries of this State.95 
 
Here again we are far removed from the ‘mysteries of state’ as a substantial and divine 
attribute of the sovereign body, and directly in the domain of state mystery as the intricacies 
and particularities of governance, knowledge of which is gained not by special dispensation 
but solely by on-the-job experience. Such examples do not necessarily contravene 
Kantorowicz’s point about James being a pontifical ruler; but they do indicate something 
peculiar in the way James invokes the mysteries of state, a peculiarity we will see echoed 
in Measure for Measure. 
 In my view, James’s ambivalent use of the mysteries of state concept is partly 
unconscious or temperamental, and partly tactical. We have already seen evidence of an 
ongoing interest—not to say obsession—with the interplay of opacity and transparency 
belonging especially to kings, and a proclivity for theorizing about sovereignty and 
statecraft. These go to the temperamental aspects of James’s ‘mysteries of state’ discourse. 
The tactics come from elsewhere. Over the course of his reign, James came more and more 
to clash with his magistrates over questions of jurisdiction. The 1616 Star Chamber speech 
responds specifically to this conflict, in which judges at common law wrangled with the 
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king over the extent of sovereign prerogative, and the inviolability of the common law’s 
jurisdictional claims. To put the matter somewhat simply: James wanted to exert some 
control over the common law courts and magistrates, even though he lacked any training 
in the labyrinthine complexities of the English legal system. He claimed that his sovereign 
intelligence, being a form of universal reason perfected by both divine dispensation and 
long experience as monarch, made his lack of empirical knowledge practically irrelevant. 
The magistracy, however, resisted these claims in order to preserve the integrity of their 
jurisdictional power.  
 Most famous among the resisting lawyers was Sir Edward Coke, who put forward 
the notion that the common law was a kind of “artificial reason” that could only be got by 
a very particular sort of education—namely, the kind dispensed at the Inns of Court. For 
Coke, no amount of sovereign intelligence, no number of years spent on the throne, could 
compensate for a lack of specific training in the rules and precedents of English common 
law, so that the king had no competence to judge in such matters. One of the most 
celebrated passages of Coke’s Reports—itself one of the most famous legal documents of 
early modern England—articulates this idea quite clearly:  
For reason is the life of the Law, nay the common law it selfe is nothing 
else but reason, which is to be understood of an Artificial perfection of 
reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every 
mans natural reason, for Nemo nascitur artifex [no one is born skilfull]. This 
legal reason est summa ratio [is the highest reason]. 
 
The law is identified with rationality itself; the study of the law raises reason to its highest 
form. How different from the idea that the intelligence of kings surpasses that of other men 





 Considered as a conscious tactic, then, evidence suggests that James came more 
and more to rely upon a rhetoric of mystery precisely because it bridged the divide between 
legal skill and sovereign substance. One could read the 1616 Star Chamber Speech as 
saying something like: “You lawyers have your mysteries and I have my own. Since mine 
are of an incontrovertibly higher order, they must govern yours.” Against this 
concatenation of technical-legal dexterity and sovereign power, one could read Coke’s 
insistence upon the common law as “artificial reason” as driving a wedge between the 
king’s divine authority and the lawyer’s mundane—albeit intricate and closely guarded—
skill. It is in this context that James’s rhetoric about the mysteries of state reaches its full 
complexity, being deployed tactically in support of a specific rhetorical and political goal. 
But the development of the notion was only possible because the ‘mysteries of state’ idea 
already contained within it the constitutive ambiguity which James came to exploit, and 
which Measure for Measure presciently illumined.  
5. The Sense of ‘Mystery’ in Shakespeare 
The word ‘mystery’ does not appear to have been a particular favorite of 
Shakespeare, occurring only 15 times in the dramas; when it does appear it is very 
frequently suspended between the substantive-religious and technical-secular senses 
indicated above.96  Perhaps the most familiar example is Hamlet’s sardonic rebuke to 
Guildenstern: “Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you make of me! You would 
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singular: in Timon it is clearly associated with craft and trade (4.1.1582); in Coriolanus the 
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play upon me; you would seem to know my stops; you would pluck out the heart of my 
mystery; you would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my compass: and there is 
much music, excellent voice, in this little organ; yet cannot you make it speak.”97 It might 
seem that we are dealing with a substantive and even quasi-religious instance of the word—
“heart of my mystery” scans readily as the innermost kernel of the inward self, as it were 
the soul of the soul. Further, the mystery invoked here is described as massy enough to be 
grasped and substantial enough to be “plucked out.” But the context raises questions.  
Hamlet is at this point wielding a recorder as a prop, which he has snatched from a 
band of musicians, and bidding Guildenstern play it; to which Guildenstern protests, “But 
these [instruments] cannot I command to any utterance of harmony; I have not the skill.” 
This statement occasions the lines from Hamlet about the heart of his mystery. The 
propinquity of “skill” and “mystery” in this dialogue seems more than accidental given the 
lexical situation we have been investigating, and may color one’s interpretation of Hamlet’s 
line. To whit: perhaps the sense of Hamlet’s remark is about pitting his own psycho-
linguistic dexterity (his ‘mystery’ in the sense of skill) against Guildenstern’s lack thereof. 
(At stake in the exchange is whether Rosencrantz and Guildenstern can wrench a 
confession from the prince as to what is bothering him). In the antic metaphor comparing 
the prince with a musical instrument, it isn’t after all that the ‘mystery’ will be ‘plucked 
out’, but rather that the string will be plucked upon, thereby sounding out the music 
within—the metaphor’s vehicle having slid from flute to lute. The exchange is obscure, but 
what can be said with a measure of certainty is that it points in the direction of a reciprocal, 
interdependent relationship between the skill (‘mystery’) required to play an instrument or 
																																																								





get into someone’s head, and the numinous, insubstantial-yet-present substance 
(‘mystery’)—the instrument’s music, the self’s subtle psycholinguistic manifestations and 
modulations of identity—thus produced.   
Let us take another example, this time from Othello. When the Moor orders Emilia 
to stand guard at the door of the room wherein he will interrogate Desdemona, he concludes 
with the command: “Your mystery, your mystery: nay, dispatch.”98 A first reading might 
interpret ‘mystery’ here as solidly secular, merely synonymous with duty or occupation: 
“Go, fulfill the task you’re trained for,” would be a suitable gloss. Numinous or religious 
overtones seem far from Othello’s mind. Yet when the exchange with Desdemona is 
concluded, Othello beckons Emilia back with the lines:  
You, mistress,  
That have the office opposite to Saint Peter,  
And keep the gate of hell! 
You, you, ay, you! 
We have done our course; there's money for your pains: 
I pray you, turn the key and keep our counsel.99 
  
Evidently Emilia’s occupation or duty was not—or at least is not as these lines are 
spoken—as entirely mundane in Othello’s mind as it first appeared. Othello seems to have 
shifted from intending mystery as a secular but secretive task, to seeing Desdemona’s 
mundane office as suffused with spiritual import, in this case diabolical rather than holy. 
And there is also the hint, reinforced by Othello’s calling her ‘mistress’ (‘mastery’ and 
‘mystery’ are closely related words and concepts, as the OED instructs us) as well as by 
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the emphatic repetition of the second person pronoun, that Emilia’s occupation or task has 
seeped into her essence, become part of her person.100 
Two other instances of the word mystery in the Shakespearean corpus should be 
brought especially to bear on a discussion of Measure for Measure; one appears in Timon 
of Athens, the other in Troilus and Cressida. In the former play, the word appears in the 
mouth of one of the bandits whom a distempered Timon exhorts as follows: 
  […] Love not yourselves: away, 
  Rob one another. There’s more gold. Cut throats: 
  All that you meet are thieves: to Athens go, 
  Break open shops, nothing can you steal, 
  But thieves do lose it: steal no less for this 
  I give you; and gold confound you howsoe’er! Amen.101 
 
Trying to understand Timon’s mad pronouncement, one of the bandits remarks: “Tis in the 
malice of mankind that he thus advises us; not to have us thrive in our mystery.”102 This is 
an accurate assessment: Timon could not care less about the bandits’ welfare; he wants to 
watch the world burn. The bandit uses mystery in its secular-technical sense, but the usage 
is ironic, applying a term used for legitimate occupations to the unsavory and illicit activity 
of robbers. The usage here is solidly secular-technical, but does the irony not become more 
impressive if behind the secular sense of the word we hear the faint religious resonance? 
In any case, as we will see shortly, this ironical usage of bears a strong resemblance to the 
banter of Abhorson and Pompey Bum in Measure for Measure, where similarly ignoble 
professions (executioner and bawd, respectively) are mock-ennobled by the epithet 
‘mystery’.  
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 Troilus and Cressida presents an even more interesting example, because in that 
play as in Measure for Measure the word mystery appears in a context that is immediately 
to do with statecraft, sovereignty, and the divine, so that a strong case can be made that the 
mystery invoked is precisely the mystery of state. Quickly, here is the context of the 
passage in which our word appears: Achilles harbors a love for the Trojan King Priam’s 
youngest daughter Polyxena, and naturally wishes to keep the fact a secret. The wily 
Ulysses, however, has discovered all. When Ulysses reveals this knowledge to Achilles, 
the hero registers shock: how could his hidden love have come to light? Ulysses then 
explains to Achilles that: 
  The providence that's in a watchful state 
  Knows almost every grain of Plutus' gold, 
  Finds bottom in the uncomprehensive deeps, 
  Keeps place with thought and almost, like the gods, 
  Does thoughts unveil in their dumb cradles. 
  There is a mystery—with whom relation 
  Durst never meddle—in the soul of state; 
  Which hath an operation more divine 
  Than breath or pen can give expressure to: 
  All the commerce that you have had with Troy 
  As perfectly is ours as yours, my lord.103 
 
The passage invites close attention, because here the “mystery […] in the soul of state” is 
presented in a deeply ambiguous way pertaining directly to the divine nature of sovereignty 
and secret administrative techniques. The mystery of state as Ulysses presents it here 
cannot be communicated; its “divine” machinery is beyond comprehension and 
expression—it is a mystical mystery in the genuine sense. Or is it? In a seemingly casual 
aside Ulysses raises the possibility that this ineffability is due less to any “divine” operation 
																																																								





than to the fact that “relation durst never meddle” with the secret stratagems of governors. 
(If no one dares to inquire about the status of the mystery, then we are left to take the word 
of its custodians concerning its nature.) Further, the state is possessed of providence, giving 
it a preternatural knowledge of events and the inner lives of its subjects. And yet the 
knowledge is not total: whereas God has (or here, given the pagan setting, ‘the gods’ have) 
a knowledge that is total and perfect from the start, with no need to ‘gather intelligence’, 
the state can manage only an approximate and partial comprehension (“almost every 
grain”), and must presumably exercise prudence and cunning to gain it. One may 
reasonably assume that Ulysses’ knowledge is the result of some stratagem—he is after all 
characterized by his cunning, wiles, and techne, rather than any vatic or oracular status—
yet his speech works to erase any evidence of how he came to know. Ulysses understands 
that he must hide his tactics if he wants to impress Achilles with the notion that the 
“mystery […] in the soul of state” is providential and divine and that he (Ulysses) is in 
possession of it, thus instilling a reverence and fear in the warrior, perhaps enough to 
persuade Achilles to join the fight. In short, the passage highlights the constitutive 
ambiguity in the mysteries of state idea—above and beyond the ambiguity of the word 
mystery in general—and how that ambiguity can be exploited to advance a particular 
agenda. As we will see presently, the same set of ideas is at work in Measure for Measure.  
6. The Mysteries of State in Measure for Measure 
 The word ‘mystery’ appears only fleetingly in Measure for Measure, in the midst 
of a comic dialogue between Vienna’s resident executioner Abhorson and his ersatz 
apprentice Pompey Bum. Leading up to the exchange, the Provost of Vienna’s prison has 





opportunity for early release, on condition that Pompey will help Abhorson work through 
a backlog of executions. Ever the opportunist, Pompey agrees. But Abhorson is nonplussed 
about the arrangement. Following is the passage in full: 
  Prov. Sirrah, here’s a fellow will help you tomorrow in your execution. If 
you think it meet, compound with him by the year, and let him abide here 
with you; if not, use him for the present, and dismiss him. He cannot plead 
his estimation with you: he hath been a bawd. 
  Abhor. A bawd sir? Fie upon him, he will discredit our mystery. 
  Prov. Go to, sir, you weigh equally: a feather will turn the scale. 
  Pom. Pray, sir, by your good favour—for surely, sir, a good favour you 
have, but that you have a hanging look—do you call, sir, your occupation a 
mystery? 
  Abhor. Ay, sir, a mystery. 
  Pom. Painting, sir, I have heard say, is a mystery; and your whores, sir, 
being members of my occupation, using painting, do prove my occupation 
a mystery. But what mystery there should be in hanging, if I should be 
hanged, I cannot imagine.  
  Abhor. Sir, it is a mystery. 
  Pom.  Proof? 
  Abhor. Every true man’s apparel fits your thief. If it be too little for your 
thief, your true man thinks it big enough. If it be too big for your thief, your 
thief thinks it little enough. So every true man’s apparel fits your thief. 
(4.2.20-45) 
 
Some brief observations will connect this moment to the other examples of ‘mystery’ in 
the Shakespearean dramatic corpus. First there is the resemblance between Abhorson’s 
invocation of mystery and that of the bandits in Timon: in both cases an ignoble profession 
is described in terms usually reserved for nobler ones. The irony only deepens when one 
considers the religious overtones of the word mystery and the diabolic associations of 
murderous bandits and masked executioners. Second, as was the case with Ulysses’ claim 
to mystery in Troilus and Cressida, Abhorson’s mystery is an extension of sovereign 
power, and thus makes a claim to being a ‘mystery of state’. Finally, one point of 
difference: unlike any other appearance of the word mystery in the dramas, here there is a 





how it ought to be applied: Pompey demands “proof” that Abhorson’s usage is justified, 
and Abhorson provides one, albeit a riddling one. 
 In the Arden edition of Measure, editor J. W. Lever glosses the word mystery in 
this exchange simply as “skilled trade.” Undoubtedly this is the primary meaning invoked, 
but it will be my contention that we ought to consider also the religious-substantive 
resonance of the word, and before continuing on I shall try to justify this claim. Consider 
first the general context of the play: it is saturated in theological themes, contains a host of 
direct references and allusions to the New Testament, and generally meditates from start 
to finish on the connections between theological principles and the exercise of political 
authority. Add to this the fact that elsewhere in the Shakespearean dramatic corpus, when 
mystery is invoked it tends to be poised between the secular and religious senses, as we 
have seen. This is circumstantial evidence, but is nevertheless highly suggestive. Further, 
on the heels of this exchange, the Provost returns and asks Pompey whether he and 
Abhorson have come to terms with the arrangement: “Are you agreed?” To which Pompey 
responds, “Sir, I will serve him; for I do find your hangman is a more penitent trade than 
your bawd; he doth oftener ask forgiveness.” So after the question of whether Abhorson’s 
trade is “a mystery” has been debated, Pompey relates the executioner’s role directly to the 
religious sphere of sin, repentance, and forgiveness. Finally and most importantly, we 
should bear in mind is that Abhorson’s occupation is a direct extension of the sovereign’s 
power over the lives and deaths of his subjects; it is the material manifestation of the “sword 
of heaven” to which the Duke has just rather high-mindedly referred at the end of Act 3. 
 In that speech, the Duke sets out the view that “He who the sword of heaven will 





trade would “discredit” his “mystery,” he is voicing a similar idea. (The falsity and comic 
pomposity of Abhorson’s claim is highlighted by the Provost’s assessment that “a feather 
will turn the scale” in which the relative virtues of hangman and bawd are weighed). Recall 
what Ernst Kantorowicz had to say about the substance of the mysteries of state idea: it is 
based in a belief “that government is a mysterium administered alone by the king-highpriest 
and his indisputable officers, and that all actions committed in the name of those ‘Mysteries 
of State’ are valid ipso facto or ex opera operato, regardless even of the personal worthiness 
of the king and his henchmen.” In Measure for Measure, the question of the personal 
worthiness of the sovereign and his officers is most fully explored in the character of 
Angelo, but this very same question animates the exchange between Abhorson and Pompey 
regarding the ‘mysteries’ of the executioner. Issues of personal worthiness and sovereign 
prerogative are at the heart of the play’s meditation on the relationship between politics 
and theology, and it would appear that this brief exchange between hangman and bawd is 
an iteration of the theme. 
 Such considerations return us to the broader argument about Measure for Measure 
and political theology, which we notice when we shift attention away from the play’s major 
characters and toward its seemingly minor ones. The play is not so much about the 
sovereign’s ability to decide upon exceptions to the law—as many critics have thought—
as it is about the relationship between charismatic sovereignty and administrative 
technique.104 The notion that the mark of true sovereignty is the ability to decide upon 
																																																								
104 On the subject of charisma, see Raphael Falco, Charismatic Authority in Early Modern 
England (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). Falco’s observation that 
“charisma brings into sharp relief a fragile balance between individual identity and 
normative structures, and between autonomy and collective identity,” resonates with many 





exceptions to the law has long been associated with the work of Carl Schmitt, and since 
Debora Kuller Shuger’s Political Theologies in Shakespeare’s England: The Sacred and 
the State in Measure for Measure (2001), Schmitt’s ideas have been a major influence on 
how the play, and especially the character of the Duke, has been interpreted. More recent 
studies of political theology in Measure have, it is true, moved away from Schmitt’s 
understanding of sovereignty and toward philosophers (Walter Benjamin, Giorgio 
Agamben, and Henri de Lubac) and characters (notably Isabella) who represent more 
radical, communal, and/or emancipatory versions of political theology.105 Such studies 
contribute a great deal to our collective understanding of the play’s complex approach to 
the uneasy marriage of politics and theology in conditions of partial secularization, yet they 
tend to overlook the problem of administration, which is judged to be less important than 
the relationship between sovereignty and citizenship, or sovereignty and community, or 
sovereignty and economy. This is true even when the concept of ‘mystery’ is foregrounded: 
the play’s mysteries are conceived along substantialist, theological, and/or corporational 
lines, while the secular-technical aspects of mystery are left to one side. The constitutive 
ambiguity of the mysteries of state concept means that if we wish to understand the political 
theology of sovereignty, we cannot look solely at the transcendent sovereign making 
personalistic decisions about the enforcement or suspension of law, but must look also at 
the techniques—the ‘mysteries’ in the sense of state secrets and bureaucratic dexterity—
																																																								
105 I have already mentioned Julia Reinhart Lupton’s excellent Citizen Saints. To this I 
would add Daniel Juan Gil, Shakespeare’s Anti-Politics: Sovereign Power and the Life of 
the Flesh (New York: Palgrave, 2013), 42-67; Philip Lorenz, The Tears of Sovereignty: 
Perspectives of Power in Renaissance Drama (New York: Fordham UP, 2013); Jennifer 
Rust, The Body in Mystery: The Political Theology of the Corpus Mysticum in the 





that allow the charismatic body-of-sovereignty to appear maximally authoritative, 
maximally sovereign. And here again we find the usefulness of a concept like the 
‘mysteries of state’, with all its ambiguity: it comprehends both a theologico-political 
sovereignty that legitimates morally questionable, and the tactical exercise of such 
techniques as reinforce the notion that sovereignty is something with which, in Ulysses’ 
words, “relation durst never meddle.” 
 Because the mysteries of state in Measure for Measure are both a substance 
inhering in the breast of the sovereign body, and a set of techniques distributed throughout 
a series of officers and ministers, characters in the play are consistently unsure about where 
sovereignty is located. The uncertainty begins in Act 1, with Angelo’s deputization, and is 
only resolved in Act 5, when the Duke’s ministers and officers work alongside him work 
to dramatize the reconsolidation of sovereign power in his person. According to the Duke 
there is no power in Vienna outside of his own sovereignty, and anyone who governs in 
any degree partakes of and participates in an authority that is and remains essentially his, 
whether he is present in his office or not. As the Duke remarks when he deputizes Angelo: 
“[…] we have with special soul / Elected him our absence to supply, / Lent him our terror, 
dress'd him with our love, / And given his deputation all the organs / Of our own power” 
(1.1.16-21, emphasis added). And when the deputization is done, both Angelo and the more 
experienced Escalus register bewilderment about the situation: “A power I have,” says 
Escalus, “but of what strength and nature / I am not yet instructed.” And Angelo concurs: 
“’Tis so with me” (1.1.79-81). 
 If we judge from the ensuing action, we notice that Angelo is full of high sentence 





governing—he damningly lacks both the personal worthiness that is the sign and seal of 
divinely authored sovereignty, and the administrative skill that recommends the good 
governor. In the first scene of Act 2, Escalus and Angelo debate the relative merits of mercy 
and strictness in the exercise of law, with Angelo enthusiastically endorsing merciless 
application of statutes, regardless of mitigating circumstances or the moral standing of 
persons (2.1.1ff). (Angelo is at least consistent on this point: when his own “faults” are 
“open made to justice” (2.1.21) in Act 5, he asks to be killed rather than pardoned; it is a 
matter of debate whether this consistency should not be accounted as merely a further 
demerit). But once the philosophical—more precisely, the theological-political—debate 
concludes, and Elbow actually brings a case of law before the court, Angelo shows 
impatience: “This will last out a night in Russia / When nights are longest there. I’ll take 
my leave, and leave you to the hearing of the cause; / Hoping you’ll find good cause to 
whip them all” (2.1.133-136). Angelo seems to be so enamored of the law’s perfections as 
to have become allergic to the messiness of the actual cases the law is meant to guide and 
govern. Escalus, however, attends to the case, exercising patience and mercy, showing 
himself to be the abler governor, and a far more scrupulous representative of the Duke’s 
sense of justice than Angelo. 
 Ultimately, though, the Duke excludes even Escalus from knowledge of his plans, 
perhaps because the elder statesman is too visible and well-known a figure to be entrusted 
with the Duke’s “secretest drifts.” In fact, we cannot be sure that any one character has 
knowledge of all that the Duke has in mind going in to Act 5. One character, however, 
comes close to knowing all: the Provost. It may seem an odd assertion to make, but the 





intercessions does the play’s comic plot advance. One might expect that the wise magistrate 
Escalus would help the Duke restore justice to Vienna, but not so; Escalus is as caught up 
as everyone else in the Duke’s fifth act coup de theatre. Instead, a low-level administrator 
becomes the Duke’s right hand, even occasionally seeming to surpass the sovereign in 
prudence and resourcefulness. Inconspicuous by design and  praised in the Duke’s closing 
speech for his “care and secrecy” (5.1.527), the relationship between the Duke and the 
Provost best exemplifies the workings of the mysteries of state in Measure for Measure.  
 First, a word or two about his name. Measure for Measure is the only play in which 
the word ‘provost’ appears in any capacity, and the Provost is the only speaking character 
other than the Duke who is identified by his official title. The title of Provost has its 
theological as well as its secular meaning, and its use may intend to suggest a parallel 
between himself and the Duke, who governs from under the friar’s cowl. Whether or not 
that is so, the action of the play makes it conspicuously clear that at several crucial turns 
of the plot, the Provost is there to assist the Duke, proving at least an indispensible and 
prudent officer, and at times appearing more sagacious than even the Duke himself. Though 
he inevitably seems a minor, even a faceless character beside the self-dramatizing and 
charismatic Duke, it is difficult to imagine the Duke pulling off his complex applications 
of “craft against vice” (3.2.270) without the Provost’s ongoing help. 
 In the first scene of Act 3, the Duke confers with Claudio, trying to convince the 
recently condemned man to accept his fate, “[b]e absolute for death,” repent his wrong and 
die with the peace of a clear conscience. The Duke commits himself to governing by means 
of direct pastoral injunction, and the strategy evidently works, with Claudio echoing a 





come on” (3.1.43-44). At this moment, though, Isabella appears, seeking audience with 
Claudio. The Duke—perhaps sensing something amiss or perhaps feeling the first 
prickings of the “dribbling dart of love” (1.3.2) after having glimpsed Isabella—says to the 
Provost: “Bring me to hear them speak, where I may be conceal’d” (3.1.52). The Provost 
complies, and through this stratagem is made aware of Angelo’s indecent proposal to 
Isabella, that she forfeit her chastity to save her brother’s life. At first the Duke seems to 
deny that Angelo means what he has said, interpreting his surrogate’s words as rather a test 
of virtue than a vicious proposal. (Perhaps the Duke inclines to such an interpretation 
because, as Louise Schleiner has persuasively showed, he is himself a type of the testing 
master familiar from several New Testament parables, and hopes that Angelo follows the 
pattern he has set out).106 After further conferring with Isabella, though, he is disabused of 
his hope that Angelo is only feigning vice, and it is at this juncture that he arrives at the 
idea of the bed-trick, one of two major substitution devices that work to produce the play’s 
comic ending. Though the Provost has effectively dropped out of the scene, the fact 
remains that it is only through his intercession that the Duke gains the critical insight into 
what has transpired between Isabella and Angelo. 
 In Act 4, when the Duke’s plans run into serious trouble, it is once again the Provost 
who prudently steps in with some saving advice. Vincentio has already concocted the idea 
to replace Claudio’s head with a surrogate in order to heighten the dramatic revelations of 
the play’s comic climax, but there is one problem: no substitute heads seem ready to hand. 
In an attempt at direct pastoral persuasion, the Duke in his Friar’s guise attempts to 
convince the reprobate Barnadine to lay down his life, so that his head might serve the turn. 
																																																								





But Barnadine flatly refuses: “I have been drinking hard all night, / and I will have more 
time to prepare me, or they / shall beat my brains out with billets: I will not / consent to die 
this day, that’s certain” (4.3.46-9). After the Duke’s attempt at persuasion fails, the Provost 
reenters the scene and asks about the status of the Duke’s plans. The Duke reports his 
failure. Just then, however, the Provost senses an opportunity: he informs the Duke of 
“[o]ne Ragozine, a most notorious pirate, / A man of Claudio’s years; his beard and head / 
Just of his colour,” who has died that very morning of a “cruel fever” (4.3.62-65). The 
provost then suggests an elegant solution to the Duke’s problem: “What if we do omit / 
This reprobate [Barnadine] till he were all inclined; / And satisfy the deputy with the visage 
/ Of Ragozine, more like to Claudio” (4.3.65-68). Here the Provost at least matches, if he 
does not surpass, the Duke’s sagacity; and it is the Provost’s intercession here that allows 
Barnadine to be pardoned at the end of Act V, rounding out the play’s all-embracing comic 
resolution.  
 Thus the Provost plays a pivotal role in both the bed-trick and head-trick episodes 
of Measure for Measure, complementing and even perhaps outdoing the Duke at these two 
most critical junctures. Nor is he absent from the grand spectacle of reconciliation that 
makes up Act 5; indeed, he is there attending the Duke bodily, carefully managing the 
Duke’s costume-changes, tending to the timed revelations and concealments, and taking a 
speaking role in the benign deceptions that make up the Duke’s majestic return to 
sovereignty. If the Duke in Act 5 appears, as Angelo has it, “like power divine” (5.1.367) 
this must be attributed to the Provost more than any other single character in the play. It is 
finally unsurprising that in the Duke’s closing speech he promises the Provost a promotion, 





 At every stage of the Duke’s machinations, then, and at every crucial turn of 
Measure for Measure’s plot, the Provost is there, unassuming and obedient, exercising 
secrecy and care. The relationship between the Provost and the Duke dramatizes and 
emblematizes the constitutive ambiguity in the mysteries of state—a phrase which names 
the occluded nexus wherein which charismatic authority and technical mastery fuse to 
create a simulacrum of divine power in the person of the sovereign. Discoursing about 
‘mysteries of state’ reveals as much as it conceals about this conjunction of authority and 
technique, as we saw in James I’s political speeches above. But dramatizing the operations 
of state mystery as Measure for Measure does has an inherent tendency to demystify, 
insofar as the emphasis on clever plotting and forensics counteracts the audience’s sense 
of wonder at a sovereign’s mystical power to sway subjects and enact justice. 
7. Conclusion 
 When we train our vision upon the minor characters of Measure for Measure—and 
especially upon the relationship between the Provost and the Duke—it becomes clear that 
the political theology of Measure for Measure cannot be reduced to a meditation on the 
divine substance of sovereignty, any more than it can be reduced to a critique of 
Machiavellianism in religious disguise. Instead, what we see is a consistent interest in the 
mysteries of state, understood as ideological nexus where sovereign substance joins 
governmental technique, with each producing and reinforcing the other. The paradox made 
evident in Measure for Measure’s representation of the mysteries of state may be 
understood as follows: in order for the Duke’s sovereignty to be acknowledged in all its 
fullness and splendor, its techniques must remain unknown; yet in order to produce and 





action at a distance) dexterous ministers must step in to supplement the sovereign’s power, 
in which process they come into possession of some uncomfortable and potentially 
compromising information, not least the memo that the sovereign’s preternatural power is 
not all it’s cracked up to be.  
 Beyond the play, an enriched understanding of the mysteries of state also sheds 
light on the complexities of secularization. Evidently the ‘mysteries of state’ (and their 
Tacitean / Machievellian precursor, ‘arcana imperii’) were from the outset ambiguously 
poised between techniques which were mundane but secreted on the one hand, and powers 
whose origins were indeed from God (or ‘the gods’) on the other. However, when we look 
closely at the development of Jacobean mysteries of state discourse, the evidence suggests 
that it was only in the midst of a contest between King James I and his English 
magistracy—who insisted on a distinction between the “artificial reason” of the law and 
the supra-rational authority of the sovereign—that the “mysteries of state” came to be 
understood as transcendental, genuinely mystical mysteries. Far from a linear progression 
from sacred kingship to statist technocracy, then, we see a sort of retrograde motion in the 
concept of divine kingship as the component parts of the secular-sacred dichotomy become 
distinguished from each other. If Kantorowicz is right in saying that what the seventeenth 
century understood as ‘mysteries of state’ is now known by more general name of ‘political 
theology’, then Measure for Measure and its Jacobean context illuminates an important 
episode in the genesis of political theology itself, which remains an important component 





CHAPTER 4: LUCY HUTCHINSON’S CRITIQUE OF LUCRETIAN ETHICS 
 
1. Introduction: Texts and Contexts 
 In this chapter I examine the motif of shipwreck in the works of Lucy Hutchinson, 
principally the biblical epic Order and Disorder. Hutchinson’s scenes of shipwreck 
reconfigure the signature Lucretian image of “shipwreck with spectator,” instead offering 
an image of “shipwreck with salvator”—a maritime emergency supervened by a personal, 
providential divinity. 107  I will show that in Order and Disorder and other works, 
Hutchinson mounts a critique of the Lucretian ethical ideal of ataraxia through such 
reconfigured scenes of shipwreck, revising the Lucretian image in conformity with a 
militant and politicized Puritan ethic of affective and existential engagement in worldly 
affairs. By “existential” here I mean that Hutchinson’s ethic, and the theodical project of 
Order and Disorder more generally, emphasize the importance of lived engagement with 
the play of good and evil, and the self-inspection and scrutiny born of such experience, as 
the way to resolve theodical questions. The interpretation of lived experience is held in 
more esteem than a justification or rationalization of the existence of evil in the abstract, 
though both are wanted and there is a connection between them as concerns ontology. 
Where the Epicurean sage envisions ataraxia as a happy condition born of refusal to enter 
into the play of fortune, Hutchinson’s credo asserts that no refusal is in fact available either 
in the world or in the mind, since both mind and world are fallen, hence already, as it were, 
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at sea.108 Given this circumstance, the active choice to take up existential seafaring appears, 
in Hutchinson, not as the foolish enterprise of those too much enamored of the world, but 
rather an acceptance of the truth of the human condition and the sine qua non of salvation. 
The image of “shipwreck with spectator,” in which the sage observes the troubles of the 
foolhardy seafarers swallowed up by the fate they have courted, provides Lucretius with a 
metaphor expressing how the wholeness and integrity of the philosophically trained mind 
makes possible a pleasant spectatorship of the world’s ills, and how the serenity born of 
this aesthetic distance amplifies the sage’s sense of wholeness and integrity. In 
Hutchinson’s writing, scenes of shipwreck are not contemplative object-lessons about what 
is bad and so to be avoided through the training of the will, but rather expressions of one’s 
inevitable involvement in the play of good and evil. Involvement with evil, in the affective 
depths of one’s subjectivity and in the ongoing political, cultural, and religious struggles 
of Restoration-era Dissenters, makes possible the conviction of sin and the conversion 
																																																								
108 I quote the Lucretius passage in question below, but for ease of reference it is worth 
including here as well, in Hutchinson’s translation.  
Pleasant it is, when rough winds seas deforme, 
On shore to see men labour in the storme; 
Not that our pleasure springs from their distresse, 
But from the safetie we our selues possesse. 
Pleasant, when without danger tis beheld, 
To see two engag’d armies in the feild; 
But nothing a more pleasant prospect yields, 
Than that high tower which wise mens learning builds, 
Where well secur’d we wandring troopes survey, 
Who in a maze of error search their way, 
For witt and glorie earnestly contend, 
Both day and night in vaine endeavors spend, 
To hord vp wealth, and swim in full delights. 
O wretched soules whom ignorance benights! (DRN 2.1-14) 
Quotations from Lucretius in this chapter are all drawn from Reid Barbour and David 
Norbrook, eds., The Works of Lucy Hutchinson, Vol 1: Translation of Lucretius (Oxford: 





experience which were central to the spiritual self-fashioning of the godly.109  
 The act of an early modern poet offering a critique of Lucretius’s moral philosophy 
is not unique to Hutchinson—Milton undertakes something similar, as I discuss below—
but such an undertaking is particularly interesting in Hutchinson’s case. For one thing, 
Hutchinson’s relationship to the seventeenth-century public sphere was arguably even 
more convoluted than Milton’s: writing in various shades of anonymity and from within a 
‘private sphere’ that can be construed as contributing to the counterpublic discourse of 
dissent in the Restoration, the relationship between Hutchinson’s writing and the dominant 
Restoration culture is extremely complex.110 As an early translator of the entirety of De 
																																																								
109 On the affective dimensions of Puritan life see Owen Watkins, The Puritan Experience: 
Studies in Spiritual Autobiography (New York: Schocken, 1972), 5-10 and passim. On the 
political and cultural contributions of Dissenters, see N. H. Keeble, The Literary Culture 
of Nonconformity in Seventeenth-Century Literature (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1987). Keeble’s account stresses that the defeat of the Good Old Cause and the repression 
of Dissenting political energies served to enliven the cultural contributions of figures like 
Bunyan and Milton. Yet this account may go too far in stressing the withdrawal of 
Dissenters from public life. More may be found in Sharon Achinstein, Literature and 
Dissent in Milton’s England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2003). “This 
book,” Achinstein writes, “understands radical action not simply as overt or covert political 
intention […] but also through the social settings in which Dissenters produced their 
resistance; in the theologies that underscored the role of God in human action; and in the 
imaginative resources from which they build schemes of apocalyptic revenge” (9). Lucy 
Hutchinson’s own biography during the restoration demonstrates that dissenting cultural 
production and political rebellion were never far apart: John’s death came after an arrest 
for alleged involvement in political subversion; and Lucy was influenced by the dissenting 
divine John Owen, whose post-Restoration career mixed radical preaching with direct 
insurrection, and who even at the end of his life was involved in the Rye House Plot to 
assassinate the King. See Crawford Gribben, John Owen and English Puritanism: 
Experiences of Defeat (Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2016), 212-17; 234-62 esp. 
260ff. On the widely varied ways revolutionaries dealt with the disappointment of 
Restoration, see Christopher Hill, The Experience of Defeat: Milton and Some 
Contemporaries (London: Faber, 1984).  
110 On women’s writing and the relationship between public spheres, private spheres, and 
counterpublics in an early modern transatlantic context, see Catharine Gray, Women 






rerum natura into English, too, Hutchinson had a closer relationship with Lucretius than 
most of her contemporaries, and scholars continue to wrestle with the extent of the pagan 
poet’s influence upon the Puritan poet’s thought and work.  
De rerum natura itself has lately been held up as a text whose recovery and 
dissemination throughout the Renaissance helped to propel Europe into the modern age, 
and recent studies have been keen to point out Lucretian moments in Milton and Spenser, 
locating within such moments the emergence of a newly invigorated materialism across 
the seventeenth century. 111  The majority of such scholarship takes up Lucretius’s 
materialist-atomist ontology and cosmology enthusiastically, but pays less attention to the 
																																																								
111  The popularizing account in Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2011) remains influential despite shortcomings. About which, in brief: in a quest 
to see connections between Lucretius and the modern, Greenblatt reads De rerum natura 
in a markedly modern fashion (i.e., as a piece of cosmological theory rather than a piece of 
moral philosophy). Above all, Greenblatt is fascinated by “the sense, driven home by every 
page of On the Nature of Things, that the scientific vision of the world—a vision of atoms 
randomly moving in an infinite universe—was in its origins imbued with a poet’s sense of 
wonder” (8). The work of Reid Barbour, English Epicures and Stoics: Ancient Legacies in 
Early Stuart Culture  (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998); Gerard 
Passannante, The Lucretian Renaissance: Philology and the Afterlife of Tradition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); and David Butterfield, “Lucretius in the 
Early Modern Period: Texts and Contexts,” in Lucretius and the Early Modern, eds. David 
Norbrook, Stephen Harrisson, and Philip Hardie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 
essentially hobbles Greenblatt’s central conceit of De rerum as a lost text whose 
rediscovery launched the modern age. Barbour attends to the complexities involved in the 
early modern reception of apathy, stemming from the variety of Stoic sources: “[T]here is 
a Stoicism that emphasizes will and the self; there is a Stoicism that emphasizes fate and 
the whole; and there is a Stoicism that works to bridge the gap between extremes” (16). 
For Lucretius in Spenser see, ex., Ayesha Ramachandran, “Edmund Spenser, Lucretian 
Neoplatonist: Cosmology in the Fowre Hymnes,” Spenser Studies 26 (2009), 373-412. For 
a recent investigation of Lucretius in Milton—an account which stands out among literary 
studies by centering attention squarely on ataraxia—see Jesse Hock, “‘The Mind Is Its 
Own Place’: Lucretian Moral Philosophy in Paradise Lost,” in Feisal Mohamed and 
Patrick Fadely eds., Milton’s Modernities: Poetry, Philosophy, and History from the 






ideal of ataraxia in moral philosophy which, I argue here, is the intended fruit of 
speculation on an atomic and stochastic cosmos. Hutchinson’s thoroughgoing critique of 
Lucretian/Epicurean moral philosophy might seem difficult to square with discussions of 
modernity in terms of human autonomy and the rise of materialism, yet the critique is no 
less a part of the modern constitution than, for example, Milton’s materialist turn. The core 
insight of Weber, who suggests a supportive analogy between the affective structures of 
Protestantism and the social structures of capitalism, make this evident.112 By staging a 
critique of ataraxia and promoting a turn toward affective and existential engagement, 
Hutchinson gives us a new way of configuring the relationship between Lucretius and the 
modern age, one in which theodicy, that tangle of questions at the intersection of ethics and 
ontology, takes center stage. 
 Although my tendency in this chapter is to read the theodical positions in 
Hutchinson and Lucretius as philosophically valuable independent of their cultural 
contexts, it is nevertheless helpful to situate the critique of ataraxia in the context of the 
Restoration, and the culture of religious dissent in 1660s England. The Restoration of the 
																																																								
112 For a classic formulation, see Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: Routledge, 2001), 67: “That worldly activity 
should be considered capable of this achievement, that it could, so to speak, be considered 
the most suitable means of counteracting feelings of religious anxiety, finds its explanation 
in the fundamental peculiarities of religious feeling in the Reformed Church, which come 
most clearly to light in its differences from Lutheranism in the doctrine of justification by 
faith.” Weber emphasizes religious anxiety as a stimulus to worldly engagement and 
socially productive activity, taking this as the hallmark of the Protestant spirit. My account 
of Hutchinson’s affective moral philosophy emphasizes grief and compassion, and takes 
up the problems of social disharmony and of theodicy (the latter of which, for Weber, 
Calvinist dogma had practically eliminated). Still, Weber’s core insight remains important: 
affect-structures associated with the interiorities of the Protestant subject help to constitute 
the modern. To which I add that these affect-structures simultaneously support 





Stuart monarchy in 1660 entailed an attempt to stamp out sectarian religious difference. A 
series of laws sought to force conformity. N. H. Keeble notes that “[t]he penal religious 
legislation of the 1660s left no doubt that the Restoration settlement intended not the 
toleration and perpetuation of an alternative religious tradition but the extirpation, once and 
for all, of all sentiments about the Reformation not in accord with those of the re-
established Episcopalian church.”113 According to Sharon Achinstein the effect of these 
laws—an effect which was to last over one hundred and fifty years—was that religious 
nonconformists were “excluded from office and university, denied legitimate burial in 
parish churchyards and marriage in their own meeting houses.”114 Although repressed in 
all these ways and more, the culture of dissent persisted throughout the Restoration period. 
Lucy Hutchinson was among the excluded: raised in a household sympathetic to 
the “Geneva discipline” and married to John Hutchinson (who later served as an officer in 
the Parliamentary army and signed the death warrant of Charles I) from 1638, Hutchinson’s 
personal, political, spiritual, and intellectual life was tied to the fortunes of English 
Puritanism.115 In the 1650s, Hutchinson undertook the full translation of De rerum natura, 
her first major literary effort, and the first recorded attempt of a full translation into English 
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recent work, Settling the Peace of the Church: 1662 Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), esp. 57-85, where Keeble considers the nuances and complexities in the 
writings of Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, for whom the suite of laws defining the 
church settlement is popularly named. Here Keeble shows that for all the imposition of 
uniformity, there was much bending and adjusting of rules and making of concessions. 
Achinstein, Literature and Dissent, 10, makes a similar point.  
114 Achinstein, Literature and Dissent, 8.  
115  David Norbrook, "Hutchinson [née Apsley], Lucy (1620–1681), poet and 







of that poem. After the Restoration, John’s activities during the Republican period 
endangered the Hutchinsons greatly.116 He managed to avoid punishment until 1663, when 
he was arrested on suspicion of being involved in insurrectionary political activity and 
imprisoned at Sandown Castle in Kent, where he subsequently died in 1664. In all 
likelihood Order and Disorder was written after his death; an anonymous edition of the 
first five books of the poem appeared in print in 1679.117 Thus the Lucretius translation and 
the later Biblical epic must be seen as bound up with the political fortunes of English 
Puritanism and dissent. Her vociferous denunciation of Lucretius, and of her own earlier 
work as a translator of him, can be read in part as a rejection of the Augustan tendencies of 
Restoration culture, “the values of the ancients, rewritten as imperial order, balance, 
openness, cosmopolitanism, and publicity.”118 
As I will show in this chapter, Hutchinson’s theodical project centers on the right 
experience of grief, an affect dismissed as inappropriate by Stoic and Epicurean moral 
philosophy, but rehabilitated in the early Christian context by Augustine. The grief in 
Hutchinson’s own biography took shape around profound personal and political loss: the 
experience of defeat as the Good Old Cause crumbled and gave way to the Restoration 
monarchy and, bound up with this, the death of her husband.119 Perhaps these experiences 
																																																								
116 Katharine Gillespie, Women Writing the English Republic, 1625-1681 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 283-6, gives a good, brief account of Hutchinson’s life 
after 1660. Gillespie’s reading of Order and Disorder as a “Tractatus Theologico-Politico 
Feminist Alchemicus,” drawing together Hutchinson’s Biblical epic and several hermetic, 
Neoplatonic, and alchemical sources, stands out as one of the more exotic interpretations 
of the poem.  
117 Norbrook, “Hutchinson, Lucy,” ODNB.  
118 Achinstein, Literature and Dissent, 11.  
119 Ross, “Lucy Hutchinson’s ‘Elegies’ and Order and Disorder,” notes that in the elegies 





are part of what led Hutchinson toward an experiential and, as I have called it, an existential 
theodical poetics in Order and Disorder, so markedly different from those of her 
contemporary Milton. Be that as it may, it is clear that whereas Milton’s project aims at a 
rationalization and justification of evil, Hutchinson explicitly rejects this kind of theodical 
approach, and instead focuses squarely on the existential and affective dimension of evil, 
on how rightly to respond when one encounters the world’s ills in lived experience. Rather 
than mounting a poetic-philosophical exegesis of scripture presenting an etiology of evil, 
Hutchinson renders stories from Genesis as educative emblems for the rectification of the 
affects.120 Working through a previous sympathetic engagement with the ataraxia at the 
heart of Lucretian ethics, Hutchinson’s theodical project revolved around a defense of 
God’s own affective comportment toward the world, His anger and His compassion, His 
mercy and His grief.121 This approach shapes Hutchinson’s self-presentation and practice 
																																																								
Lucy mourns deeply and personally the loss of a beloved husband and the end of the Good 
Old Cause” (175).  
120 Sarah C. E. Ross, Women, Poetry, and Politics in Seventeenth-Century Britain (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 198: “Hutchinson’s propensity to carve an emblem out of 
the biblical narrative draws on a culture of emblem poetry that flourished in England in the 
1630s [in which] the emblem […] encouraged and codified the typological reading of the 
Bible as bearing directly on the seventeenth-century world.” In the description of the world 
flood in Order and Disorder discussed below, Hutchinson explicitly invokes the emblem 
tradition. On the kinds of typological reading encouraged by this emblematizing tendency, 
see Kevin Killeen, The Political Bible in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017).  
121  See Reid Barbour and David Norbrook, “Introduction,” in The Works of Lucy 
Hutchinson Vol. 1: Translation of Lucretius, Pt. 1: Introduction and Text, eds. Reid 
Barbour and David Norbrook, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), lxxxi-lxxxix. 
Norbrook and Barbour note that Hutchinson’s translation shows sensitivity to the Lucretian 
ethics surrounding pleasure—that it distinguishes carefully between hedonistic pursuit of 
satisfaction often ascribed to Epicurean philosophy, and the rational detachment it really 
promotes. They further point to evidence (in Hutchinson’s biography of her husband John) 
of sympathy with an “Epicurean withdrawal from public life” (lxxxix). Yet the same body 
of evidence demonstrates the impossibility of such withdrawal: for John and Lucy were 





as an author of poetry and interpreter of scripture, which is the subject of the next section. 
Before turning to Hutchinson, though, it will be helpful to lay out the relationship between 
Epicurean philosophy and the problem of evil, and the role of De rerum natura in this 
relationship in early modernity. 
2. Epicurus’s Old Questions 
 In Part 10 of Hume’s Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion (1779), the character 
Philo mounts an attack on the anthropomorphic conception of God as in some sense a (or 
three) Person(s), and on the world as in some sense designed with human happiness in 
mind: “Is it possible … that after all these reflections, and countless others that might be 
suggested, you still stick to your anthropomorphism, and assert that the moral attributes of 
God—his justice, benevolence, mercy, and uprightness—are of the same nature as these 
virtues in human creatures?” The passage continues:  
We grant that his power is infinite: whatever he wills to happen does 
happen. But neither man nor any other animal is happy; therefore God 
doesn’t will their happiness. His knowledge is infinite: he is never mistaken 
in his choice of means to any end. But the course of nature doesn’t lead to 
human or animal happiness; therefore nature isn’t established for that 
purpose. Through the whole range of human knowledge, there are no 
inferences more certain and infallible than these. Well, then, in what respect 




the time of writing Order and Disorder had become how to understand being thrown into 
the play of political fortune, how to respond when engaged in the active struggle between 
good and evil. Ataraxia provides one ethical means, but I will argue here that Hutchinson 
found it wanting in its inability to deal with evil. Hugh de Quehen [ADD CITE] notes that 
Lucretius provides some eudaimonistic ways of dealing with that contingency, too, but the 
gist of my argument is that eudaimonism’s promotion of self-management does not allow 
for the kind of resonant affective response which, for Hutchinson, promotes union between 
God and human beings.  
122  David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Dorothy Coleman 





Philo then moves on to a classic statement in early modern philosophy of what is called the 
logical problem of evil: “Epicurus’s old questions have still not been answered. Is he 
willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then 
is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?”123 The tradition of 
tracing these questions back to Epicurus—or attributing them to him in the form of 
quotation, as do many present-day Christians and atheists in the heat of debate—goes back 
to Lactantius’s (ca. 250 - ca. 325) De ira dei.124 The thirteenth chapter of that work 
attributes to Epicurus the following ideas:  
God, he says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, 
and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and 
able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance 
with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which 
is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both 
envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, 
which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? or why 
does He not remove them?  
 
And Lactantius adds, perhaps with the Stoics in mind, “I know that many of the 
philosophers, who defend providence, are accustomed to be disturbed by this argument, 
and are almost driven against their will to admit that God takes no interest in anything, 
which Epicurus especially aims at.” For both Lactantius and Hume, and for generations of 
philosophers and theologians in between, the name of Epicurus was associated with this 
version of the problem of evil.   
																																																								
123 Hume, Dialogues, 74.  
124  Hutchinson seems to have been more than passingly familiar with Lactantius, an 
important theologian and rhetorician dubbed the “Christian Cicero” by early humanists. 
Lucy Hutchinson, On The Principles of Christian Religion (London, 1817), cites 
Lactancius several times, and in one notable passage includes him in a list of authors who 
summarize “[t]he purer theologie of the heathen, which they either acknowledgd against 
their wills, or when they in tended something else, or when they purposely searcht to trace 





As much or more than any other purported feature of the Epicurean philosophy—
its valuation of pleasure, its materialism, its mortalism, its theory of human origins—the 
attribution of this question contributed to early modern perceptions of Epicurus and his 
mouthpiece and disciple Lucretius as atheistic.125 In a compelling recent article, Nicholas 
Hardy has made the case the De rerum natura can be read as a work of natural theology, 
and that many early modern readers of Lucretius read the poem as a defense of natural law 
and evidence of a rational (though not intelligent) design in nature, rather than as a 
celebration of the stochastic dance of atoms.126 According to Hardy, readers as diverse as 
Thomas Creech, Robert Boyle, and Pierre Gassendi read Lucretius’s poem “as a natural 
theology manqué, a hymn to the harmonious cooperation of nature and human reason that 
happened to draw unusually anti-theistic conclusions.”127 In a similar vein, Sarah Hutton 
and Lynn Sumida Joy have described a process, spearheaded in France by Pierre Gassendi 
and in England by Walter Charleton, of Christianizing Epicurean philosophy; these 
philosophers held that Epicurus’s ideas were more compatible with Christian faith than 
																																																								
125 On these features of De rerum natura and their contribution to perceptions of atheism, 
see Reid Barbour and David Norbrook, “Introduction,” in The Works of Lucy Hutchinson 
Vol. 1: Translation of Lucretius, Pt. 1: Introduction and Text, eds. Reid Barbour and David 
Norbrook, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), lxv-lxxxi; lxxxix-xci. The word 
“atheism” was used in the period to cover a range of beliefs that in some measure denied 
God’s providential involvement in world affairs; this kind of early modern “atheism” can 
be seen as a product of renewed attention to the problem of evil. On the term, see Lucien 
Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais, trans. 
Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) and David Wootton, 
“Lucien Febvre and the Problem of Unbelief in the Early Modern Period,” Journal of 
Modern History, 60 (1988), 695-730.  
126 Nicholas Hardy, “Is the De rerum natura a Work of Natural Theology? Some Ancient, 
Modern, and Early Modern Perspectives,” in Lucretius and the Early Modern, eds. David 
Norbrook, Stephen Harrison, and Philip Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
201-21.  





those of Aristotle.128 Hutchinson’s near-contemporary Robert Boyle shared something of 
this view, although he criticized both Epicurus and Gassendi on other grounds.129 Although 
in this chapter I do emphasize the ethical function of De rerum natura’s ultimately 
stochastic ontology, it is important to note that the poem also registers the evident 
rationality of natural phenomena, and that holding together atomism, natural law, and 
Christian belief was far from impossible.  
Yet as Hume knew, proponents of natural theology run into difficulty when 
confronting the problem of evil. The demand for “harmonious cooperation of nature and 
human reason” had been strengthened as a necessary condition for the construction of 
theistic proofs, but mere rationality in the order of things is not in itself sufficient to 
demonstrate a Providence working to ensure goodness or happiness where individual 
human beings are concerned.130 The crux of Hume’s attack, and what Lactantius most has 
in mind in critiquing Epicurus, is the idea that there is no accommodating thread that might 
																																																								
128  Sarah Hutton, British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 61: “Epicurus had a reputation as an atheist, and his materialism 
was problematic for his early modern readers. However, like other ancient philosophies, 
Epicureanism was ‘Christianized’ for seventeenth-century consumption, opening the way 
for the adoption of Epicurean ideas in natural and moral philosophy. The ‘baptism’ of 
Epicurus was the achievement of the French philosopher Pierre Gassendi. Walter Charleton 
was the most significant disseminator of Epicureanism in England, drawing on him in both 
his moral and natural philosophy.” See also David Norbrook, “Atheists and Republicans: 
Interpreting Lucretius in Revolutionary England,” in Lucretius and the Early Modern, eds., 
Daivd Norbrook, Stephen Harrison, and Philip Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 225-8; Lynn Sumida Joy, Gassendi the Atomist: Advocate of History in an Age of 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).  
129 See Hardy, “Is the De rerum natura a Work of Natural Theology?,” 217-9; Hutton, 
British Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century, 63.  
130 The Copernican turn was a watershed moment in the history of the human demand that 
for the world to be good, it ought to be intelligible. See Hans Blumenberg, The Genesis of 
the Copernican World, trans. Robert Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). I discuss 





connect human justice with divine justice, human wisdom with divine wisdom, and, 
crucially for this chapter, human affect with divine affect (hence Lactantius’s title, ‘On the 
anger of God’). Even supposing we read De rerum natura as a work of natural theology, 
the universe it portrays, and the kind of reason that governs this universe, is marked by 
indifference. We can say that regular laws of nature govern both good harvests and plague 
outbreaks, but if we regard Providence as in some sense the work of an agent with a sense 
of justice and goodness intelligibly related to the human sense of justice and goodness, then 
further explanation will be necessary as to why one rather than the other occurs. Lactantius 
claims that Epicureans reject Providence altogether; Hume, taking what he regards as an 
Epicurean position, reduces it to an affordance of the bare means of survival for the species, 
and not a guarantor of individual human (or animal) happiness. Early modern 
Christianizers of Lucretius might apologize for “unusually anti-theistic conclusions,” but 
there remained a strong tendency to view De rerum natura as a text that struggled to make 
sense of evil, or to offer any practical moral guidance of how to deal with natural evil. 
Quite famously the poem ends with a long description of the plague at Athens, an 
unremitting spectacle of suffering similar to the Flood episode in Order and Disorder 
discussed below, but absent any sense that the providential reasons for the plague should 
guide one toward fear, hope, grief, or any other affective comportment toward the divine. 
It is unclear whether the seemingly truncated ending of De rerum natura is intentional or 
not; in either case, it heightens the sense that this is a poem working through questions of 
how to deal with the problem of evil at the levels of theory and of lived experience.131  
																																																								
131 Much has been written on the problematic end of De rerum natura. For an evaluation 
that grants intentionality to the poem’s end, and refers to some of the scholarly debate about 





Perhaps the two most important open literary-historical questions regarding 
Hutchinson’s relationship to Lucretius is why a Puritan writer found De rerum natura so 
compelling in the first place, and how we are to understand the volte-face recorded in the 
dedicatory epistle of Hutchinson’s translation of De rerum, and the similarly phrased 
expressions of repugnance toward Lucretius in the preface to Order and Disorder. David 
Norbrook and others have argued that one major attraction of Lucretius for early modern 
Protestant and Puritan writers was his sustained attack on religio, which fit with the 
anticlerical agenda of Revolutionary writers who would go on to become Dissenters. 132 I 
agree with Norbrook that such anticlericalism appealed to Hutchinson in particular.133 But 
why the turn away from Lucretius? The evidence assembled in this chapter suggests that 
the reason centers on what Hume would call in the century after Hutchinson wrote, 
“Epicurus’s old questions,” i.e., the problem of evil.134 Christianize Epicurus and Lucretius 
																																																								
Press, 1990) 228-37. See also David F. Bright, “The Plague and the Structure of De rerum 
natura,” Laotmus 30, no. 3 (1971), 607-32.  
132 David Norbrook, “Atheists and Republicans,” 227.  
133 Norbrook, “Atheists and Republicans,” 243-6.  
134 Another reason for the turn was likely that Hutchinson came to see how much the proto-
natural theology of Lucretius had in common with Socinianism. John Owen, whose 
theology influenced Hutchinson, had vociferously denounced the Racovian Catechism—
the constitutional text of the Socinian movement—in several works. See Sarah Mortimer, 
Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianismn 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 205-35. “[Owen] thought that Socinus’ 
writing not only attacked Reformed views of justification [as did Arminius]—it also 
undermined those principles on which religious unity in England was to be based. Socinus 
had insisted that Christianity was an ethical religion, which demanded good works from all 
its adherents, and he had also denied that men had any natural knowledge of the deity, 
emphasising [sic] instead the role of the historical Christ in revealing the will of God. Owen 
quickly came to see that this aspect of Socinus’ writing—his sharp separation between 
Christianity and the natural ideas of humans—was potentially the most damaging of all to 
his own plans for the English Church. It implied that religion was an individual and 
voluntary matter which need not concern the magistrate and it suggested that humans could 





as one might, the critique articulated by Lactantius still obtains when reading De rerum 
natura, for in that poem there is no affordance of a theodical solution. The plague scene at 
the poem’s end reinforces the sense that however an individual responds to suffering, the 
providential order is void of affective content—it is governed by the (metaphorical) retired 
Epicurean Gods, enjoying the pleasure of perfected detachment and ataraxia. Hutchinson 
may have even read De rerum natura as a work of nascent natural theology;135 yet the kind 
of theodical satisfaction she sought was only available from revealed religion over and 
above the rational evidences of providential order. The emphasis on affect in Hutchinson 
depends for its spiritual efficacy on the underlying claim that there is indeed a thread of 
accommodation connecting human grief with divine grief, and that by coming to a right 
experience of grief in the face of ills, human beings are drawn nearer to a personal deity 
involved in the lives of individuals.  
3. Universal Rack 
The preface of Order and Disorder declares an intention to anchor the biblical epic 
in the revealed word of God, eschewing philosophical speculation and poetic flights of 
fancy. Hutchinson acknowledges that by setting the Genesis narrative to verse she leaves 
the poem open to censure from two sorts of critics. The first are those who “understand and 
love the elegancies of poems.” Such readers will find little to like in Order and Disorder, 
																																																								
ideas of ‘natural theology’ could become, depending on what conceptions of the divine 
were thought to be natural or reasonable.  
135 Although several of Hutchinson’s marginal comments register her sense of Lucretius as 
an atheistic thinker. See Hardy, “Is the De rerum natura a Work of Natural Theology?,” 
210: “When Lucretius admits that humans seem to have an innate (but nonetheless 
erroneous) conviction that there is life after death, Hutchinson writes in her margin: ‘How 
much this poore deluded bewitcht mad wretch strives to put out the dimme light of nature 






for there is “nothing of fancy in it; no elevation of style, no charms of language.” 
Hutchinson claims to have no “gift” for such poetic fancy and no desire to employ it in any 
case:136  
Had I a fancy, I durst not have exercised it here; for I tremble to think of 
turning Scripture into a romance; and shall not be troubled at their dislike 
who dislike on that account, and profess they think no poem can be good 
that shuts out drunkenness, and lasciviousness, and libelling satire, the 
themes of all their celebrated songs. (OD, 5)137 
 
What exactly is meant by the idea of turning scripture “into a romance,” and why 
Hutchinson is so adamant about avoiding it?138 In the first place, Hutchinson likely has in 
mind here other Biblical epics of the period, such as the Royalist Abraham Cowley’s 
Davideis. 139  More broadly, Hutchinson intends here is that her work will not be a 
speculative interpretation of scripture, but will maintain fidelity to the biblical source 
material. Yet such fidelity is a complicated matter, since every choice involved in turning 
scripture into verse, from selection of episodes to the widest possible range of formal 
considerations, bespeaks interpretation. Further, forms of some forms of interpretation 
deemed ‘natural’ within the horizon of seventeenth-century Biblical hermeneutics might 
																																																								
136 The claim reflects Hutchinson’s characteristic caution about characterizing herself as 
an author. However, as Elizabeth Scott-Baumann points out, Hutchinson’s engagement 
with the title of poet is complicated, and at times her modesty seems to mask ambition and 
justified pride in poetic accomplishments. See Forms of Engagement: Women, Poetry, and 
Culture 1640-1680 (Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2013), 203-204.  
137 Citations are from Lucy Hutchinson, Order and Disorder, ed. David Norbrook (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001), OD in parenthetical citations. Line numbers are cited for all lineated 
material; for the preface and other unlineated material, page numbers have been used.  
138 Emily Griffiths Jones, “‘My Victorious Triumphs Are All Thine’: Romance and Elect 
Community in Order and Disorder,” Studies in Philology 112, no. 1 (2015), 162-93, 
notably reads this statement against the grain, and sees in Order and Disorder many of the 
generic elements of romance.  
139  See Elizabeth Scott-Baumann, “Lucy Hutchinson,” in The Intellectual Culture of 
Puritan Women, Elizabeth Scott-Baumann and Johanna Harris, eds. (New York: Palgrave, 





not seem so to those outside.140 One way Hutchinson’s poem makes good on the promise 
of faithfulness to the text is by not explicitly bringing in material from outside: consider 
the marginal glosses of Order and Disorder, which refer scripture always back to scripture, 
suggesting that the Bible is a complete and completely self-interpreting text. As both 
Elizabeth Scott-Baumann and David Norbrook note, however, the marginal glosses 
complicate the matter of the verse as or more often than they simply amplify it or resolve 
problems; Norbrook points out that in Hutchinson’s discussion of human rebellion at the 
poem’s beginning, “[t]he annotations form a series of counterpoints,” giving “sharp 
political resonance to the more abstract generalizations of the verse.”141 Further, if the 
marginal glosses still do not move the reader beyond the text of the bible itself, throughout 
the poem are allusions to other works including those of pagan philosophy, even of the 
‘atheistic’ pagan poet Lucretius. When Hutchinson explicitly rejects “fancy” as a guide to 
scriptural poetics, then, she is not rejecting interpretation outright, nor is she conflating 
faithfulness with refusing all extra-biblical knowledge, but only rebuking a specific mode 
of going beyond scripture itself into the domain of philosophical and historical speculation 
about scripture.142  
 Hutchinson’s biblical poetics exercise faithfulness toward the scripture by 
interpreting it in and as a series of devout meditations; authorship and readership work 
together to perceive and experience the truth of events outlined in Genesis.  As Norbrook 
																																																								
140 For instance, typological reading of scriptural events—particularly those of the Old 
Testament—was considered to be in a way “natural,” in opposition to allegorical 
interpretation. See Kevin Killeen, The Political Bible in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2017), 33-42.   
141 Norbrook, “Introduction,” xxvii.  





points out in the introduction to Order and Disorder, “Hutchinson subtitled the first cantos 
of her poem ‘Meditations upon the Creation and Fall, as it is recorded in the beginning of 
Genesis,’” a title which “implies a secondary form of writing, one whose main aim is not 
to tell a story but to summarize it and suspend the action to discourse on its meaning.”143 
Yet this description does not quite fit the mode of, for example, the Noah episode, which I 
claim below is exemplary of Hutchinson’s biblical poetics. There the story is not suspended 
so that the meaning-making can be taken up as a “secondary” activity; rather, the story 
itself is extended, specifically in its affective dimensions, as details are imagined and added 
to the story itself which guide the meditation deeper into a vivid, mournful compassion. 
The details so added encode Hutchinson’s political and ethical aims for the poem.  
Despite Hutchinson’s own disavowals, then, it is precisely because Order and 
Disorder does in fact take certain liberties in converting the scriptural text into poetry, that 
the preface records an anxiety about other critics, those who would “think Scripture 
profaned by being descanted on in numbers.” Against these critics Hutchinson offers a 
twofold defense: on the one hand, “a great part of the Scripture was originally written in 
verse;” on the other, believers “are commanded to exercise our spiritual mirth in psalms 
and hymns and spiritual songs” (OD, 5). Yet Hutchinson’s departures from the scriptural 
account in Genesis veer, as often as not, toward a mournful, dark, even grotesque 
imagination of the events presented in Genesis rather than toward spiritual mirth.  
This observation about the affective charge of Order and Disorder links the biblical 
epic with the set of Hutchinson’s elegies uncovered and published by David Norbrook in 
																																																								





the 1990s.144 Sharon Achinstein, who discusses the post-Restoration elegies under the 
rubric of a “poetics of darkness,” observes in them “an interlacing of a grief over civil war 
atrocity that she would rather keep private, and protest against the relentless theatre that 
has become the public sphere.”145 This same admixture of grief and political protest infuses 
the passages in Order and Disorder where Hutchinson’s poetics of darkness enjoins 
“spiritual mirth” and praise for God’s providential guidance. In such passages, political 
and affective concerns blend together, linked inextricably with each other, with both 
militating against the ataraxic suspicion of political engagement characteristic of the 
Epicureanism of Lucretius’s De rerum natura. It is precisely when Hutchinson’s 
imagination turns toward this poetics of darkness with its mournful contemplation of 
suffering, that the specific critique of Lucretius’s De rerum natura comes most clearly to 
the fore.  
In Hutchinson’s portrayal of the events surrounding the life of Noah and the world-
destroying flood in Order and Disorder’s seventh canto, we can see these aspects of the 
text’s biblical poetics in action. In order to understand how and why Hutchinson departs 
from the Genesis text, and how these departures critique Lucretian ethics, we can begin 
with the apocalyptic description of the flood in Genesis:  
Fifteen cubits upward did the waters prevail; and the mountains were 
covered. And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl, and of 
cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, 
and every man: All in whose nostrils was the breath of life, of all that was 
in the dry land, died. And every living substance was destroyed which was 
upon the face of the ground, both man, and cattle, and the creeping things, 
and the fowl of the heaven; and they were destroyed from the earth: and 
																																																								
144 David Norbrook, “Lucy Hutchinson’s ‘Elegies’ and the Situation of the Republican 
Woman Writer,” English Literary Renaissance 27.3 (1997): 468-521.  





Noah only remained alive, and they that were with him in the ark. And the 
waters prevailed upon the earth an hundred and fifty days.146 
 
Striking here is the compression of time and space—one hundred and fifty days worth of 
suffering, in an event encompassing the entire world—into a few trenchant verses. The 
passage calls to mind Erich Auerbach’s discussion of the representational strategies at work 
in the story of Abraham and Isaac in Mimesis. Auerbach is particularly taken with the 
“blank duration” of the journey to the place—itself suspended in a kind of void—appointed 
for the sacrifice. By contrasting the Elohist’s representational strategy to that of Homeric 
epic, Auerbach tries to captures the grave reticence of the Biblical material that provides 
the basis for Hutchinson’s poem. The scriptural style is marked by: 
the externalization of only so much of the phenomena as is necessary for 
the purpose of the narrative, all else left in obscurity; the decisive points of 
the narrative alone are emphasized, what lies between is nonexistent; time 
and place are undefined and call for interpretation; thoughts and feelings 
remain unexpressed, are only suggested by the silence […]147 
 
But the three-days journey of Abraham is dwarfed by the sheer magnitude of “blank 
duration” implicit in the Flood story. Five months worth of gradual, continual suffering 
and death are given the space of four sentences stripped down to bare factual reportage. 
The repetition in the Genesis passage lends its account an emphatic air; the calamitous 
event is rendered in bold outline, stripped of detail. As I will shortly demonstrate, 
Hutchinson’s “Meditation” upon this passage takes up the task of rendering those hundred 
and fifty days sensible through filling out its details, letting imagination play over the 
events described, amplifying the biblical account yet not speculating into causes and 
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reasons. Entering into the “silence” of the scriptural account, the biblical poetics of Order 
and Disorder conjecture at what must have been the “thoughts and feelings” of those 
involved. By doing so Hutchinson’s poetics turn the event of cosmic maritime disaster into 
an emblem (“The Holy Spirit drew the old world thus / To be our emblem” (OD 7.193)) 
for contemplation, a form of contemplation meant to evoke precisely the affects of grief 
and compassion which Lucretius’s shipwreck scenes tacitly reject.  
Before turning directly to the description of the flood, we may read in the lead-up 
to that event some clues that Lucretius is on Hutchinson’s mind. Order and Disorder’s 
seventh canto begins by picking up the patriarchal descent from Adam through Seth and 
Enoch down to Noah. The history is marked by a continual turning away from God and 
toward brutish pleasures—pleasures reminiscent of the Restoration society. Hutchinson 
specifically targets the sins of sexual license and adultery, sensual indulgence in food and 
drink, and flaunting of wealth in grand clothing and estates—all three of which, as N. H. 
Keeble has written, were frequently attacked in sermons and satires, and all three of which 
had a basis in fact.148 The poem reports of Adam’s descendants: 
They thought themselves from pupillage now free; 
Their guardian gone, joyed in their liberty, 
Through which their sure and swift destruction came. 
Yet triumph they in their obdurate frame 
As if their stout sins had caused God to yield 
And leave them masters of the quitted fieild. 
As madmen who their friendly chains had broke, 
So raged they, gotten out of that safe yoke 
Which was a curb to their licentious will 
While waking conscience checked them in their ill. 
While heaven shined and rich fruits crowned the earth 
They wholly gave themselves to feasts and mirth, 
Ate, drunk, built piles, got children and new wives, 
																																																								






As if no danger threatened their lewd lives 
And their first natural impressions were 
Vain superstitions and a childish fear; 
Boasting they had attainèd to be wise 
When they with manly courage could despise 
Fictions of God and Hell that did control 
A vulgar, weak, deluded, pious soul. (OD 7.117-36) 
 
If it was not abundantly clear that through this depiction of a world run riot, Hutchinson is 
taking aim at the “licentious” skeptics and atheists of the Restoration court, the next line 
clarifies: “So run the old world then, so do they now” (OD 7.137).149 Norbrook’s notes 
point out the connection here to the courtly culture of ‘atheism,’ with its interest in 
materialist philosophy and specifically atomism.150 Biographically interesting is the fact 
that the Earl of Rochester, scion of the libertinism, atheism, and materialism of the 
Restoration court, was related to Lucy Hutchinson by marriage, and so may have been a 
specific topical reference for passages critical of these features of courtly culture in Order 
and Disorder.151 Lucretius’s De rerum itself, and Hutchinson’s complex feelings about her 
																																																								
149 For Hutchinson, the “old world” remains present alongside the new, just as Adam (the 
“old man”) and Christ (the “new man”) are copresent forces in the historical period between 
Incarnation and Apocalypse, and in the lives of individual believers. The passage 
demonstrates Hutchinson making use of a typological hermeneutic of Biblical 
interpretation described by Kevin Killeen, The Political Bible in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 35: “The typological shifts by which 
figures of the Old Testament could be prefigurative of both the New and of contemporary 
events were discerned in a reading practice that insisted on a constant negotiation of 
meaning between text and event-in-history and a perpetual modulation between the divine 
political presence in the Bible and the providential ‘evidence’ of God’s action in the present 
[…] Typology purported to discover the conjoined nature of historically disparate events 
or figures.” See also Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism and the Rise of Natural 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 129-137.  
150 The most notorious of the Royalist materialist natural philosophers was Hobbes, who 
was part of the intellectual circle around Charles II in France during the Republican 
experiments in England. Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) advances an unwavering materialist 
natural philosophy, as well as a strong defense of monarchical government.  
151  See David Norbrook, "Hutchinson [née Apsley], Lucy (1620–1681), poet and 





work translating that poem, are partly formed in response to the fact that Epicurean / 
Lucretian ideas originally thought to support Puritan spiritual and intellectual culture by 
confronting superstition were being conscripted to the service of the Augustan Restoration 
culture.  
Back to Noah’s world: God continues to care providentially for the denizens of the 
old world, despite their willful rejection of Him: 
His watchful providence for them employed, 
Nor left the wretched world without a guide, 
But wisely led and turned their violent streams 
To ends that were not in their thoughts nor aims; 
Wrought their deliverance, danger did prevent, 
When they miscalled his high help accident, 
Nor owned nor blessed that unseen powerful hand 
By whose support Nature’s loose frame did stand. (OD 7.149-56) 
 
The mistaken vision of those who imagine the world as utterly stochastic, created and ruled 
by the accident of the atomic swerve (“this Casuall, Irrationall dance of Attomes” (DRN 
D.68), echoes language Hutchinson used to decry Lucretian materialism in the dedicatory 
epistle of her translation of De rerum. Writing of the plight of heathen philosophers, who 
were endowed with consciousness of sin but lacked revelation of its remedy, Hutchinson 
explains: 
they set up their vaine imaginations in the roome of God, and devize 
superstitious foolish services to avert his wrath, & propitiate his favour, 
suitable to their devized God, inventing such fables of their Elizium & Hell, 
& other joyes & tortures of those places, as made this Author & others turne 
them into allegories, and thinke they treated more reverently of Gods, when 
they placd them above the cares & disturbances of humane affairs, and set 
																																																								
order atheism was becoming fashionable among courtiers, notably the earl of Rochester, 
son of her cousin Anne Wilmot, who had intervened for her husband in 1660. Her own 
early translation of Lucretius was now returning to haunt her. Learning that an 
unauthorized manuscript was in circulation, she had a new copy made and presented to her 
friend Arthur Annesley, earl of Anglesey, with a dedication denouncing modern atheists as 





them in an unperturbed rest & felicity, leaving all things here, to Accident 
& Chance, denying that determinate wise Councell and Order of things they 
could not dive into, and deriding Heaven & Hell, Eternal Rewards & 
Punishments, as fictions in the whole, because the instances of them in 
particular were so ridiculous, as seemd rather stories invented to fright 
children, then to perswade reasonable men. (DRN D.107-21).  
 
Throughout the dedication, Hutchinson connects the ancient atomism with the skeptical 
philosophical stances of Royalists such as Hobbes, or Restoration court figures like 
Rochester (“the old comtemplative Heathen revivd, & brought forth in new dresses” (DRN 
D.95-6)). According to these passages, the Lucretian view of the world order is subject to 
a twofold error: on the one hand, cosmic order is conceived of as emerging from pure 
chance and accident; while on the other, natural order itself is seen as autonomous and 
independent from divinity, as the gods rest in their own perfected ataraxia, free of all 
concern with the goings-on of the world. Opposed to naïve trust in natural order is 
Hutchinson’s invocation, on the eve of the catastrophic flood, of “Nature’s loose frame,” 
of a world that would easily run to chaos without the constant interventions of Providence 
on the part of an active, involved, and personal divinity. In sum, then, in the lead-up to the 
flood event, we can detect several moments of incipient critique of Lucretian positions, and 
we see also that these critiques are bound up with topical political critiques. 
Though Hutchinson writes, concerning the worldwide disaster of the flood and 
Noah’s experience, that “[t]hought cannot reach this universal rack” (OD 7.485) far enough 
to encompass it, Order and Disorder seeks virtue in the attempt. Noah has constructed his 
ark and its passengers have miraculously come aboard: 
Meanwhile, at the first hour, the storm begun. 
Black threatening clouds obscured the noonday sun 
And added double horror to the night 
Wherein no friendly star gave forth its light, 





Seeming to have quenched out all its radiant flame 
Except that whirling, cloud-engendered fire 
That doth even in its dreadful birth expire. 
Thick did these flames break thorough all the sky, 
Where rattling south winds as their ushers fly. 
Prodigious thunders followed the dire blaze, 
Filling all hears with terror and amaze 
While they the rocks, the oaks and mountains rent, 
Nor with less fury tore the firmament. 
These fragors thus unjointing the whole frame, 
Heav’n and Earth Chaos once again became. (OD 401-16). 
 
In terms of the question about biblical poetics and turning scripture into a romance, we 
may note here that Order and Disorder goes far beyond the account given in Genesis, 
filling in the grisly details of the scene. The passage serves as a ready corrective for those 
who might want to claim that Hutchinson’s biblical poetics cause her to hew somehow 
slavishly to what is given in the scripture (a claim often made in contrasting Order and 
Disorder with Milton’s more speculative supplementation in Paradise Lost). 152  More 
positively, the additions here amplify the sense of grief at beholding the scene, stoking the 
compassion of the reader, and the above passage is only the beginning of Hutchinson’s 
dilatory meditations on it: 
Nor did the wretches single deaths endure, 
Not less distracted now than late secure, 
Struck with dire apprehension, which is still 
The most tormenting plague in every ill. 
Though sudden the surprise, their death was slow, 
That terror might by the protraction grow. 
Some run from the ascending floods in vain, 
By falling torrents hurried back again; 
																																																								
152 See, for instance, Joanna Piccotto, Labors of Innocence in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press , 2010), 403: “In assuming narrative responsibility 
for innocent existence, [Milton] engaged not in fiction but experimentation: an ongoing 
effort of rational reconstruction. The distinction was lost on many of his contemporaries. 
Lucy Hutchinson’s hexameral epic Order and Disorder, clearly written as a corrective to 
Paradise Lost, is prefaced by the disclaimer, ‘I tremble to think of turning Scripture into a 





Some climbed up the high hills but only there 
Longer in death’s sad expectation were, 
At last as certainly destroyed as those 
Whom the first rising billows did enclose. 
Some from high towers the desolation viewed, 
Whom thither the triumphing flood pursued 
And made them know, the walls that most aspire 
Yield small defence against th’Almighty’s ire. 
[…] 
Some vessels got, but could not then provide 
Food to sustain their lives, and starving died. 
Some pushed the billows back, but with those oars 
Could not convey themselves to any shores; 
Their strength they did in vain endeavors spend 
And fainting could no more with fate contend. (OD 7.453-78) 
 
We continue to see the affectively charged intent of these meditations on the influx of 
universal disorder, marked out by words explicitly evocative of compassion: the “terror” 
and “sad expectation” of the flood’s victims solicits the reader’s own emotional response. 
By presenting a scene of oceanic disaster in a way meant to elicit the emotions of grief and 
compassion, Order and Disorder actively reworks the “shipwreck with spectator” motif in 
De rerum natura. Attentive readers familiar with Hutchinson’s translation of that work 
would notice here a direct allusion: there are spectators of this scene just as in the Lucretian 
text, those who climb to “high towers,” only to be swallowed up themselves. The language 
here echoes the Lucretius translation, which speaks of “that high tower which wise mens 
learning builds” (DRN 2.8), i.e., the philosophical wisdom enabling the spectatorial 
distance of the sage, which the safety of shore in the shipwreck motif metaphorizes. The 
appearance of such “high towers” in Order and Disorder, the “walls that most aspire” to 
the security of philosophical wisdom, make clear the critical reference to this passage. And 
the experience of the inhabitants of those towers—they are not only engulfed in the 





to the spectatorial pleasure described by Lucretius. Further supplementing the Genesis 
account, Order and Disorder’s assertion that other sailors joined Noah in attempting to 
survive the flood on ships, but “[c]ould not convey themselves to any shores,” also casts a 
sidelong glance to at the image of shipwreck with spectator, since it works to show that the 
shore itself, like the “high towers,” are ultimately unreliable, offering only an illusion of 
the safe distance from disorder and concomitant emotional upheaval—the secure ground 
upon which ataraxic pleasure grounds itself. Hutchinson’s description of the flood event 
stands as a meditative reminder that such safe harbor cannot be attained through the 
philosophical exercises of the pagan schools; wherever it exist, as on the ark, it comes by 
a grace that transcends the wisdom of any individual human being. Absent providence, or 
in cases where God’s benevolence turns to wrath, then “Nature’s loose frame” immediately 
reverts to a world-consuming chaos and disorder. These two moments in the description of 
the flood show Hutchinson offering direct critiques of ataraxia, echoing the exact language 
used in the translation of De rerum’s shipwreck with spectator passage. The “high towers” 
of philosophical wisdom, the safe harbors of the sage’s mind, offer no protection from the 
universal flood. 
 After describing the slow death of swimming beasts and the birds of the air—
another particularly grievous passage, since these creatures have not come in for the same 
strident moral critique as their human counterparts—we read: 
With chokèd carcasses the seas grew black. 
Dead shepherds floated with their drownèd sheep 
And larger herds with those that did them keep. 
The winds awhile with lighter things did play 
Till ruder storms carried them all away. 
The gallants’ scarves and feathers, soldiers’ tents, 
The poor man’s rags and princes’ ornaments, 





Themselves too borne up with light robes like sails, 
Bandied in sport awhile, at last did all 
Equally lost into the hazard fall. (OD 7.486-96) 
 
This closing note gives the lie to Hutchinson’s self-effacing claim to have no “gift” for 
poetic invention, for it encodes a complex critique of the affectations of courtly culture, as 
well as a powerful statement about the transitory nature of political authority and social 
hierarchy, in a single striking image. There is a specific emphasis here on attire. Obsession 
with clothing went hand in hand, as N. H. Keeble points out, with the emphasis on 
“refinement in manners,” the “polite, civil, and decent” bearing not only of courtiers, but 
also of Restoration culture more broadly.153 Such material markers of social station and 
worldly aspiration are made to float “like sails,” a grimly ironic simile driving home the 
inability of either these commodities or the wealth they conspicuously signify to provide 
any shelter.  
 The description of the biblical flood in Order and Disorder mounts a critique of the 
Lucretian ethical ideal of ataraxia, and along with that the underlying ontology of atomistic 
materialism. I have shown also that Hutchinson’s biblical poetics in Order and Disorder 
do move beyond scripture in determinative ways, and that the author’s proclamation of 
faithfulness to scripture does not mean the text takes no liberties with its material. The 
specific movement beyond scripture in Order and Disorder—a meditative elaboration of 
biblical narrative imagined as material historical event—invites emotional response, filling 
in the declamatory account in Genesis with details encoding complex critiques of ancient 
and contemporary philosophical and political positions. In the next section, I will clarify 
the exact nature of, and reasons for, Hutchinson’s critique, via a discussion of the 
																																																								





revaluation of grief and compassion in Augustine, specifically City of God, Book IX. 
Drawing on the dedication of Hutchinson’s De rerum translation, as well as her prose 
Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson, I will present further instances where scenes 
of shipwreck encode the critique of Lucretian / Epicurean ethics. Following this, I explore 
the connection between Lucretian atomism and ataraxia, between the ontological vision of 
the world presented in De rerum natura, and the ethical stance held out as ideal. This 
exploration at the nexus of ontology and ethics entails consideration of theodicy.  
4. Atoms and Ataraxia 
 Especially within the discipline of literary studies, a substantial portion of the 
scholarship on Hutchinson and Lucretius—and more generally on Lucretius in the early 
modern period—has centered on the reception of the pagan poet’s atomistic materialism. I 
have already mentioned Stephen Greenblatt’s The Swerve, which has prompted historians 
and literary critics to explore just how far, whether and in what ways, the idea of an atomic 
clinamen (rather than divine creation) at the origin of things may have helped usher in the 
modern age of the autonomous, freethinking subject. In this section I will briefly review a 
bit of the relevant criticism on Hutchinson and Lucretian materialism, before turning 
toward my principle argument: that the atomic natural philosophy and the ethical ideal of 
ataraxia cannot ultimately be separated, and that the celebrated physical theory is in large 
part instrumental, serving the ethical ideal, and is more rightly considered as a scaffolding 
for moral philosophy than as a theoretical value in its own right.  
 The discussion of Lucretian influence on Order and Disorder has largely centered 
on the question of how seriously Hutchinson took Epicurean atomism while she was 





atomist-materialist notions after the catastrophic collapse of the Good Old Cause and her 
turn toward biblical epic. It is important to note here that atomic philosophy and Christian 
piety were not necessarily viewed as incompatible. Quite the contrary: Pierre Gassendi, 
Walter Charleton, Jan Comenius, Robert Boyle and others maintained that an atomic view 
of the natural world was more consistent with Christian teaching than was the older 
Aristotelian model.154 This means Hutchinson’s move away from the active study of pagan 
philosophy and toward scriptural meditation need not imply a concomitant rejection of 
atomic materialism. In this spirit Cassandra Gorman reads Order and Disorder as 
combining “Platonic, Lucretian and Calvinist terminology to establish a material 
experience that accommodates spiritual knowledge.”155  That is, Hutchinson remains a 
materialist of some stripe, and that materialism does not forbid but rather stands behind 
and strengthens Calvinistic / Augustinian references to sinful and redeemed bodies, and 
Platonically-inflected talk of forms. Gorman is right, I think, to point out that Hutchinson’s 
engagement with materialism and atomism is every bit as complex as Milton’s, and not 
reducible to simple binaries.156  
																																																								
154 Reid Barbour, “Lucy Hutchinson, Atomism and the Atheist Dog,” in Women, Science 
and Medicine 1500-1700, ed. Lynette Hunter and Sarah Hutton (Phoenix Mill: Sutton 
Publishing, 1997), 128-131. See also Norbrook, “Lucretian Sublime,” 7: “Natural 
philosophers were finding the traditional Aristotelian framework for comprehending the 
universe inadequate and Epicurean atomism proved a more effective instrument for 
understanding many phenomena. In the 1640s and 1650s the philosopher Pierre Gassendi 
published a series of massive works on Epicureanism which rehabilitated all its aspects, 
and claimed that the very implausibility of atoms’ coming together by sheer chance to form 
a cosmos was a useful proof for the existence of God. Lucretius could then be valued as an 
opponent not of religion but of superstition.” 
155 Cassandra Gorman, “Lucy Hutchinson, Lucretius, and Soteriological Materialism,” The 
Seventeenth Century 28.3 (2013): 293-309, and see esp. 306.  





 Jonathan Goldberg takes this recognition further still, and seeks to read back from 
Lucretius and into Order and Disorder a critique of notions of identity and difference that 
would destabilize even the critical assertion Hutchinson is negotiating a series of 
contradictions or tensions between De rerum and Puritan orthodoxies. In Order and 
Disorder Goldberg sees Hutchinson as “compulsively” attempting “to place God where 
Lucretian matter prevails,” which for him means “to place God at the invisible location of 
the atoms.”157 The strength of Goldberg’s account lies in his recognition of a pervasive 
materialist thread running consistently through Hutchinson’s retelling of Genesis. But his 
argument tends toward an improbable conclusion: Hutchinson seems to emerge as a kind 
of proto- or perhaps crypto-Spinozan, a poet and thinker in whom the prospect of “Deus 
sive Natura” is already made available, even if Order and Disorder and other works leave 
that availability latent, waiting to be actualized by later critics.  
 Far less attention has been given the critique of the specific Lucretian ethical ideal 
of ataraxia in early modern Biblical epic. A notable recent exception is Jesse Hock’s essay 
in the collection Milton’s Modernities. Hock works with Paradise Lost rather than Order 
and Disorder, but makes the case that Satan in that poem at times figures forth the failures 
of ataraxia. A recent review essay by John Leonard wonders how the figure of Belial, 
whose lines about “thoughts that wander through eternity” directly translate Lucretius, 
might fit into the argument Hock puts forward. However that may be, taken together, the 
essay and Leonard’s response confirm that a critique of ataraxia from the standpoint of 
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(2006): 275-301, 293. The essay is reproduced in Goldberg, The Seeds of Things: 
Theorizing Sexuality and Materiality in Renaissance Representations (New York: 





Christian ethics was on the mind of Hutchinson’s contemporary. We have already begun 
to see that Hutchinson’s critique in the flood episode is more direct, more sustained, and 
more intently focused on metaphorical ramifications of the seminal Lucretian image of 
shipwreck with spectator than what we find in Milton’s epic. This critique of ataraxia goes 
hand in hand with a critique of Epicurean natural philosophy, since the theory of the atoms 
was not an end in itself, rather serving as a theoretical instrument effecting the therapeutic 
attainment of an ataraxic stance toward the turbulence of the world. 
Catharine Wilson, who has charted the progress of Epicureanism through the early 
modern period, puts this point very succinctly: “Epicureanism in its original form was not 
especially favourable to the open-ended investigation of nature.”158 Theoretical curiosity 
was not in and of itself a value for the Epicureans and Lucretius; the value lay rather in the 
therapeutic effect of repeatedly running up against the atoms, which were the absolute 
limits of knowledge. On the Epicurean-Lucretian account, “[o]ne should believe that all 
celestial phenomena, even [and especially] the most alarming, have atomic explanations, 
as there are no coherent alternatives to that position, but it is counterproductive to try for 
more.”159 The atomic theory of Lucretius stakes its claim to validity not on its truth value, 
but on its functional value for ethics; it is ultimately a “technique of demonstrating the 
affective neutrality of all possible theories about the natural phenomena that surround man 
and fill him with uncertainty.”160 The “affective neutrality” of all theory is the point; for 
the ancient Epicurean, the materialist, atomist theory is a therapeutic instrument.   
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This strain of Epicureanism, with ontology in service of ethics, flourished in the 
seventeenth century alongside other materialist lines of thought. 161  There is also 
quantifiable evidence of an increasing interest in the atomistic theories contained in De 
rerum, beginning in the late sixteenth century.162 By the time of Hutchinson’s translation, 
Gassendi and others had created a strong interest in Lucretius’s atomistic theory, and 
reimagined its ethical commitments in terms compatible with Christian belief. 163 
Hutchinson’s marginal glosses in the translation of De rerum show that she found the 
passages concerning natural philosophy noteworthy as well. Yet such notations do not 
necessarily imply an interest in ontology and natural philosophy for its own sake, nor an 
approval of theoretical curiosity. The flood episode in Order and Disorder demonstrates 
that Hutchinson was more concerned with how Lucretius’s atomism militated against an 
appropriate affective experience of the meaning-laden processes underlying natural events. 
Thus Hutchinson recognized a fact that some of the more experimentally-minded early 
modern interpreters of Lucretius overlooked: that the atomic hypothesis in Lucretius was 
never meant to stand alone; it was rather intended to provide speculation with an absolute 
limit, and so to delimit the range of the sage’s affective response to disturbing events in the 
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162 Ada Palmer, “Reading Lucretius in the Renaissance,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
73, no. 3 (2012), 395-416, see esp. 415.  
163 On the Christianization of Lucretius, see Hutton, British Philosophy in the Seventeenth 
Century; Norbrook, “Atheists and Republicans”; and Joy, Gassendi the Atomist. Hans 
Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: 
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phenomenon itself producible independently of its real conditions in nature.” Both 
Gassendi and Boyle, that is, put the atomic hypothesis to work in the service of human 
constructive capacity and experimentalism, rather than taking it as a therapeutic premise 





world by suggesting that beyond the limit imposed by the atoms, meaning is dissolved into 
the utterly stochastic churning of unintelligible forces. The atoms are to inquiry what the 
Pillars of Hercules were to the classical world: they furnish theory a nec plus ultra. 
Let us look again at the signature Lucretian image of shipwreck with spectator, 
informed now by the foregoing observations about the essential connection between 
atomism and ataraxia. The lines begin book two, and so follow directly on Hutchinson’s 
proem, which I quoted above. The passage reads: 
Pleasant it is, when rough winds seas deforme, 
On shore to see men labour in the storme; 
Not that our pleasure springs from their distresse, 
But from the safetie we our selues possesse. 
Pleasant, when without danger tis beheld, 
To see two engag’d armies in the feild; 
But nothing a more pleasant prospect yields, 
Than that high tower which wise mens learning builds, 
Where well secur’d we wandring troopes survey, 
Who in a maze of error search their way, 
For witt and glorie earnestly contend, 
Both day and night in vaine endeavors spend, 
To hord vp wealth, and swim in full delights. 
O wretched soules whom ignorance benights! (DRN 2.1-14) 
 
The sage stands on the terra firma of the shore, looking out at a scene of shipwreck, 
enjoying a pleasure carefully distinguished from Schadenfreude, but which still takes the 
suffering of others as a signifier of the security of the philosopher, rather than an ethical 
problem for her. Formally interesting here is the slight irregularity of the line “Than that 
high tower which wise mens leaning builds,” in which the word “tower” potentially 
stretches out over the monosyllable which would ensure regular pentameter. Perhaps 





the poetic construction of the line. 164  In any case, the ethics of the autonomous, 
eudaimonistic self here is conditional upon the philosophical achievement of aesthetic 
distance from a catastrophe in which only the others are entangled, and this through their 
folly and thirst for distinction, their desire for “witt and glorie.” Here the Epicurean sage 
resembles Lucretius’s gods, who have removed themselves entirely outside the sphere of 
mundane concern and the affairs of humanity, so as to enjoy the pleasure of a permanent 
and perfected ataraxia.   
Hans Blumenberg reads Lucretius’s invention as both a culmination and 
contradiction of the “theory ideal of classical Greek philosophy.” For the sake of argument 
let us take the generalization at face value: Blumenberg asserts that the Greek theory ideal 
accentuates the felicity of the observer of the starry heavens; the benefits of philosophy 
come through the contemplation of the noble objects of theoretical inquiry themselves. But 
in Lucretius:  
what the spectator enjoys is not the sublimity of the objects his theory opens 
up for him but his own self-consciousness, over against the whirl of atoms 
out of which everything that he observes is constituted, including himself. 
The cosmos is no longer the Order whose contemplation fills the observer 
with happiness (Eudaemonia). It is at most the remaining assurance that 
such a firm ground exists at all, beyond the reach of the hostile element.165 
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Thus the pursuit of ataraxia as an ethical ideal shifts the locus of philosophical value away 
from the cosmic and/or worldly objects of inquiry—away, in fine, from the natural-
philosophical theory of the atoms and all the sublimity of their chaos, clinamen, and 
coming into apparent order—and toward the “self-consciousness” of the observer. The 
“hostile element” in the atomic theory is ubiquitous, constituting both body and world; 
therefore the only secure harbor is in the psyche of the sage who has learned to treat all 
theoretical explanations of natural phenomena as ultimately indifferent, since in the end 
they all must run against the absolute limit of thought provided by the atomic hypothesis. 
Driving the point about the ultimate indifference of theory home, Blumenberg continues:  
When Lucretius resorts once again to the metaphor of distress at sea and of 
shipwreck, he accordingly speaks of his universe of randomly moving 
atoms as an ocean of matter (pelagus materiae), from which the forms of 
nature are thrown onto the beach of visible appearance, like the debris from 
a massive shipwreck (quasi naufragiis magnis multisque coortis), as a 
warning to mortals of the perils of the sea. It is only because the supply of 
atoms is inexhaustible that the catastrophes of physical reality continue to 
be fruitful in forms and to allow the man standing on the shore of 
appearance to observe a certain regularity. One sees what the indicium 
mortabilus (advice to mortals) means here: man does well to be content with 
the spectator’s role and not to abandon his philosophical standpoint before 
and above the natural world. As an individual, he can gain no advantage 
from the identity of catastrophe and productivity in this theory of an ever-
developing, ever-dissolving universe.166 
 
For the Epicurean (like Lucretius), the objects of theory are no longer a locus of value, but 
only the theoretical stance itself, with its assumption of distance from the sublime chaos 
underpinning apparent order, which theory regards as an unwitting byproduct of infinite 
disaster. And so the question of affect comes once again to the fore. The idea that a mind 
properly buffered by philosophical wisdom, having achieved the proper spectatorial 
																																																								





distance from the chaotic dance of atoms, could by this distance become affectively 
immunized from the turbulence of the world, can more readily be seen as virtuous in the 
case that the ultimate reality grasped by theory really is a matter of indifference. Even the 
Epicurean gods depend for their happiness on the attainment of this distance as they, 
“having passed through philosophy to their situation outside the worlds […] are neither the 
authors nor the administrators of what happens in the world and are concerned wholly with 
themselves.”167  
But if the reality posited in a cosmology is not an object of indifference with respect 
to human beings; if, that is, there is not only a providential order of things (as the Stoics 
thought) but if that order has a personally involved author and administrator, one’s 
affective stance toward the world and its beings, oneself and all the others who find 
themselves within that world, must become quite different. A change of affective 
comportment under such circumstances would appear to be required, since the events that 
befall others have a meaning which encompasses the self. The line, essential to Stoic and 
Epicurean ethics, between my ends and values and the ends and values of others is blurred, 
since both are subsumed within a universal and all-embracing providential order, one 
requiring vigilant discernment so that its meanings, and their import respecting one’s own 
salvation, will not be missed. Hutchinson’s critique of Lucretian ethical philosophy, with 
its revaluation of grief and compassion as affects that respond appropriately to the truth of 
human suffering in the world, turns on just such a perception of authorship and meaning in 
the world. It also draws on Augustinian philosophical anthropology, articulated in the 
																																																								





course of early Christianity’s conflict with eudaimonism. It is to this early Christian 
background, and Hutchinson’s adaptation of it, that I turn in the next section.  
5. Compassion and Grief 
 The following excursion into Augustine will help us to understand the motives for 
Hutchinson’s critique of Lucretian ethics, as well as to explain more generally the 
importance of emotion in Hutchinson’s work. In a recent article on Hutchinson’s religious 
prose, Elizabeth Clarke has noted that one distinguishing feature of the treatise On the 
Principles of Christian Religion (1668?) is the emphasis on affect:  
Most of the last part of the treatise seems to be dedicated to how it feels to 
be a Christian: how the human believer discerns the presence of a Divine 
Spirit dwelling in her and how she facilitates its operations. The ‘duties’ 
Lucy Hutchinson talks about, which are the way a human believer relates to 
the divine presence, are the most original aspects of this theological treatise, 
and their very difference from the way ‘works’ are understood in the 
Arminian-Antinomian quarrel helps to illuminate the freshness of the 
theological thinking that is going on here.168 
 
The “duties” Hutchinson specifies are all what we might call affective in character: the list 
is made up of joy, delight, fear, desire, hope, and confidence.169 Commenting on this list 
of “duties” in the context of debates around Antinomianism and the necessity of works, 
Clarke comments: 
These are certainly not what Antinomians would refer to as ‘works’—they 
are aspects of the believer’s relationship with God, resembling what look 
like ‘emotions’ rather than ‘duties’. This final section of Principles is, 
however, devoted to ‘inward worship’. Hutchinson is very clear that 
‘inward worship’ must accompany all ‘outward worship’. It seems that 
Lucy Hutchinson is redefining ‘duties’ not as what Antinomians call 
‘works’ but as something else—emotions, or what would be called 
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‘motions’ in the seventeenth century—holy impulses produced by the Holy 
Spirit.170 
 
I quote this essay at some length because it shows that the turn toward affect and “holy 
impulses” of an emotional kind form the distinguishing conceptual basis of Hutchinson’s 
theology in general.  
 Further support for this is given by Mark Burden, who has shown that in 
Hutchinson’s translation of John Owen’s theological treatise Theologoumena, affect plays 
a key role. Without digressing too far: Owen’s treatise describes the growth of pagan 
philosophy out of the corruption of perfect theology after the fall. This corruption involves 
both human reason and human passions, and crucially involves them with each other. The 
word “feeling,” meaning both a groping movement of the reasoning mind, and an affective 
searching, comes to prominence when Hutchinson translates this part of Owen’s treatise. 
“Philosophy, then,” Burden summarizes, “is the consequence of the corruption of theology 
by the fallen mind, for which emotion and intellect are fatally intertwined. It is this dual 
element of feeling as both passionate reason and reasoned passion through which 
Hutchinson interprets Owen’s narrative of the vainglorious arrogation of philosophy by the 
Greeks.” 171  Working with the Elegies, Erica Longfellow has similarly noted the 
importance of affect in Hutchinson’s cosmological and theological thought. Longfellow 
demonstrates that in the Elegies, Hutchinson “draws on a rich tradition of literature and 
Biblical scholarship that likened divine love to human love,” and that the “affective 
language of the Psalms and Song of Songs” works in the poems to support the analogy 
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between human eros and divine agape. Longfellow describes how for Hutchinson, 
“[h]uman beings, and human history, issue forth like streams and reflections, bearing with 
them an element of the divine within their corrupt forms. It is this element of the divine 
that enables human beings to know God, who is otherwise invisible.”172 The evidence from 
Clark, Burden, and from this study suggests that the “element of the divine” in question is 
affective in character, and that a strong belief in the connection between human affect and 
divine affect is a large part of Hutchinson’s reasons for turning away from Lucretius. All 
of this evidence confirms the central importance of affect in Hutchinson’s theology. The 
critique of Lucretian ataraxia in Order and Disorder’s shipwreck with salvator setpiece in 
Book 7, enlarging as it does the story of the flood as a means of educating and shaping the 
affects of the faithful as a means of drawing them closer to the affective structure of the 
Godhead, shows (as does the passage from Owen) how struggling with classical sources 
participates in this educative process. In this struggle with classical exponents of 
eudaimonism, Hutchinson was preceded by, and took some cues from, Augustine.  
 In the fourth and fifth chapters of the ninth book of City of God, Augustine 
undertakes a critique of Stoic ethical philosophy which develops along lines similar to 
Hutchinson’s, and his critique centers on a scene of shipwreck. Augustine refers to the Attic 
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Nights of Aulus Gellius, in which Gellius reports “that he once made a sea-voyage with a 
distinguished Stoic philosopher.” Augustine’s summary of the account continues:  
when the sky and sea grew threatening and the ship was tossed about and in 
great peril, this philosopher grew pale with fear. Those present noted this, 
and, even though death was so close, they were most curious to know 
whether the philosopher’s mind would be disturbed. When the tempest had 
subsided and safety made conversation—or, indeed, gossip—possible, one 
of those who had boarded the ship, a wealthy and pleasure-loving Asiatic, 
jokingly teased the philosopher with having shown fear and grown pale 
while he himself had remained unmoved by impending disaster.173 
 
Some banter ensues, in which the philosopher says that while the prosperous man might be 
forgiven for not having much concern about the fate of such an ignominious soul, the 
philosopher himself was right to worry about his own valuable life. Such gibes aside, the 
philosopher explains to Aulus Gellius that the experience of fear is not properly an emotion 
at all, but rather a pre-emotion that may disturb the body and mind for a little while, until 
the Stoic sage can consent, or withhold consent, from the emotional judgment of the matter. 
Although some scholars have held that Augustine’s critique of Stoicism misses the mark 
because it confuses the pre-emotional disturbance with emotion proper,174 in this instance 
Augustine seems less inclined to critique this technical dimension of the Stoic theory of 
the passions, and more inclined to take a more obvious tack: “But how much more 
honourable it would have been,” Augustine muses, “if the Stoic in Aulus Gellius’s story 
had been disturbed by compassion for a fellow man, in order to comfort him, rather than 
by fear of shipwreck! Far better and more humane.”175 Yet this stance would, by his own 
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lights, have been worse for the Stoic philosopher in the Attic Nights than the state of being 
perturbed in a preliminary way by fear, since “Stoics […] are wont to reproach even 
compassion,” and a genuine experience of compassion could only come about through the 
kind of consent which Stoic ethical theory takes to be the hallmark of emotion proper, as 
distinguished from mere pre-emotional disturbance.176 
 Yet Augustine admits in this same book that other pagan philosophers do not reject 
compassion in this way. “Cicero, so eminent an orator,” Augustine writes, “did not hesitate 
to call compassion a virtue, whereas the Stoics are not ashamed to number it among the 
vices.”177 This is important because it points us to a deeper level of the Augustinian critique 
of pagan ethical thought, one that we have already seen at work in Order and Disorder. In 
short, it points us toward grief. While Cicero is willing to admit compassion into the list of 
affects that can be experienced positively, he joins the Stoics—and the other major schools 
of classical and antique eudaimonistic ethics—in rejecting grief. Augustine, however, 
appeals to the fallen nature of the world and the universality of loss inaugurated by the fall 
to suggest that the experience of grief cannot be warded off, if one stands in full 
acknowledgment of one’s condition. James Wetzel, commenting on this Augustinian 
revaluation of grief, writes: 
Augustine’s rehabilitation of grief marks his profoundest break not only 
from the cognitive therapy of Stoicism but from all the various forms of 
philosophical self-help he associated with classical culture. Even his 
beloved Platonists, who seemed to him to love the one God, desired too 
blithely the soul’s separation from the body, as if this were a liberation of 
life and not the disintegration of personality that comes of sin and death. 
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They failed to comprehend, as would any school of philosophy untutored in 
scriptural wisdom, the first form of grief: the soul’s lack of God.178 
 
The rejection of grief in Stoicism and elsewhere in ancient ethics depends upon the fact 
that it is an emotion without a eudaimonistic use: it contributes nothing to the life of the 
sage. The use that grief could be put to, namely instructing a person not yet wise in how to 
turn away from the evils of the world that invite loss into the life of the soul, do not apply 
in the case of the wise man.179 Yet for Augustine, original sin touches every member of the 
human race, and its most intimately felt aspect is the one touching the insufficiency of self 
and the need for grace. And more importantly, the perception of security from grief on the 
part of the sage is based upon a misapprehension of the essential nature of reality, since it 
overlooks the fact that human beings are born into a loss they did not author—for 
Augustine, the loss of God introduced by the fall. Thus where the eudaimonist feels most 
secure in self-sufficiency, a self-sufficiency which is the source of joy in Lucretius’s 
shipwreck with spectator motif, there they are in fact in most peril. As I showed above, 
Hutchinson’s description of the inhabitants of the world before the world flood plays upon 
this same sense of security: “They wholly gave themselves to feasts and mirth […] As if 
no danger threatened their lewd lives” (OD 7.128-30). As we will see presently, 
Hutchinson makes a similar gesture in the dedicatory epistle of the translation of De rerum 
natura, where the Augustinian sense of fallenness—of a world in which everything, 
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including nature and the human mind, are always already at sea, and so in danger of 
shipwreck—is turned ingeniously against the poet of ataraxia. In the epistle as in the flood 
episode, the specific emotion invoked is neither the pleasures of security from danger, nor 
righteous scorn of others’ obduracy (both of which responses would betoken an underlying 
sense of pride), but rather a solidly Augustinian feeling of grief for the other, or what 
Hutchinson will call “sad compassion.”   
To summarize the foregoing: Augustinian philosophical anthropology challenges 
Stoic and Epicurean ethics—indeed it challenges the whole eudaimonist ethical 
framework—by fundamentally altering the definition of the self, and (what I have not 
discussed here) emphasizing the relationship between self and a fallen, compromised, 
duplicitous human will in the generation of affect. Augustine confers upon grief and 
compassion (a species of grief directed toward the other rather than the self) a nobility 
denied by, in particular, the Epicureans. The Epicurean gesture of refusing grief and 
compassion is enlarged and given vivid poetic expression in the shipwreck with spectator 
motif that opens the second book of De rerum natura. There, as we saw, the Epicurean 
sage adopts an ethical stance that takes pleasure in measuring the spectatorial distance 
between the autonomous observer of shipwreck and the plight of those involved others. 
Augustine’s riposte to these refusals of grief and compassion give Hutchinson a template 
for her vision of the role of affect in a devout life, a vision in which right feeling comes to 
be as important as right acting, with the “duties” of inward devotion being tantamount to 
various affective stances. Such inward devotion informs the dedicatory epistle composed 





Hutchinson’s critique of Lucretius, and her decision to go ahead with publishing her 
translation of the poem despite misgivings, so I quote it here at some length: 
My Philosophers taught me, by their owne instance, that unregenerate, 
unsanctified reason makes men more monstrous by their learning, then the 
most sottish brutish idiots; while they employ the most excellent gifts of 
humane understanding, witt, & all the other noble endowments of the soule, 
as weapons against him that gave them. The gave me a dreadfull prospect 
of the misery of lapsed nature, whereby I saw, with sad compassion, the 
uncomfortable shadow of death wherein they consume their lives, that are 
alienated from the knowledge of God. I saw the insufficiency of humane 
reason (how greate an Idoll soever it is now become among the growne-
men) to arrive to any pure & simple Truth, with all its helps of Art & Studie. 
I learnt to hate all unsanctified excellence, if that impropriety of expression 
may be admitted, & to run out of my monstrous selfe, to seeke Light, Life, 
knowledge, tranquility, rest, & whatever else is requisite to make up a 
compleate blessednesse, and lasting felicity, in its only true & pure devine 
fountaine. As one, that, walking in the darke, had miraculously scapd a 
horrible precipice, by day light coming back & discovering his late danger; 
startles and reviews it with affright, so did I, when I, in the mirrour of 
opposed truth and holinesse and blessednes, saw the ugly deformitie, and 
the desperate tendency of corrupted nature, in its greatest pretences, and 
having by rich grace scapd the shipwreck of my soule among those vaine 
Philosophers, who by wisedome knew now God, I could not but in charity 
sett up this seamarke, to warne incautious travellers, and leave a testimony, 
that those walkes of witt which poore vaineglorious schollars call the Muses 
groves, are enchanted thicketts, and while they tipple att their celebrated 
Helicon, the loose their lives, and fill themselves with poyson, drowning 
their spiritts in those pudled waters, and neglecting that healing spring of 
Truth, which only hath the vertue to restore & refresh sick humane life. 
(DRN P.163-90). 
 
The image of shipwreck recurs here, as Hutchinson imagines the “vaine Philosophers” 
themselves caught up in a catastrophe that for all their wisdom they could not even 
perceive. Turning the metaphorics of maritime emergency back upon Lucretius, 
Hutchinson views the position of the sage, tranquil and deluded, with “sad compassion,” a 
grieving form of fellow-feeling that confirms faith without joying in self-sufficiency. The 
Lucretius text, which vaunts the security of the sage against existential shipwreck, becomes 





dedicatory epistle’s warnings. Hutchinson turns her own excursions into pagan philosophy 
into an emblematic instance of salvation from unsuspected dangers, met with not in the 
pursuit of fortune or honor, but of the very philosophical wisdom Lucretius considers a 
safe harbor. 
 Hutchinson’s emphasis on grief and compassion, with its Augustinian roots, makes 
the claim to approach ultimate reality more closely than the pagan wisdom of antiquity. 
This claim centers on the question of how eudaimonism and Christianity understand the 
origins and the lived experience of evil in the world. That is to say, it centers on theodicy. 
As I noted in the introduction, Hutchinson’s own life was marked by the kinds of suffering 
and loss that put theodical thinking to the test, especially the loss of her husband John on 
charges related to political sedition after the Restoration. In this final section I highlight 
one further instance of shipwreck metaphorics in Hutchinson’s work, this one drawn from 
her biography of John, which exposes how theodicy and politics interact in Hutchinson’s 
work and thought.   
6. Conclusion: Politics, Theodicy, and Authentic Emotions 
I form the light, and create darkness: I make 
peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all 
these things. Isaiah 45:7 KJV 
 
 If for a moment we take a step back from the specific features of the ethical conflict 
between Hutchinson and Lucretius, we can make some general observations about 
maritime metaphors that lead us toward the connection between theodicy and politics. 
“Two prior assumptions above all,” Hans Blumenberg writes, “determine the burden of 
meaning carried by the metaphorics of seafaring and shipwreck.” He continues: 
First, the sea as a naturally given boundary of the realm of human activities 





in which it is difficult to find one’s bearings. In Christian iconography as 
well, the sea is the place where evil appears, sometimes with the Gnostic 
touch that it stands for all-devouring Matter that takes everything back into 
itself. It is part of the Johannine apocalypse’s promise that, in the messianic 
fulfillment, there will no longer be a sea (he thalassa ouk esti eti). In their 
purest form, odysseys are an expression of the arbitrariness of the powers 
that denied Odysseus a homecoming, senselessly driving him about and 
finally leading him to shipwreck, in which the reliability of the cosmos 
becomes questionable and its opposite valuation in Gnosticism is 
anticipated.180  
 
Both cultural assumptions—the sea as an ontological the boundary of human activity, and 
as the source and origin of anomy, meaninglessness, and evil (“the unreckonable and 
lawless”)—inform classical philosophy and the scriptures of the Abrahamic religions. For 
a scriptural instance we may turn to Psalm 107, which contains a direct statement about the 
dangers of going out to sea. Intriguingly, the psalmist connects seafaring not only to the 
acquisition of material goods but to the acquisition of knowledge as well; that is, the 
connection between seafaring and the claims of theory one finds in Lucretius is also 
grasped in this text. But unlike Lucretius’s shipwreck, the force that causes the storm and 
the force that quiets it is not an impersonal and ultimately unsearchable natural reality, but 
rather a God who is—in this instance at least—concerned enough to respond to the 
distressed. In faintly condemnatory tones, the Psalm speaks of: 
They that go down to the sea in ships, that do business in great waters;  
These see the works of the Lord, and his wonders of the deep. 
For he commandeth, and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the  
waves thereof. 
They mount up to the heavens, they go down again to the depths: their  
soul is melted because of trouble. 
They reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man, and are at their wits’  
end.  
Then they cry unto the Lord in their trouble, and he bringeth them out of  
their distress. 
He maketh the storm a calm, so that the waves thereof are still. 
																																																								





Then are they glad because they are quiet; so he bringeth them unto their  
desired haven.181 
 
The Psalmist here asserts that shipwreck itself is no less the work of God than is salvation. 
For Lucretius, as we saw, the world of natural forms emerges from an ungoverned infinity; 
the cultural assumption that the sea is the place from which evil emerges makes it a perfect 
vehicle for which the tenor of a lawless chaos of atoms. The sea can become the sign of 
ultimate reality as play of arbitrary forces—an ultimate reality licensing the ethical ideal 
of ataraxia. But for the Psalmist, as for Hutchinson, the sea is no less the creation of God 
for being as well the home and womb of Leviathan. The sea in this sense—which a deeply 
ingrained cultural assumption says is evil—raises the question of whether the creator of all 
Good might not be the author of evil as well. Or at the very least, whether the sea might 
not mark a limit not only to human endeavor, but also to God’s sovereignty. In the passage 
from Blumenberg above, the fact that in fullness of time the sea as a whole must be 
redeemed—indeed removed from—within the order of creation illustrates this problem. 
The sea brings the whole problem of theodicy into view in a way that’s difficult to ignore, 
because it is not a small instance of seeming evil in an otherwise benevolent natural order 
(a poisonous plant, for instance, or a dangerous animal), easily dismissed as an isolated 
privation of the good. The sea represents a limit to the order of the good itself, a zone 
standing over against the zone of providential control, seeming to retain the formlessness 
and senselessness of an arbitrary, ungovernable, stochastic primal chaos.  
 If in the world to come “there will no longer be a sea (he thalassa ouk esti eti),” 
then the “old world” (OD 7.193) consumed by flood represents an inversion of this image 
																																																								





of perfection. In the story of Noah, the sea engulfs the whole order of creation; all is turned 
to chaos. The passengers of the ark vividly experience this ultimate disorder:  
Its trembling sailors heard sick Nature’s groans 
Which shattered into atoms the firms stones, 
And men’s more flinty hearts with terror struck 
Who now like trembling leaves in autumn shook 
While they inevitable death beheld 
With spirits sinking as the waters swelled, 
And the great King of Terrors on the waves 
In triumph sat, hemmed round with yawning graves (OD 7.441-8). 
 
The poem once again nods to Lucretius, as the stones are torn asunder “into atoms,” an 
image of shattered natural and psychic constancy. Yet the sea is not, as for Lucretius, an 
ungoverned chaos; here the sea too bears an image of sovereignty in the form of the “King 
of Terrors,” who rides triumphant amid the gruesome spectacle of universal death. 
 The phrase “king of terrors” is drawn from Job 18:14, where it personifies death 
itself as sovereign. In Hutchinson’s poem, the anti-Royalist charge of the image cannot be 
ignored. Yet by reaching out toward the politically potent metaphor, Hutchinson invites—
no less, it is true, than does scripture itself in several places, not least the book of Job from 
which Hutchinson draws her reference—the idea that the sovereignty of the world is 
divided between a good ruler and an evil one, between forces of light and darkness. As the 
poem bends toward political critique here, it also veers toward Gnosticism, in the sense 
that Blumenberg invokes it above.182  
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In that passage Blumenberg notes that Odysseys, and the world in which they take 
place, anticipate Gnosticism in the sense that they contain the idea of a world ruled over 
by gods who care about human beings, but also represents a conflict among good and evil, 
or benevolent and hostile, forces within the pantheon, so that the meaning-laden cosmic 
order can suddenly appear, as it did to Odysseus, to be a trap, a snare, the result of a malign 
conspiracy. 
And sometimes a given order of things can in fact be precisely such a conspiracy. 
That is how the political order of the Restoration must have looked to Lucy and John 
Hutchinson and other partisans of the Good Old Cause.183 Indeed Christopher Hill, in The 
Experience of Defeat, points out that the change in political fortunes was so sweeping that 
it had about it a certain theodical flavor: “The experience of defeat meant recognizing the 
collapse of the system of ideas which had previously sustained action, and attempting to 
discover new explanations, new perspectives” (17). This description links up nicely with 
																																																								
2005). Yet certain commonalities obtain, and those commonalities are in line with 
Blumenberg’s usage, as is pointed out in Walter Wakefield and Austin P. Evans, Heresies 
of the High Middle Ages (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 10-11: 
“Gnosticism seems to have derived from many sources—Persian, Jewish, Greek, and 
Egyptian—and was exhibited in an extraordinary variety of sects. What these sects had in 
common was to take away from God the responsibility for a wicked world where the souls 
of men are temporarily incarcerated in human bodies, from which they are promised release 
and salvation through gnosis, secret knowledge. […] For most Gnostics, God was the First 
Principle, beneath whom many lesser, semidivine, eternal beings (eons) were arrayed in a 
perfect spiritual creation (the pleroma). Among the eons, about whose nature Gnostic sects 
disagreed, transgression of some kind led to a fall from perfection, which in turn gave rise 
to a subordinate creator (the Demiurge). He is was who formed the world, which like its 
maker is imperfect and antagonistic to the supreme, remote, and perfect Divine Being.” In 
short, we may say that Blumenberg takes Manichaeism as being synonymous with 
Gnosticism—a partial view with respect to current scholarship on the variety of Gnostic 
philosophies, but a reasonable one with respect to the views of Gnosticism developing 
within Christianity from Augustine on. 





the discussion of John Berger’s notion of a “sacred canopy” in the first chapter of this 
dissertation, by suggesting that the change in political order entailed a fundamental shifting 
of the normative fabric of interwoven explanations, and thus presented a profound problem 
for theodicy (considered as a broadly sociological rather than narrowly theological 
activity).184 In such times of crisis, the desire to identify good and evil, to say who are the 
bearers of order and who of disorder, becomes a source of considerable urgency and 
anxiety. In the Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson, Lucy Hutchinson write about 
her husband, a signatory of the death warrant of Charles I whose status in respect to good 
and evil (in political-theological terms) was formally put to question as he stood on charges 
of sedition. The defense—itself a political theodicy of a kind—which Lucy reports John 
offering, sets out in terms of shipwreck metaphorics the dangers of becoming involved in 
troublous political affairs, while at the same time evoking the demands of conscience that 
one become so involved. In response to his accusers, John claims: 
That for his actings in those days, if he had erred, it was the inexperience of 
his age, and the defect of his judgment, and not the malice of his heart, 
which had ever prompted him to pursue the general advantage of his country 
more than his own; and if the sacrifice of him might conduce to the public 
peace and settlement, he should freely submit his life and fortunes to their 
disposal; that the vain expense of his age, and the great debts his public 
employments had run him into, as they were testimonies that neither avarice 
nor any other interest had carried him on, so they yielded him just cause to 
repent that he ever forsook his own blessed quiet, to embark in such a 
troubled sea, where he had made shipwreck of all things but a good 
conscience; and as to that particular action of the king, he desired them to 
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Here we can see the consequence of a belief-system in which existential seafaring is not an 
option, to be taken up by the fool and rejected by the sage. If one accepts that we are always 
already embarked upon the metaphorical sea (a metaphor in this instance of political 
engagement), a site of contested or ambiguous sovereignty in which the King of Death and 
the Lord of Life make claims upon their partisans, then one must choose. If one refuses to 
sail, what is left is not the security of shore but the listless insecurity of drifting. So John 
Hutchinson made his choice; and in his own defense here he enlists not his “judgment,” 
being defective, nor his wisdom, but rather his affect: despite having judged poorly, despite 
taking a foolish course, he did so without the “malice of his heart” being involved. His 
“sense” of things—a word pointedly inclusive of affect—was that of “an Englishman, a 
Christian, and a gentleman.” This appeal to sense, to affect, can understood with reference 
to Lucy Hutchinson’s discussion of the “duties” of the Christian above, which as we saw 
took affective response to things as the sign of goodness. And it is on this basis that John 
makes his own appeal, ineffective as it would turn out, but leaving intact his conscience, 
as the one good saved from the existential shipwreck his actions had invited.  
 This chapter has taken up the question of theodicy in two distinct philosophical and 
poetic texts: Lucretius’s De rerum natura, and Lucy Hutchinson’s Order and Disorder. I 
have attempted to show how the dialogue across centuries between these two poets 
illuminates the theodical connections between ontology and ethics—between the order of 
the world, and the sphere of human existence. Hutchinson, following Augustine, takes what 
the eudaimonist ethics of Lucretius would consider to be involuntary and so of no moral 
account, namely the nature of the disturbances of the mind considered to be pre-emotions 





subject. Spontaneous emotional responses—of grief and compassion in the passages from 
Order and Disorder discussed here—come to be regarded as the defining feature of true 
piety. The experience of these emotions mirrors the life of the Godhead—a life which was 
for Hutchinson characterized by affects that can be tied by threads of accommodation to 
the affective lives of individual human beings. The watchwords of this project are 
experience and authenticity. The Puritan emphasis upon an experience of authentic and 
intense emotion as the guide to spiritual and religious truth has been well documented. 185 
Owen Watkins, in The Puritan Experience, suggests that understanding and 
communicating experience was a cornerstone of the Puritan educational project, and that 
by these means “a particular way of life was communicated to many humble and poorly 
educated people. This caused them to extend their range of self-awareness, as the doctrines 
which they learned became almost simultaneously embodied in personal experience and 
afterwards articulated through narrative and testimony.”186 Even before the pressure of 
successive political and social crises of legitimacy, the authenticity of such inner 
																																																								
185 Alec Ryrie, Being Protestant in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 18-62; 239-56. At pp. 4-5 Ryrie signals his major thesis: “[British 
Protestantism] was intense in that it sought and—often—found a particular, heightened 
pitch of emotional experience […] It was the strength of these emotions, not their nature, 
which principally mattered. Above all, this was a search for authenticity, for the 
unmistakable touch of God in a believer’s life.” This study deals with British Protestant 
emotionality only to 1640; the evidence from Hutchinson’s writings and from other critical 
work (Achinstein, Keeble) suggests that the specific emotion of grief—the “nature” of that 
particular emotional experience—was indeed important in the context of Restoration and 
Dissent, both because of the political commitment implied by continuing to grieve the loss 
of the revolutionary cause and, more closely touching Hutchinson, because the experience 
of grief and compassion in particular distinguished Christian affective life from the Stoic 
and Epicurean counterparts eagerly conscripted into the Augustan culture of the 
Restoration, and from which Hutchinson consequently sought to distance herself in her late 
work.  
186 Owen Watkins, The Puritan Experience: Studies in Spiritual Autobiography (New 





experience was for the Godly the marker—we might say, with Hutchinson, the 
“seamarke”—of the Good. After those crises of legitimacy in society and politics, the 
intensity of inner scrutiny required to authenticate experience would be expected to become 
even more acute, and we may read evidence of such an intensified scrutiny in Hutchinson’s 
turning back upon her own experience as a translator and reader of Lucretius in the context 
of the Restoration. The claim of authentic experience is at the center of John Hutchinson’s 
self-defense against charges of sedition, and is essential to the list of “duties” outlined in 
Lucy Hutchinson’s manual of personal devotion. By associating authenticity with the 
experience of what eudaimonist ethics would dismiss as pre-emotional, hence pre-rational 
and of no account with respect to morality or self-evaluation, Hutchinson’s work urges the 
reader toward the intensification of a specific kind of inwardness that continually 










 In this chapter I attend to the use of the word “survey” in Paradise Lost (as well as 
a couple of instances where surveying takes place without the word being explicitly 
invoked) as a means of gaining insight into how the poem configures the relationship 
between theory and theodicy. I frame my analysis by drawing on the work of three modern 
philosophers who concern themselves with defining and describing modernity: Hannah 
Arendt, Hans Blumenberg, and Karsten Harries. These thinkers depict, in closely related 
ways, the transformation of theory wrought by early modern astronomical discoveries—
the revolution of human beings’ understanding of their place in the cosmos, and the kinds 
of meaning-making activities afforded by that placement, signified by the names 
Copernicus and Galileo. This revolution in understanding, and the transformation wrought 
upon theory enabled by it, has been considered the watershed dividing the premodern from 
the modern epochs by many historians of ideas. In this chapter, I use Paradise Lost to probe 
the affordances and limitations of this way of periodizing intellectual history. Although the 
word “theory” is not itself to be found in Paradise Lost, I work from the premise that in 
Milton’s use of the word “survey” we ought to hear an echo of the Greek root of the English 
word “theory”: θεωρός, a word which, like “survey,” links the act of seeing clearly and 
comprehensively with the gaining of knowledge and the right interpretation of phenomena. 
The remainder of this section will set out the key terms used throughout the chapter, 
adumbrate my arguments about the Copernican turn and its discontents, and introduce my 
thesis: that in Paradise Lost, theodicy—the justification of God’s ways to mankind—is 





of theodicy that would go on to motivate philosophical developments from Leibniz through 
Kant and Hegel to Marx), but that the theory ideal it advances is a hybrid, joining 
constructive (‘modern’) and contemplative (‘premodern’) attitudes together via a complex 
metaphorics of visionary knowing (theoresis) and visionary making (poesis).187  
																																																								
187 The scholarship on Milton and theodicy is, of course, voluminous. In asking whether 
God is good or wicked vis-à-vis the fall of mankind, William Empson, Milton’s God (New 
York: New Directions, 1962) and Dennis Danielson, Milton’s Good God: A Study in 
Literary Theodicy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) fairly divide the field 
between them. As a perennial question for Christian theological discourse, ‘new’ takes on 
the problem of evil in this limited sense are rare, and Danielson and Empson cover most of 
the traditional material. Danielson avails himself of John Hick, Evil and the God of Love 
(London: Macmillan, 1966), which does develop something new—or at least long 
forgotten—within the Christian theological discourse around justifying the fall, by 
outlining his “Irenaean” approach (pp. 201-362). Before them, A. O. Lovejoy, “Milton and 
the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall,” English Literary History 4, no. 3 (1937), 161-79, 
explored Milton’s indebtedness in thinking about the felix culpa to Du Bartas and others. 
My own approach to theodicy as a question within the history of philosophy and sociology 
of religion includes but is not limited to the theological question of whether God’s role in 
the fall makes Him good or wicked. Peter C. Herman and Elizabeth Sauer, eds., The New 
Milton Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), includes six essays 
dealing more or less loosely with theodicy, of which Richard Strier, “Milton’s Fetters, or, 
Why Eden is Better than Heaven” (25-44) especially chimes with my own sense that as 
regards Paradise Lost’s take on the problem of evil, “The goal is rational explanation” 
(26). Strier’s approach follows that of Peter Fisher, “Milton’s Theodicy,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 17, no. 1 (1956), 28-53: “Evil must be treated as imperfection in its most 
universal sense and the problem which it raises will include the entire philosophic position 
of the thinker who would discover a solution” (30). In a similar vein see Christopher 
Kendrick, “Constituent Providence and Antinomian Obedience: Monistic Stories in 
Spinoza’s Ethics and Milton’s Paradise Lost,” in Milton’s Modernities, eds. Feisal 
Mohamed and Patrick Fadely (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2017), 135-167, 
where Kendrick detects a Spinozan philosophical rational theodicy in Paradise Lost. See 
also Claire Colebrook, Milton, Evil, and Literary History (London: Continuum, 2008); 
William Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005); Neil Forsyth, The Satanic Epic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), esp. 
8-12, 188-216; Dennis Danielson, “The Fall and Milton’s Theodicy,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Milton, ed. Dennis Danielson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 144-59; J. M. Evans, Paradise Lost and the Genesis Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1968), 242-92; William J. Grace, Ideas in Milton (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1968), esp. 73-123; Northrop Frye, The Return of Eden: Five Essays on Milton’s 





 In the introduction and in previous chapters I have made use of the idea that 
theodicy, and the problem of evil to which it responds, have to do with intelligibility and 
meaning-making, with recognizing a sensible order in the natural world and in human 
nature, and with the fabrication and maintenance of a nomos that orients the individual to 
society, and the society to what is ultimately real. It is worth briefly reviewing that claim 
again with special reference to Milton and to the other two keywords of this chapter (theory 
and modernity). Here the work of Susan Nieman can be of aid: in Evil in Modern Thought: 
An Alternative History of Philosophy (2002), Nieman lays out a persuasive argument that 
the history of modern philosophy (with ‘modern’ in principle encompassing the sixteenth 
century to the present, but in practice mostly concerning developments from Leibniz 
through Nietzsche) can and indeed should be understood as a continual (though not 
continuous) struggle to frame a satisfactory theodicy—an adequate response to the 
presence of evil in the world. Writing about the way the problem of evil is phrased in the 
philosophical tradition, Nieman observes that “[t]he problem of evil can be expressed in 
theological or secular terms, but it is fundamentally a problem about the intelligibility of 
the world as a whole. Thus it belongs neither to ethics nor to metaphysics but forms a link 
between the two.” 188  Nieman’s description of the problem of evil as concerning 
intelligibility effectively dissociates theodicies—that is, responses to the problem of evil—
from two distinct misconceptions. First, it shows that theodicies are not first of all about 
proving or disproving the bare existence of some God, although assertions about the 
world’s intelligibility may ascribe that intelligibility to an intelligent Creator. Second, it 
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shows that theodicies are not only about whether this or that action ascribed to a specific 
God (say, to Yahweh) in scripture, or this or that doctrine of a given faith or denomination, 
is just or unjust, warranted or unwarranted. That kind of defense falls more into the realm 
of apologetics than theodicy as Nieman defines it here. In Paradise Lost one finds both 
‘religious’ apologetics and ‘philosophical’ theodicy; indeed, the two are closely bound up 
with each other. Yet what is remarkable in the poem is the way the two interact, the way 
that a restless intellectual struggle with the question of the intelligibility of the world as a 
whole, or the lack thereof, is taken into account and allowed to shape and reshape the 
dogmatic truths it seeks to express. 
 Theodicy in this sense is linked to the fortunes of theory.189 Can human beings 
expect theory to resolve the problem of evil, or must the mystery of iniquity remain 
impenetrable? If the intellect can provide theodical satisfactions, what are the limits it must 
																																																								
189 Robert Markley, Fallen Langauges: Crises of Representation in Newtonian England, 
1660-1740 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 1-33, demonstrates that the idea of 
“theory” in and out of the philosophy of science is at best fractious and diffuse: “If theory, 
like analysis, is uncertain, then we might say that it represents the desire for […] 
‘imaginary’ unity and closure […] it marks the gaps between an ideal narrative form of 
transcendent meaning, purposeful intent, and logical and aesthetic closure and the 
‘disparate facts’ on which that form must be imposed. If we view the discourses on theory 
as dialogical, fractured, and incomplete, then we can begin to redefine theory itself as a 
dynamic that mediates between idealist conceptions of order and the constructed and 
contested ‘facts’ of experience” (29). Gordon Teskey, Delirious Milton: The Fate of the 
Poet in Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) defines theory as 
“visualizing, abstractly and synchronically, that which already exists” (1); theory is held 
out against forward-looking poesis. My own view of what theory means is influenced by 
Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985). For Blumenberg theory means something like the human 
ability to sound out order and value in the world. It has at various times allied with and 
warred with sensory “facts,” and is something in which one can have more or less 
confidence, as the fortunes of theory after Copernicus and before Galileo demonstrate. See 
Bernard Yack’s essay-review of Blumenberg’s Work on Myth, in Political Theory 15, no. 





accept, what are the criteria by which it may be judged? Must human reason be 
supplemented by some supra-intellectual, supernatural source of illumination, or will it 
produce sufficient light itself? All of these questions about the prospects and limitations of 
theory—what early moderns sometimes called ‘science’ in its broadest sense—come up 
when confronted with the philosophical problem of evil, conceived as the question of the 
intelligibility of the world as a whole. The linkage of theory and theodicy allows Hans 
Blumenberg, in The Genesis of the Copernican World (1975; trans. 1987), to describe the 
Copernican turn as an epoch-making act of theodicy that inaugurates the modern age. 
Copernicus inherited a situation in which the heavenly bodies and their motions were a 
source of bafflement and incomprehension. Centuries of astronomical and religious dogma 
insisted that the reason for this was that God had made them that way, evidence of a design 
feature at best indifferent with respect to human beings, and at worst positively intended to 
frustrate them. “This,” writes Blumenberg, “is the dilemma that Copernicus will aim to 
remove by relieving the Creator of the reproach that it is the object that confuses cognition, 
rather than cognition that fails when faced with its object. Seen in this way, the modern age 
begins with an act of theodicy. In it we are called upon not to rest satisfied with a state of 
theory that renders questionable God’s intentions with the world and with man.”190 Readers 
will note that the endeavor to exonerate the Creator is at the same time a campaign in 
defense of the human creature and of the capability of theory to pierce through apparent 
confusion and arrive at truth; in other words, it is at once a theodicy—defense of God, from 
Greek theos (god) and dike (justice)—and an anthropodicy, or defense of mankind. Modern 
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philosophical theodicies characteristically have this dual structure, which reflects a certain 
confidence in the theoretical capacities of the human, and assumes a reciprocal relationship 
between God’s reasons for creation, and human reason in apprehending it. 
 Yet the Copernican turn also presented new challenges for theory, because it 
displaced human beings from the stable, central place in the universe presumed by 
geocentrism, and severed the traditional link between ‘theory’ and the naïve evidence of 
the senses. In a pithy moment, Blumenberg describes the Copernican dynamic this way: 
“From the motion of the object [i.e., the starry heavens], the subject apprehends his own 
motion. The systematic central point, however, from which the totality would have to 
become surveyable and transparent as a unified rational process, remains unoccupied and 
unattainable.”191 (But not lost: Copernicus still supposes a principal cosmic center in the 
Sun—one of several such ‘centers’—about which more shortly). Copernicus the theodicist 
in this way becomes, in the early modern imagination and beyond, a perpetrator of the great 
crime of setting human beings to perpetual wandering, displacing them from a stable 
cosmic homeland (a charge reflected in, for example, John Donne’s Ignatius His Conclave 
(1611)).192 This ambivalence about the meaning of Copernicus’s innovation has remained 
alive in the popular and philosophical imagination throughout the modern age. It prompted 
Karsten Harries to write Infinity and Perspective (2001), a book that seeks to redress what 
Harries calls ‘postmodern nihilism’—the abandonment, sometimes mournful and 
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192 In which Copernicus beats upon the doors of hell, astounded at being barred entry, and 
exclaims: “Are these shut against me, to whom all the Heavens were ever open, who was 
a Soule to the Earth, and gave it motion?” John Donne, Ignatius His Conclave (London: 





sometimes giddy, of theory’s claim to truth. In the introduction to this work, Harries 
explains post-Copernican discontent this way: 
The Greek or the medieval cosmos assigned human beings their place near 
the center, but the Copernican revolution would seem to have condemned 
us to an eccentric position. To be sure, eccentricity still presupposes a 
center: Copernicus (as we should expect, given his place still on the 
threshold separating our modern from the medieval world) was himself only 
a half-hearted modernist and continued to hold on to the idea of a cosmic 
center, as he continued to invoke the idea of a divine architect and with it 
the idea of a bounded, well-ordered cosmos; he only denied the earth that 
central place, giving it instead to the sun. But […] of more fundamental 
importance than the shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric understanding 
of the cosmos proved to be the authority granted to human reason, bound 
up with a self-elevation that frees the thinking subject from any particular 
place. Such self-elevation, a new freedom, and a new anthropocentrism go 
together with a new sense of homelessness.193 
 
From almost the moment of its very inception, Copernicus’s innovation in astronomical 
theory has provoked acute pessimism about this homelessness. I have already mentioned 
Donne, to which other early modern examples could easily be added.194 Closer to our own 
time, Nietzsche registers a dour response: “Since Copernicus, man seems to have got 
himself on an inclined plane—now he is slipping faster and faster away from the center 
into—what? into nothingness? into a penetrating sense of his own nothingness?” 195 
Copernicus frees theory from its bonds to the intuitive world of the senses, but that same 
freedom may be construed as a fundamental alienation of the human from her 
																																																								
193 Karsten Harries, Infinity and Perspective (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), 8.  
194 See Blumenberg, Genesis, 264-289. The chapter is tellingly entitled, “The Theoretician 
as ‘Perpetrator’.” 
195  Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1989), 155. Harries calls attention 
to this passage in Infinity and Perspective, 8. See also David Luban, Legal Modernism 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015), 18, where this passage from Nietzsche 
is cited with the following comment: “Modernity sets us the task of relocating ourselves 
and rediscovering—or perhaps reinventing—our sense of worth against a background of 





determinative place in the natural order.196 In sum: our senses tell us that the world is still 
and the heavens move about us, but if we begin from this intuitive premise, the best 
theoretical efforts cannot come to grips with heavenly motion. Either our senses deceive, 
or our theoretical capacities are not adequate to the task of apprehending the reason in 
God’s creation. The Copernican turn acquits God of designing a heavenly order that yields 
nothing but confusion; yet at the same time it irrevocably divorces theory from vision, 
reality from appearance, in a way that lays the groundwork for the incertitude of a 
Descartes, and for early modern philosophical theodicy writ large.197  
 Today we stand on one side of this development and look back over it 
retrospectively. The failures of the modern project have been well documented, yet in many 
quarters confidence in the potentials of theory—now largely overseen by institutions of 
science—remains high.198 I don’t want to belabor this point about a crisis in and of the 
modern here, but I do want to look at what Harries recommends as a solution to it, because 
																																																								
196 See also Mary Thomas Crane, Losing Touch With Nature: Literature and the New 
Science in Sixteenth Century England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014). 
I discuss Crane’s thesis about the breaking-apart of the Aristotelian synthesis (with its 
emphasis on intuition and naïve sensory evidences) in Chapter 1, with reference to Spenser.  
197 On Descartes’s philosophy as a response to the problem of evil, see Zbigniew Janowski, 
Cartesian Theodicy: Descartes’ Quest for Certitutde (Dordrecht: Kluer, 2000).  
198 Works on the crisis of modernity taking in theology and theory include Bruno Latour, 
An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns, trans. Catherine 
Porter, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); O. Bradley Bassler, The Pace of 
Modernity: Reading With Blumenberg (Victoria: Re-Press, 2012); Feisal Mohamed, Milton 
and the Post-Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, Terrorism (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2011); Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008) which tellingly borrows its epigram from Satan’s 
opening monologue at PL 1.242-63; Leszek Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden 
Agenda of Modernity (New York: Free Press, 1990); and Hans Blumenberg, The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT University 





it leads back in compelling and unexpected ways to Paradise Lost. Toward the conclusion 
of Infinity and Perspective, Harries writes: 
An ontology is needed that is not born of pride. Such an ontology will 
recognize that the pursuit of truth has its measure in an ideal that will always 
be denied to human beings, accepting that the pursuit of truth demands 
objectivity even though we shall never be able to be altogether objective. 
But this ontology will also recognize that when reality in its entirety is 
subjected to the pursuit of objective truth, such a pursuit must become a 
movement toward nihilism. For the pursuit of objectivity is inseparable 
from the twofold reduction […] where the first reduction robs the world of 
meaning and the second transforms it into a ghostly collection of facts. That 
is to say, such an ontology will recognize that theory, while legitimate 
within its limits, does not provide our only access to what is, as every lover 
knows. Theory alone will never overcome nihilism. That conquest 
presupposes respect, above all for the earth and its inhabitants. 
Notwithstanding the decentering power of Copernican reflection, there is a 
sense in which such respect will return the earth to that central position from 
which Copernicus had dethroned it.199 
 
Could we not describe the cosmological dimensions of Paradise Lost as an attempt to 
develop an “ontology […] not born of pride?” As I will argue, in its complex meditations 
upon what could constitute a cosmic center or a place of privileged observation, and the 
criteria upon which the truth-value of such observations may be judged, Milton’s poem is 
already wrestling with the problem diagnosed by Harries, and already attempting a 
theodical solution to it. Yet where Harries recommends “respect, above all for earth and its 
inhabitants”—and here we ought to carefully distinguish between this recommendation and 
a more muscular anthropocentrism—Milton will suggest that such respect is impossible 
without acknowledgement of and (crucially) obedience to the Creator, which gives sense 
and intelligibility to creation and creature. This, then, is the sense in which Paradise Lost 
																																																								





engages in a modern philosophical theodicy that is nevertheless grounded in a religious 
sense ill fitted to Harries’ resolutely secular conception of the human, and human theory.200 
 I say that the issue of obedience is crucial to Milton’s theodical epistemology in 
Paradise Lost, because only through such obedience is the Copernican promise of freedom 
for the human mind made available. Such a view requires that the world as a whole be not 
only rationally intelligible, but morally intelligible also. One final piece of scaffolding will 
help to situate this aspect of the theodicy in Paradise Lost in its early modern context. As 
I mentioned in the introduction to this project, it was Leibniz who introduced the term 
theodicy into the philosophical lexicon of modernity. Leibniz engaged with the problem of 
evil throughout his career, and in the “Specimen Dynamicum” (1695) he considers the 
following approach to it: 
[…] everything in the world can be explained in two ways: through the 
kingdom of power, that is, through efficient causes, and through the kingdom 
of wisdom, that is, through final causes, through God, governing bodies for 
his glory, like an architect, governing them as machines that follow the laws 
of size or mathematics, governing them, indeed, for the use of souls, and 
through God governing for his glory souls capable of wisdom, governing 
them as his fellow citizens, members with him of a certain society, 
governing them like a prince, indeed like a father, through laws of goodness 
or moral laws.201 
 
By dividing God’s governance into two parallel ‘kingdoms’, Leibniz lays open the 
possibility of two separate, coactive regimes of explanation, which are in principle 
																																																								
200 Milton’s uncanny relationship to the modern, the liberal, and the secular, and the kind 
of critical praxis necessary for grasping that relationship, has been well described in 
Mohamed, Post-Secular Present, 10-18. See also Gordon Teskey, Delirious Milton: The 
Fate of the Poet in Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). Teskey’s 
description of how Milton had to pass through and go beyond epic theory in order to arrive 
at poetic freedom relates obliquely to my own discussion of theory and technics.   
201 Leibniz, “Specimen Dynamicum,” in Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, Vol. 





independent of one another. The rational intelligibility of the world on the one hand, and 
the moral intelligibility of the world on the other, are here depicted as separate and 
autonomous spheres. I point to this example to measure the distance between Paradise Lost 
and the works of early modern philosophical theodicy with which it nevertheless bears an 
affinity. In Paradise Lost what Leibniz calls the “kingdom of power” and the “kingdom of 
wisdom” are not separable, not autonomous explanatory regimes existing independently of 
one another; instead, the two interpenetrate and mutually inform one another. Physics and 
ontology reflect ethics and morality—thus at the moment of the fall not only the human 
intellect but the cosmos itself is wrenched from its original moorings.202 Holding the two 
spheres together in a heroic act of constructive poesis is a central concern of the poem. 
Although the microcosm-macrocosm relationship is destabilized by the Copernican turn’s 
pushing human beings into an eccentric cosmic position, Milton will maintain and defend 
a version of it that is not based on geocentric or heliocentric physics, but rather on a strong 
consonance between theoretical reason (which allows for perception of the intelligibly true) 
and right reason (which allows for the perception of the morally good), a consonance that 
persists at once in the human intellect and in the order of things, despite the impairment of 
the fall.  
 In the next section of this chapter I trace the use of the word “survey” in Paradise 
Lost, and introduce Hannah Arendt’s description of the “human surveying capacity” in The 
Human Condition.203 In the section following that, I will use the work of Hans Blumenberg 
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Lawrence Babb, The Moral Cosmos of Paradise Lost (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 1970).  
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to understand the astronomical vision of Paradise Lost, in Book 8 and elsewhere. I show 
that the poem’s cosmology tries to work through the consequences of geocentrism and 
heliocentrism by rethinking the concept of a cosmic center in terms spiritual and 
metaphysical rather than physical; and that in doing so it promotes an “ontology not born 
of pride,” in the phrase of Karsten Harries above. The poem thus evinces an ambivalent 
attitude toward astronomical theory: on the one hand, we see the advice of Raphael to 
Adam to “be lowly wise,” disregarding as indifferent to salvation abstruse questions about 
the intelligibility of the cosmos. On the other hand, the poem leaves open the possibility 
that this advice, given to an unfallen Adam, does not adequately address the condition of 
fallen human beings, who may justly regard the unintelligibility of the heavens as 
scandalous, and desire theodical satisfactions about their rationality.  
2. Three Forms of Surveying in Paradise Lost 
 
And the Lord said unto Satan, Whence comest thou? Then 
Satan answered the Lord, and said, From going to and fro 
in the earth, and from walking up and down in it. – Job 1:7 
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 In Book 9 of Paradise Lost, Satan takes a seven-day tour of the earth by orbiting it, 
surveying the habitation of humanity’s first parents for possible points of weakness beyond 
the prying eyes “the cherubim / That kept their watch” (9.61-2).204 At the end of his quest, 
he has found a back door to Paradise and a “[f]it vessel” (89), the serpent, in which to 
conceal himself for the purpose of tempting Eve. The poem tells us that: 
 […] full of anguish driven, 
The space of seven continued nights he rode 
With darkness, thrice the equinoctial line 
He circled, four times crossed the car of Night 
From pole to pole, traversing each colure; 
On the eighth returned, and on the coast averse 
From entrance or cherubic watch, by stealth 
Found unsuspecting way. (9.62-9) 
 
But before he sets about infiltrating Eden, Satan experiences a moment of “inward grief” 
(97), occasioned by all that he has seen during his “inspection deep” (83) of the earth. 
Overwhelmed by his “bursting passion” (98) Satan is moved to a kind of exuberant 
melancholy, and spontaneously articulates an ode to our world:  
O earth, how like to heaven, if not preferred 
More justly, seat worthier of gods, as built 
With second thoughts, reforming what was old! 
For what god after better worse would build? 
Terrestrial heaven, danced round by other heavens 
That shine, yet bear their bright officious lamps, 
Light above light, for thee alone, as seems, 
In thee concentring all their precious beams 
Of sacred influence: as God in heaven 
Is center, yet extends to all, so thou 
Centring reciev’st from all those orbs; in thee, 
Not in themselves, all their known virtue appears 
Productive in herb, plant, and nobler birth 
Of creatures animate with gradual life 
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Of growth, sense, reason, all summed up in man.  
With what delight could I have walked thee round,  
If I could joy in aught, sweet interchange  
Of hill and valley, rivers, woods and plains, 
Now land, now sea, and shores with forest crowned,  
Rocks, dens, and caves; but I in none of these 
Find place or refuge; and the more I see 
Pleasures about me, so much more I feel 
Torment within me, as from the hateful siege 
Of contraries; all good to me becomes 
Bane, and in heaven much worse would be my state.  
But neither here seek I, no nor in heaven 
To dwell, unless by mastering heaven’s supreme. (9.99-125) 
 
Although Satan’s sevenfold circumnavigation of the earth has shown him all its varied 
splendors, he remains as fundamentally alienated from the world as he is from heaven. His 
speech here suggests that in addition to his immediate errand of finding an entry-point into 
Adam and Eve’s walled garden, Satan has been in a sense looking for himself. “Rocks, 
dens, and caves; but I in none of these”—the slightly inverted syntax delays the verb and 
objects (“find,” “place or refuge”) which the prepositional phrase modifies; “I in none of 
these” suggests a Satan half-hoping to find among earth’s plentiful landscapes a locus 
amoenus of his own, some site bearing an affinity with him. Satan’s denial of having so 
sought at the end of the speech only strengthens the impression, coming as it does on the 
heels of another moment of recognition that he is condemned to limitless exile, a cosmic 
alienation not conditioned by place or space. Satan searches for a privileged place, but is 
unwilling and unable to relinquish the idea that he himself embodies, and so perpetually 
inhabits, the sovereign place. His objectifying gaze can but measure distance between 
himself and the world; surveying from within the inviolable sphere of the self isolated from 





converts the existence of unpossessable goodness into a sense of his own suffering born of 
lack.  
 Although the poet-speaker affirms that Satan’s fact-finding mission involves 
“inspection deep,” the knowledge he gains from the endeavor seems curiously superficial. 
Consider the poet’s description of the journey, rich with context-bound information and 
place names, compared with Satan’s strangely detached explanation of what he has seen. 
The poet tells us that Satan journeys: 
From Eden over Pontus, and the pool  
Maeotis, up beyond the river Ob;  
Downward as far Antarctic; and in length  
West from Orontes to the ocean barred  
At Darien, thence to the land where flows  
Ganges and Indus: thus the orb he roamed. (9.77-82) 
 
The place names here signal specificity and an experiential or historical depth; they suggest 
a richly meaning-laden geography fitted within a pattern of providential history. The 
sonorous, incantatory quality of the catalogue reinforces the sense that these places are sites 
of lived experience to which their names bear witness. Beside this, Satan’s bare list of 
deracinated landscape features—“land […] sea […] shores […] forest […] rocks, dens, and 
caves” (9.117-8)—appears bereft of any sense of context or meaning. The contrast between 
the poet’s catalogue of places and Satan’s own abstract description heightens the effect of 
the pun involved in “thus the orb he roamed / With narrow search,” where narrow initially 
suggests an investigation especially illuminating because it is “painstaking, careful” (see 
OED 1A4a), but in full context implies instead a search “limited in range or scope” (see 
OED 1A3a). Compared to the richly immanent knowledge of the poet-speaker, Satan’s 





from the world as a dwelling-place affects the kind of knowledge he can have of it, causing 
it to be limited, abstract, solipsistic and instrumental. 
 It is of course possible to say that the difference between Satan’s report and the 
poet-speaker’s is merely temporal: when Satan is looking at earth, the place-names 
mentioned in the poem have not been established; only the poet-speaker, because of his 
position in history, knows what they will come to be called. Yet the real contrast here is 
not between Satan’s surveying capacity and the poet-speaker’s, but between Satan’s vision 
and God’s, which the poet-speaker here shares and to which the poetic description 
approximates. God’s surveying capacity as described in Book 3 (the word “survey” is used 
in connection with God the father at 3.69) comprehends time as well as space. So when the 
poet-speaker advertises knowledge of the place names involved in Satan’s bare survey, the 
poem’s language approximates to, or at least brings into the ken of the reader, this supra-
temporal dimension of divine surveying—a prophetic outlook which Adam will also be 
able to share when Raphael presents to him the panorama of global history in Book 11. 
Satan’s survey comprehends only the objects in the world as they relate to himself; the 
poet-speaker, divinely inspired, understands them in the context of creation and prophetic 
history.  
Satan’s surveying is opposed to the all-encompassing spatiotemporal survey of 
divine omniscience; but it is also contrasted in the poem with Adam’s unfallen human 
surveying capacity, which is depicted in Book 8. Discussing with Raphael the story of his 
own creation, Adam relates: 
Straight toward heaven my wondering eyes I turned, 
And gazed a while the ample sky, till raised 
By quick instinctive motion up I sprung, 





Stood on my feet; about me round I saw 
Hill, dale, and shady woods, and sunny plains, 
And liquid lapse of murmuring streams; by these 
Creatures that lived, and moved, and walked, or fled, 
Birds on the branches warbling; all things smiled, 
With fragrance and with joy my heart o’erflowed. 
Myself I then perused, and limb by limb 
Surveyed, and sometimes went, and sometimes ran 
With supple joints, as lively vigor led. (8.257-69) 
 
Adam’s observations lead directly to the beginnings of the development of self-knowledge, 
based on recognition of himself as a created being, one bearing affinity with the “Creatures 
that lived, and moved, and walked, or flew,” and “Birds on the branches warbling” (8.264-
5). Adam then intuits the similarities between these creatures, their means of locomotion 
and their communicative calls, and himself: “Myself I then perused, and limb by limb / 
Surveyed, and sometimes went, and sometimes ran / With supple joints, as lively vigor 
led” (8.267-9). Having already intuited a creaturely similitude between himself and the 
wholly animate world around him, Adam reasons back from his creatureliness to the 
existence of a creator, and further reasons that he might pose a question: 
[…] Thou sun, said I, fair light, 
And thou enlightened earth, so fresh and gay, 
Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains, 
And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell, 
Tell is ye saw, how came I thus, how here? 
Not of myself; by some great maker then, 
In goodness and in power pre-eminent; 
Tell me, how may I know him, how adore, 
From whom I have that thus I move and live, 
And feel that I am happier than I know. (8.273-83) 
 
This primal scene of naming takes place dialogically; Adam addresses the world as a Thou, 





being.205 For Satan to experience the affinity he seeks in his seven days survey of the earth, 
he would have to admit his own createdness, which of course he cannot do. Thus unlike 
Satan, whose observation of the world inflames his mind with newly refreshed envy and a 
redoubled sense of alienation, who finds “I in none of these,” Adam’s act of “surveying” 
himself is only made possible on the basis of affinity between himself as a created being 
whose existence depends upon the Creator, and the other creatures that dwell in the world 
alongside him. The truth of Adamic self-perception—the validity of this unfallen 
“survey”—springs from a recognition of likeness that Satan cannot admit.  
 These, then, are the three forms of surveying at work in Paradise Lost: the 
omniscient divine survey, the fallen Satanic survey, and the unfallen Adamic or Edenic 
survey. We could add to these a fourth, the prophetic survey occasionally voiced by the 
poet-speaker—the word is used in connection with Ezekiel who “when by the vision led / 
His eye surveyed the dark idolatries / Of alienated Judah” (1.456)—although this is in effect 
derivative of the first, divine and omniscient, form. (Hence Ezekiel’s survey is “led” by 
another, supervening “vision”). The use of the word “survey” in these three ways evokes 
three divergent but interdependent epistemologies of vision, three distinct ways of seeing-
as-knowing—that is, three different versions of theory. 
In Blumenberg and Harries special attention was paid to the transformation of 
theory as a cause and a result of revolutions in astronomical thinking. Hannah Arendt offers 
an account similar to those of Blumenberg and Harries in The Human Condition (1958), 
writing of the “human surveying capacity” and its transformation in modernity. Arendt’s 
																																																								
205 On Adamic language in Paradise Lost the classic study remains John Leonard, Naming 
in Paradise: Milton and the Language of Adam and Eve (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 





insights are especially productive for interpreting Paradise Lost, because instead of 
drawing on Copernicus, who does not appear directly in the poem, Arendt draws on Galileo 
and the technics of telescopy, both of which the poem explicitly thematizes. In the wake of 
Copernicus’s severing the traditional bonds of theory and vision, opening up a gap of 
incertitude, Arendt argues that Galileo and the telescope effect a temporary recoupling of 
theory with sense certainty, one dependent upon the abstraction and mediation of 
technology. The question that swirls around Galileo, in the criticism on Paradise Lost, is 
how to evaluate his contribution: is the telescopic searching of the heavens more akin to 
Satanic, Edenic, or perhaps prophetic surveying?206  Arendt’s argument that surveying 
becomes the fundamental form of knowledge practiced in modern science also allows us 
to test how Paradise Lost might fit into a sophisticated scheme of periodization.  
The telescopic discoveries of Galileo—who in Paradise Lost stands as an 
ambiguous figuration of the advancement of learning—ought then, according to Arendt, to 
be considered along with two other “great events” which “stand at the threshold of the 
modern age and determine its character,” namely the discovery of the New World by early 
modern explorers, and the Reformation, which inaugurates an era of capitalism urged on 
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by what Max Weber identified as the “innerworldly asceticism” of the Puritans.207 These 
three events, for Arendt, all bear witness to the development of surveying as the 
paradigmatic form of modern human rationality. Of the three, Arendt speculates, it was 
perhaps the Galilean innovation that has exerted and will continue to exert the most 
profound influence over the course of history, from premodernity to modernity to what 
comes after, since its consequences have “eclipsed not only the enlargement of the earth’s 
surface […] but also the still apparently limitless economic accumulation process.”208 For 
what Galileo’s telescope heralded was “the discovery of the Archimedean point,” the 
establishment of a perspective from which to view the world in universal terms, and to 
dispose of the world as if from a point outside. 209  Arendt cites Galileo rather than 
Copernicus in her account of the development of modernity because Copernicus’s 
theoretical innovations—daring and brilliant though they were—still left the status of 
theory, having been severed from vision, in question. The gap between what appeared to 
be real to theory and what was evidently true to the senses set up a conflict that was only 
resolved by the expansion and transformation of the human sensorium by means of 
technique—the telescopic survey of the heavens. Galileo’s discoveries married the 
theoretical confidence of Copernicus to a form of certainty delivered to the senses, but 
mediated, indirectly, abstractly, and by means of a practical advance in the technology of 
vision. Arendt explains:  
What Galileo did and what nobody had done before was to use the telescope 
in such a way that the secrets of the universe were delivered to human 
cognition ‘with the certainty of sense perception’; that is, he put within the 
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grasp of an earth-bound creature and its body-bound senses what had 
seemed forever beyond his reach, at best open to the uncertainties of 
speculation and imagination.210 
 
It was precisely this enlargement of the scope of human experience noted by Arendt, the 
modification through technology of what constitutes the horizon of human sense 
perception, and the similitude of this amplified vision to the vatic aspirations of Milton’s 
own attempt at cosmic description, that prompt the Tuscan artist’s inclusion in the epic. 
The visual and technological dimension of Galileo’s investigations, as distinct from the 
theoretical character of Copernicus’s modeling of the heavens, make him a figure of 
interest to both Arendt and Milton, because it combines visionary knowing (theory) and 
skillful making (praxis; poesis) in a way that produced dramatic, indeed epoch-shaping 
results. Copernicus’s theory was built upon the edifice of medieval physics and 
mathematics; it remained in a sense a product of reason as contemplation alone; it could 
still be rendered as an inert hypothesis as Osiander’s preface to De revolutionibus makes 
evident; and most importantly it retained the notion of a physically localizable cosmic 
center—the sun, rather than the earth. (This last assumption is one that Paradise Lost 
explicitly works to destabilize, as I discuss below). Galileo’s discoveries on the other hand, 
and the profound change in world picture entailed by them, came about through 
observation and mapping assisted by technology, and so emblematize the modern paradigm 
of reason as surveying, with surveying here meaning a form of knowledge combining 
‘pure’ theory with technical praxis.  
																																																								





 Arendt’s description of “surveying” as the paradigmatic modern form of knowledge 
seems to afford a comparison with the Satanic surveying we have been looking at in Book 
9:  
It is in the nature of the human surveying capacity that it can function only 
if man disentangles himself from all involvement in and concern with the 
close at hand and withdraws himself to a distance from everything near him. 
The greater the distance between himself and his surroundings, world or 
earth, the more he will be able to survey and to measure and the less will 
worldly, earth-bound space be left to him.211 
 
Unlike theory-as-contemplation, theory-as-surveying alienates the knower from what it 
discloses. The alienation, according to Arendt, begins with the objectifying tendencies of 
an empirical knowledge gotten through the senses enhanced by technology, as was the case 
with Galileo but goes on to leave the specifically human perspective (scale-bound and 
reliant on the unaided senses) behind altogether. “The modern astrophysical world view, 
which began with Galileo,” we read, presents a “challenge to the adequacy of the senses to 
reveal reality,” leaving us “a universe of whose qualities we know no more than the way 
they affect our measuring instruments,” which bear only the most tenuous relationship to 
the phenomenological domain of human perception. Arendt continues: “Instead of 
objective qualities, in other words, we find instruments, and instead of nature or the 
universe […] man encounters only himself.”212 In the mode of world-intelligibility given 
in modern science, human beings encounter themselves as the inheritors of a dubious 
autonomy—a freedom from the limitations of the human senses bought at the cost of self-
evidence, not only in matters of empirics and reason, but also in matters of value and faith. 
And for Arendt, the autonomy bought at the cost of world alienation is the defining feature 
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of modernity: “World alienation, and not self-alienation as Marx thought, has been the 
hallmark of the modern age.”213 Satan seems to have such an encounter with himself at the 
end of his own journey of surveying, finding nowhere on the earth a “place or refuge.” And 
yet, Satan seeks to use this very alienated knowledge as a means of solving the problem of 
his alienation. As noted above, what Satan finds in his survey is a sort of back door into 
Eden, a portal granting access to our first parents, through whose temptation he hopes to 
begin “mastering heaven’s supreme,” which he fantasizes will allow him to “dwell” in full 
autonomy, within the world, but beyond the reach of God.  
 For Arendt, the survey is a paradigmatically modern form of knowledge because in 
it we begin to “dispose of the earth as if from a point outside of it.” In it we stake a claim 
on the world’s intelligibility for us, at the cost of a sense that our experience of its 
intelligibility is immanent to it. Surveying, we realize the utility of approaching our 
knowledge of the world not as nature within nature—a microcosm dwelling within a 
macrocosm that repeats and reflects our being—but as something standing outside of the 
world, upon an Archimedean point. That is, Arendt views the act of surveying as 
emblematic of the transformation of theory that launches the modern age, a transition from 
a contemplative form of knowledge to an active, reconstructive, practical and utile one. 
Contemplative truth is both quiescent and, since it is not governed by an ideal of 
generalizable and repeatable construction, subject to the perspectival distortions of the 
contemplator. Active, reconstructive truth, by contrast, supposes itself to be free from such 
distortions and its mark of veracity is that it is in principle available to everyone who wishes 
to construct it anew. In the transition from theoretical contemplation to utilitarian surveying 
																																																								





in the service of a constructive human science, Arendt discerns an epistemological shift 
characteristic of the passage from premodern vita contemplativa to modern vita activa.  
 Although Arendt’s discussion of modernity may seem somewhat outdated, the most 
recent scholarship on surveying, scientific knowledge, and poesis in the early modern 
period confirms the applicability of Arendt’s basic insights to the interpretation of Paradise 
Lost.214 Ayesha Ramachandran, to take one example, notes “the doubling of cartography 
and astronomy in Paradise Lost,” arguing that both impulses are tied to the early modern 
project of worldmaking.215 Ramachandran shares Arendt’s insight that the mapping of the 
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heavens in the wake of Galileo and the mapping of the “New World” are epistemologically 
twinned enterprises of surveying as a mode of knowling. Her argument also confirms that 
theodicy in Paradise Lost is ultimately a matter of the world’s intelligibility as a whole, 
that “the justification of the ways of God to men is finally tied to evidence of a coherent 
system of world order,” and that surveying-as-knowing is related to the attainment of 
theodical satisfactions in the poem. 216  But where Arendt’s analysis emphasizes the 
existential cost involved in transforming the theoretical enterprise from a kind of world 
contemplation (in the premodern vita contemplativa) into an iterative process of world 
making (in the modern vita activa), the stress in Ramachandran’s argument falls on the 
liberatory gains the subject achieves thereby. Rather than seeing technologies of 
worldmaking as a dubious intrusion of knowledge as power, Ramachandran sees in 
worldmaking an extension of early modern imaginative cosmopoesis, writing of the “union 
of science and the aesthetic imagination.” Descriptively the accounts of Arendt and 
Ramachandran are quite similar; yet Arendt’s ultimate evaluation of the use of surveying 
in the pursuit of worldmaking is at most hesitant and ambiguous, whereas Ramachandran’s 
tends to be quite positive, even exuberant.  
In a coda on twenty-first-century mapping technologies like Google Earth, 
Ramachandran sees in “the image of the individual at her computer screen playing with a 
digital globe that she makes and unmakes with virtual push-pins” an image of 
“worldmaking at its most exciting.”217 (The image calls to mind Raphael’s description of 
those worldmaking astronomers who seek virtually to “model heaven,” “build, unbuild,” 
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and “wield / The mighty frame” (PL 8.79-81)). Combining incredible surveying power 
with responsiveness to the imaginative impulses of individuals, this kind of worldmaking 
exemplifies the “supple, expansive approach to the problem of expressing a vision of 
totality—without succumbing to totalizing rigidity” that the term “worldmaking” seeks to 
capture. One could of course argue that the “supple” virtual interface of Google Earth is 
paid for by a kind of material “totalization” that goes unmentioned here; nevertheless, this 
analysis provides a noteworthy counterpoint to Arendt in our exploration of the modern in 
Paradise Lost, since it reminds us of the special role played by poetry in early modern 
attempts to render the world as a whole intelligible. The leading idea is that poetry like that 
found in Paradise Lost, “as a form of human worldmaking that imitated a presumed divine 
original,” has the power to “unite religious faith, rationalistic exegesis, empirical method, 
and a changed understanding of the world order to produce a new kind of skeptically 
grounded faith, one which acknowledged uncertainty but triumphantly asserted its own 
creative potential.” In poetry, that is to say, the sacred and the secular harmonize. Yet as 
the seven days of uncreation episode demonstrates, imitating the “divine original” in 
Paradise Lost is often freighted with diabolical associations. So while we do well to see in 
poetic imagination a potential to reconcile the keen desire for objective truth with the 
realities of perspectival limitation, we must also bear in mind that this potential is 
compromised in Paradise Lost by its uncomfortable similarity to diabolic pride.  
 For Satan, excluded permanently and in advance because of his fall, the 
instrumental handling of knowledge about the world is not an option among others, but is 
the only possible epistemological stance. It seems clear on the evidence of the text that 





Arendt’s sense: it is affectively marked by a clearly registered sense of world-loss and 
alienation; it attempts to dispose of the world form the outside inward as Satan seeks access 
to Paradise; and its ends are finally instrumental in character since the knowledge acquired 
cannot, we are told, be enjoyed for its own sake. Yet Arendt and Milton also seem to 
disagree about the fundamental significance of Galileo, with Milton holding open a 
possible meaning of telescopic surveying quite different from the one imagined by Arendt. 
As Dennis Danielson has shown, beyond its explicit references to Galileo, there are 
multiple examples in Paradise Lost of Milton adopting and repurposing Galilean insights 
to serve the ends of divine epic. To Galileo and the telescope we owe the existence in the 
poem of the “innumerable stars” (3.565) populating the heavens and composing the Milky 
Way, the identification of the earth as a shining star among other luminous bodies, and the 
pluralization of celestial phenomena (i.e., “other suns perhaps / With their attendant 
moons” (8.148-9)).218 By weaving these telescopic observations into the fabric of a divine 
epic in the way that he does, Milton holds out the possibility that the figure of Galileo, and 
his telescopically enhanced surveying capacity, may have more in common with the 
unfallen Edenic survey than with the diabolical survey. Arendt’s account positions the 
technological supplement of the telescope as an ambiguous step forward into uncharted 
territory, an overcoming of the natural human sense of scale by means of instrumental 
reason; but there are hints—and indeed more than hints—that Milton may have seen in it 
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a reclamation of the full, natural human surveying capacity lost in consequence of the 
fall.219  
So the semantic field of the word “survey” in Paradise Lost is attended with all 
kinds of ambiguity, and the inquiries of Arendt and Ramachandran help us to understand 
how evaluations of surveying as a way of knowing come to affect attitudes toward 
modernity. We can now return to the seven days of uncreation episode, and to the import 
of diabolical surveying more generally, with our own horizons somewhat expanded. 
Although the keyword “survey” is not used in the seven days of uncreation sequence in 
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(“Reforming,” 27), where Glanvill writes that Adam had a clear and intuitive sense 
perception that the earth was in motion. A similar argument to Piccioto’s is laid out in Peter 
Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Modern Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). For additional insights on Milton and education, see 
Ryan Netzley, “Learning from History: Empiricism, Likeness, and Liberty in Paradise 
Lost, Books 11-12,” in Milton’s Modernities, eds. Feisal Mohamed and Patrick Fadely 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2017), 85-110; Sarah Higinbotham, “Education 
as Repair: Paradise Lost in Prison,” in To Repair the Ruins: Reading Milton, eds. Mary 
Fenton and Louis Schwartz (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2012), 339-58; 
Catherine Gimelli Martin, Milton Among the Puritans: The Case for Historical 
Revisionism (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 203-11; Thomas Festa, The End of Learning: 
Milton and Education (New York: Routledge, 2006), 23-44; 99-157; Janel Mueller, 
“Embodying Glory: The Apocalyptic Strain in Milton’s Of Reformation,” in Politics, 
Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose, eds. David Loewenstein and James 





Book 9, it is used earlier in connection with Satan: in Book 3, when the fallen angel stands 
“on the lower stair / That scaled by steps of gold to heaven’s gate,” and “Looks down with 
wonder at the sudden view / of all this world at once” (3.540-3). In this scene, we are told, 
Satan “surveys” the entire universe with a mixture of wonder and envy, the same affective 
mixture that characterize his soliloquy in Book 9. The poem also includes some telling 
language here: “Round he surveys,” we read, “and well might, where he stood / So high 
above the circling canopy / Of night’s extended shade” (3.555-7). One could read the aside 
“and well might, where he stood” as simply setting up the stunning astronomical 
descriptive passage that follows on this moment, as Satan winds his “oblique” way toward 
the human world through “innumerable stars” (3.564-5). But the phrase “and well might, 
where he stood” seems to be signaling, more than the sublime position that Satan adopts 
as he surveys the world, a sense that he ought not be there at all, a sense that the vantage 
point from which he gazes at the world is not properly his, that he is interloping there. 
Shifting attention from “where he stood” to “and well might” encourages questions about 
the legitimacy of Satan’s perspectival position here, about his claims upon this point of 
vantage above the universe—in other words, it raises the question about whether his survey 
can embody truth. His affective response, blending envy and wonder, reveals that even in 
this moment of sublimity there is in fact an overriding poverty of perspective—a poverty 
of ethical perception which undermines empirical perception as well.220  
																																																								
220 My reading of Book 3 is indebted to Isabel G. MacCaffery, “The Theme of Paradise 
Lost, Book III,” in New Essays on Paradise Lost (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1969), 58-85: “The poem treats the ways of God to men; Book III deals specifically with 
divine epistemology, the ways whereby men can know, or come to know, God” (58). To 
which I would add (in the visual epistemology of Satan) also the ways whereby they can’t. 





 In order to grasp the stakes of Satan’s diabolical surveys of the universe and the 
world in Book 3 and Book 9 respectively, we must first understand that he is himself at 
those very moments not only the surveyor but also the surveyed. Earlier in Book 3, we read 
the following about God the Father: 
Now had the almighty Father from above,  
From the empyrean where he sits 
High throned above all height, bent down his eye, 
His own works and their works at once to view: 
About him all the sanctities of heaven 
Stood thick as stars, and from his sight received 
Beatitude past utterance; on his right  
The radiant image of his glory sat, 
His only Son: on earth he first beheld 
Our two first parents, yet the only two 
Of mankind, in the happy garden placed, 
Reaping immortal fruits of joy and love, 
Uninterrupted joy, unrivalled love 
In blissful solitude; he then surveyed  
Hell and the gulf between, and Satan there 
Coasting the wall of heaven on this side night 
In the dun air sublime, and ready now 
To stoop with wearied wings, and willing feet,  
On the bare outside of this world, that seemed 
Firm land imbosomed without firmament, 
Uncertain which, in ocean or in air.  
Him God beholding from his prospect high, 
Wherein past, present, future he beholds, 
Thus to his only Son foreseeing spake. (3.56-79) 
 
Here God sits upon “his prospect high,” not high in the merely spatial sense applied to 
Satan later in Book 3, but “high above all height,” in a way that transcends time as well as 
space, since from that prospect “past, present, future he beholds.” What follows upon this 
moment of divine surveying is God the Father’s description of all that will follow in the 
epic, and all that will follow upon that: Satan’s temptation, mankind’s disobedience, and 
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the Son’s redemption. God’s perfected knowledge allows for a comprehensive survey of 
all temporal duration as well as all spatial extension; this knowledge provides the substance 
of Adam’s prophetic education in Book 11, another instance in which a vatic seeing-as-
knowing partakes of and participates in the omniscient, divine survey. In this moment, 
which is called “surveying” only by way of accommodation, to be sure, though the gap 
between the reality and the accommodation is precisely our point of interest here, God need 
not parcel his attention in any way. Although He “bent down his eye,” his beneficent gaze 
still goes out to all the “sanctities of heaven” that surround him; nor is the “image of his 
glory” slighted by this seeming shift of attention. God’s survey here, shared by the reader, 
shifts the frame of reference in which Satan’s journey is viewed: what seemed in Book 2 
as a heroic rise from Hell and Chaos appears now as a descent, with Satan appearing “ready 
now / To stoop with wearied wings” to the “opaque sphere” surrounding the entire 
universe.221 Recall also that in Book 9 Satan undertakes his survey precisely in order to 
escape being, himself, surveilled, that he seeks to enter Eden undetected by “cherubic 
watch,” to find some “unsuspected way” (9.68-9). Divine omnipotence, however, has 
already seen all that will develop in its maximally panoramic spatiotemporal aspect. 
Considered in this way, Satan’s act of surveying must be read not as a prelude to his fraud, 
but already an instance of it, an attempt to attain a kind of universal knowledge by usurping 
the vantage from which God views the earth in an all-encompassing perspective. The fact 
that the seven-days’ survey travesties the seven days’ creation reinforces this thematic fact 
at the level of narrative and formal construction. The attempt founders by confusing the 
																																																								





metaphysical locus of divine omniscience with a physically privileged observational 
point—an Archimedean point, to recall Arendt’s terminology above.  
 Later in Book 9, when Eve succumbs to the serpent’s temptation, there occurs a 
double change in her perspective that deserves some mention in this discussion of seeing-
as-knowledge in the poem. The passage has become a locus classicus for discussing 
Milton’s attitude toward science. After “greedily” eating the fruit, Eve speaks the following 
lines as though “heightened as with wine”:  
O sovereign, virtuous, precious of all trees 
In Paradise, of operation blest 
To sapience, hitherto obscured, infamed 
And thy fair fruit let hang, as to no end 
Created; but henceforth my early care, 
Not without song, each morning, and due praise 
Shall tend thee, and the fertile burden ease 
Of thy full branches offered free to all; 
Till dieted by thee I grow mature 
In knowledge, as the gods who all things know; 
Though others envy what they cannot give; 
For had the gift been theirs, it had not here 
Thus grown. Experience, next to thee I owe, 
Best guide; not following thee, I had remained 
In ignorance, thou op’nest wisdom’s way, 
And giv’st accéss, though secret she retire. 
And I perhaps am secret; heaven is high, 
High and remote to see from thence distinct 
Each thing on earth; and other care perhaps 
May have diverted from continual watch 
Our great forbidder, safe with all his spies 
About him. (9.795-816).  
 
Still intoxicated by the immediate effects of the fall, Eve begins to think of knowledge in 
terms of experience, which is to say in terms of fallen or diabolic surveying, colored by 
exteriority and alienation. According to Eve, experiential “sapience” grants “accéss” to 
“wisdom’s way,” which otherwise, she reasons, would have stayed barred. Knowledge here 





led to the penetration of Eden. At the same time that Eve begins to think of knowledge as 
something concealed, and of the pursuit of knowledge as a movement from a position of 
outsideness to one of penetrating insight, she also comes to regard herself as “secret,” 
hidden from the all-perceiving survey of God. This, then, is the double change resulting 
from the fall into knowledge-by-experience: truth is regarded as something remote and 
occluded which must be approached and then penetrated; and, at the same time, the self 
comes to be regarded as something hidden, so that God’s knowledge seems like espionage, 
not surveying but surveillance (hence Eve calls the angels God’s “spies”).222 Eve’s self-
deceived discussion of the “high and remote” vantage from which God surveys all of 
creation echoes the language used to describe God’s surveying in Book 3, but is prone to 
the same physicalizing error evident in Satan’s attempt to occupy such a privileged 
observational place. The description of divine surveying in Book 3 explicitly denies both 
of Eve’s assumptions about the way in which God’s visionary knowledge works: first that 
it is ineffective because too distant, and second that he might be temporarily distracted. 
From Book 3, recall, we have already learned that God can “bend his eye” through space 
and time from “where he sits / High throned above all height,” and that attending to one 
thing (ex. “Our two first parents”) does not involve leaving something else unattended (ex. 
“the sanctities of heaven”).  
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explored. The difference between a truly providential divine knowledge and an 
approximately providential sovereign knowledge is at the core of Measure’s meditation on 





 The change in Eve’s perception of knowledge and self after the fall, and its 
proximity to Satan’s view of knowledge in the seven days of uncreation, seems to confirm 
Arendt’s sense that the human surveying capacity is inevitably tied to alienation and world-
loss. It also seems to imply a certain scientific backwardness in Paradise Lost, since it 
associates the new science—its reliance on experiment, its search for nature’s secrets, and 
its assumption of an Archimedean point from which to dispose of the world as from 
outside—with the primal scene of sin. In this analysis eating the fruit of the Tree of 
Knowledge becomes synonymous with the “discovery of the Archimedean point,” 
although that discovery, which was itself coming to fruition in Milton’s time in the form 
of Galileo’s telescopic surveys and unprecedented voyages of discovery, is projected back 
into the primal scene of fallen epistemology.  
Although Eve’s speeches after the fall place full confidence in the validity of sense 
perception as a means of access to the truth, as we will see presently, the example of 
Adam’s unfallen inquiry about the heavenly motions proleptically points forward to a 
situation in which, precisely, what is seen—the sun is seen to move about the earth, the 
sphere of fixed stars is seen to whirl about—is not to be believed, in which theory must go 
beyond what is seen in order to achieve theodical results. It is true that the evidentiary force 
of Galileo’s telescopic discoveries helped to invalidate many arguments against 
Copernicanism. But it is just as true that in the adoption of the idea that the apparent 
motions of the heavenly bodies—something to us utterly apparent—is actually the result 
of the earth’s motion—something we do not perceive at all—modernity shows itself not to 
be a seeing-is-believing empirical enterprise only, but rather one in which theory can sway 





 When Satan is tempting Eve in serpentine form, he makes the following false 
claims about the effects of the forbidden fruit. He climbs the tree and eats, and then, 
Sated at length, ere long I might perceive 
Strange alteration in me, to degree 
Of reason in my inward powers, and speech 
Wanted not long, though to this shape retained. 
Thenceforth to speculations high or deep 
I turned my thoughts, and with capacious mind 
Considered all things visible in heaven, 
Or earth, or middle, all things fair and good. (9.598-605) 
 
I want to pause for a moment over “speculations high or deep,” which points to a 
connection between knowledge as surveying and knowledge as penetration. This same 
relationship between surveying and penetration also finds expression in the seven days of 
uncreation episode discussed above, in which Satan’s world tour serves to find a hidden 
entrance through which he can steal into Paradise. Thus the diabolical form of surveying 
always seems to possess a depth dimension, being at once an inspection from on high and 
also, in the poem’s language, an “inspection deep.” The connection between surveying 
from above and fathoming the depths is further confirmed in Book 6, when Satan, 
prompted by Nisroc, lays out his invention of diabolical war machines powered by 
“materials dark and crude”: 
Not uninvented that, which you aright 
Believ’st so main to our success, I bring: 
Which of us who beholds the bright surfáce 
Of this ethereous mould whereon we stand, 
This continent of spacious heav’n, adorned 
With plant, fruit, flower ambrosial, gems and gold, 
Whose eye so superficially surveys 
These things, as not to mind from whence they grow 
Deep under ground, materials dark and crude, 
Of spiritous and fiery spume, till touched 
With heaven’s ray, and tempered they shoot forth 
So beauteous, op’ning to the ambient light. 





Shall yield us, pregnant with infernal flame, 
Which into hollow engines long and round 
Thick-rammed, at the other bore with touch of fire 
Dilated and infuriate shall send forth 
From far with thundering noise among our foes (6.470-87) 
 
Knowledge as surveying, knowledge as penetration, and the invention of ingenious but 
destructive technics come together here in a passage dense with references to alchemy and 
sexual procreation. One wonders how Satan’s rhetorical question would have been 
answered—do all the fallen angels share the impulse to plumb the depths that Satan 
describes here? Whether they do or not, Satan is the progenitor and exemplar of this restless 
impulse to tear up the “bright surfáce” of things, to peer into their depths, to seek out the 
hidden, to master the occult properties of nature through technics. For Satan, to “mind” is 
at the same time to “mine” as the pun advertises.  
 The connection between diabolical surveying and penetration, the thing that binds 
“speculations high or deep” into a single, and singularly pernicious sin, is curiosity.223 Like 
surveying—diabolically shaded into surveilling—the world from a superior vantage got by 
usurpation, prying into the depths transgresses a boundary of knowledge. Satan’s reaction 
to the beauty of heaven is precisely that concupiscentia oculorum (“lust of the eyes”) 
which, under the name of curiositas, Augustine in the Confessions enrolls in the list of 
vices.224 By endorsing the notion that knowledge ought to have its limits, Paradise Lost 
																																																								
223  On Milton, curiosity, and forbidden or vain knowledge, see Regina Schwartz, 
Remembering and Repeating: Biblical Creation in Paradise Lost (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 40-59; Howard Schultz, Milton and Forbidden Knowledge (New 
York: Modern Language Association, 1955), 43-95.  
224 The theme of curiosity runs throughout St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. F. J. Sheed 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2nd ed. 2006). On interpretations of Augustine and curiosity, I draw 
principally upon Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. 





might appear distinctly out of step with modernity, which valorizes curiosity, especially 
and above all the “scientific curiosity” which in its more aspirational forms seeks 
limitlessly to expand the frontiers of the world’s intelligibility. Yet the ambiguity attending 
Galileo and the telescope should be borne in mind, since the expansion of frontiers in that 
case finds its way into the fabric of Milton’s own inspired poesis. Galileo’s telescope 
appears in the poem as an ambiguous emblem, rather than an image of all that is to be 
condemned. And although Raphael gently chastises Adam for his (unfallen) expression of 
astronomical curiosity in Book 8, I will show in the next section that the poem leaves open 
the possibility that for fallen human beings, the search for theodical assurances in the form 
of a theory that can make the heavens intelligible to reason may not be an instance of 
curiosity at all.  
 Having now discussed the diabolical or fallen survey and its relation to the 
omniscient, divine survey in Paradise Lost, I will turn now to the unfallen, Edenic mode. 
The word “survey” is used twice in connection with Adam. In both cases, Adam’s sense 
of, and use of, surveying take place within human bounds, but the perfected and (by 
comparison with ours) enlarged form granted at their first creation. His theoretical 
capacity—his faculty of seeing-as-knowing— is not yet conditioned by the alienation that 
marks the diabolical surveying of Satan, and the paranoia about being surveilled of the 
fallen Eve. At the same time, Adam’s surveys are not divine; they are not omniscient and 
insofar as they are not colored by pride, they do not aim to be. The unfallen surveying 
capacity complicates the categories set out by Arendt: it is at once enhanced (as if by 
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technics) and natural; it is at once able to perceive the “innumerable stars” of the Milky 
Way as though telescopically, and yet it is not bound to the technological teleology which 
gave Arendt pause and colored her evaluation of modernity. In short: the possibility of an 
unfallen or Edenic epistemology opens up an entirely new horizon within the account of 
The Human Condition, one in which knowledge-as-vision takes place without the 
assumption of an Archimedean point. As discussed briefly in the first section of the present 
chapter, in Book 8, Adam describes his first moments of dawning consciousness to Raphael 
with the following words:  
Straight toward heaven my wondering eyes I turned, 
And gazed a while the ample sky, till raised 
By quick instinctive motion up I sprung, 
As thitherward endeavoring, and upright 
Stood on my feet; about me round I saw 
Hill, dale, and shady woods, and sunny plains, 
And liquid lapse of murmuring streams; by these 
Creatures that lived, and moved, and walked, or flew, 
Birds on the branches warbling; all things smiled, 
With fragrance and with joy my heart o’erflowed. 
Myself I then perused, and limb by limb 
Surveyed, and sometimes went, and sometimes ran 
With supple joints, as lively vigor led: 
But who I was, or where, or from what cause, 
Knew not. (8.257-71) 
 
The poem here presents, in a highly condensed form, the foundations of an unfallen human 
anthropology, and it is not by accident that the keyword we have been tracing appears in 
conjunction with its near synonym “peruse.” Adam’s moment of self-surveying at the 
moment his consciousness dawns differs from Satan’s diabolical survey in that it does not 
seek to imitate the divine surveying of Book 3; it does not rely on the usurpation of a 
privileged vantage point, as did Satan’s. Adam’s seeing-as-knowing moves swiftly from a 





upright, hence specifically human posture—to a consideration of his own body.225 In fact, 
the word “survey” may seem slightly out of place here, accustomed as we might be to take 
the word “survey” in its geographical sense of cognizing and describing something vast in 
comparison with human limits: a continent, say, or the sweep of centuries worth of literary 
history. The word’s appearance here confirms the existence of a prelapsarian surveying 
capacity operating on a human scale at once intimate and (as book 8 has already 
demonstrated through the cosmological dialogue with Raphael) vast, yet one that operates 
without the dubious luxury of an “Archimedean point” supplied by any technics. Such a 
point, once attained, is supposed to allow the philosopher to set move the earth in all its 
immensity; Adam’s survey intends only to set the body to moving, it does not tally with 
the demiurgic desire of an Archimedes. One last point of contrast between Satan’s 
surveying and Adam’s bears mentioning: Adam’s moment of looking on the whole of his 
own corporeal form remains at a level that Satan calls “superficial”—it does not seek out 
the mechanical causes buried beneath his own skin, does not turn to imagining the 
“materials dark and crude” from which he has been fashioned. Recalling Leibniz above, 
the cause Adam seeks is not that of the “kingdom of power” (efficient cause) but of the 
“kingdom of wisdom” (final—or in this case first—cause). Yet at the same time, Adam’s 
self-surveying does entail mastery of  allows him to put his own body into a form of motion 
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that gives him delight, he locates a depth of use in his own corporeal form, rather than self-
destructively attempting to strip it away. Yet some questions about this passage remain.  
 Why does Adam, whose language we know to be perfectly adequate and unfallen, 
use two words to describe his self-perception, and where does the difference lie between 
“peruse” and “survey,” if indeed there is a difference? The OED cites this passage in 
definitions of both words. At peruse, v. II.3 the word is supposed to mean “To examine in 
detail; to scrutinize, inspect, survey, oversee; to consider, to take heed of.” And at survey, 
v. 4.a this passage is adduced in support of the sense, “To look at from, or as from, a height 
or commanding position; to take a broad, general, or comprehensive view of; to view or 
examine in its whole extent.” (Interestingly, the OED also includes under this definition 
the moment of God the Father’s surveying of creation at 3.555; I will return to this point 
shortly). Judging from the OED then, the words are quite nearly synonymous. But 
etymologically “peruse” is rooted in the word “use,” whereas “survey” is rooted in the 
Ladin “videre,” to see. What I want to highlight here is that in this moment of self-
apprehension it seems that use and enjoyment, uti and frui, are not yet divided for Adam, 
but seem rather to combine into one sense. Perusing himself, learning the use of his limbs, 
and surveying them in their peculiar arrangement that makes him alone among creatures 
walk upright on two legs, Adam then begins to put his body to work, running and walking 
as pleases him. The use of his body yields an aesthetic sense of pleasure. In this scene of 
dawning self-awareness, then, uti and frui, the distinction upon which Augustine based his 
limitations on the human desire for knowledge—we should strive to know only what is 
useful, and be wary of seeking knowledge only for the sake of pleasure divorced from 





not bound to attend to the same difference between useful and vain knowledge that 
constrains human beings in their postlapsarian state. This must change the way we view 
Raphael’s gentle rebuke of Adam in Book 8, because it suggests that curiosity, if it exists 
at all in an unfallen mind, must operate quite differently. 
 Is the OED justified in combining this moment of unfallen human survey with the 
divine sense of survey in Book 3? On the one hand, it appears strange to say that Adam 
here views his own body “from, or as from, a height or commanding position,” or that he 
is able to “examine in its whole extent” his own corporeal form. His back, for instance, 
would be hidden from view, and he can hardly be said to perceive himself here as from 
above, although he is in a “commanding” position understood in terms of agency rather 
than space. Yet the similarity between the two moments runs deep, maybe deeper than the 
OED’s editors had in mind when they adduced the two passages in support of one sense. 
As Dennis Danielson has showed through an analysis of Paradise Lost and De doctrina, 
the “first matter” of creation, out of which all celestial, terrestrial, and diabolical being is 
woven, is in some sense a part of the body of God. Until now we have been proceeding as 
though God’s surveying in Book 3 was like a justified and heightened version of what 
Satan did in Book 9, but here there is an indication that the proper point of comparison is 
rather with Adam’s surveying of his own body. God looks out over the creation not as one 
watching others—as the fallen Eve seems to think as she grows paranoid about God’s 
observation of her—but as Being perceiving itself.   
 This sense of surveying as self-perception finds oblique confirmation the second 
time Adam makes use of the word. When he expresses his doubts about the heavens to 





its substantive form to mean their whole sweep, their entire extent. The stars “in all their 
vast survey” seem to gaze upon themselves, just as Adam has gazed upon himself limb by 
limb, and God, when surveying creation, observes those things which are his. In all, what 
is suggested here is an intimate connection between the way of seeking knowledge that we 
know by the word “survey” on the one hand, and relative scales or the play of perspectives 
on the other. The “human surveying capacity” identified by Arendt, and cited as the 
primary organ through which the intelligibility of the world is transmitted in the modern 
age, operates licitly when it operates within the perspectival frame set for it, rather than 
seeking the vantage of the Archimedean point. The ‘invention’ of the telescope by Galileo 
also marks the discovery of this point for the modern age, since it finally puts to rest the 
idea of a two-story universe operating through distinct sets of physical laws, and since it 
did so through a demonstration with all the hallmarks of sense-certainty but was 
nevertheless a technical achievement. From there a mathematized, universal physics was 
but a short step. And it was this universality of knowledge bought at the price of abstraction 
that gave impetus and meaning to the Enlightenment. Answers to the question: Wouldn’t 
it have been better if human surveying had stayed within the perspectival bounds set out 
for it by God? tend to be given in vain, as is the attempt to dictate a system of rules or a 
cultural condition in which those bounds might be revived. Once the Archimedean point 
has been discovered it cannot be walled off again, though the way to it can indeed be 
forgotten, and politics and culture can aid in this forgetting. But thinking this way 
anticipates a conclusion which we are not yet in a position to make. First we must look 
more closely at Adam looking at the stars, which gaze at themselves within the constant, 





3. Theodicy, Astronomical Curiosity, and Theory’s Claim to Truth in Book 8 
 In Milton and the Natural World: Science and Poetry in Paradise Lost (2005), 
Karen Edwards declares in no uncertain terms: “Milton stands on this side of modernity”—
and by modernity is meant the project of modern science, including the new astronomy of 
the late seventeenth century.226 Up to this point, our examination of the keyword “survey” 
in Paradise Lost has not really supported such a claim. It has showed, via Arendt and 
Ayesha Ramachandran, that surveying and worldmaking are characteristically modern 
enterprises; and it has demonstrated that in Paradise Lost surveying is frequently 
associated with diabolism, with the illicit usurpation of divine perspective, and that the 
poem tends to condemn the “discovery of the Archimedean point” which Arendt claims 
begins when Galilean technics confirms the theoretical picture of Copernicanism in a way 
that challenges the self-evidence of the sense, yet is “delivered to human cognition ‘with 
the certainty of sense perception” through the mediation of technology. In this section, I 
will offer some evidence that Paradise Lost is in one sense “on this side of modernity” in 
its approach to what we might call (borrowing from Odo Marquard) gnoseological evils—
evils related to forbidden knowledge and vain learning, and to the desire for such 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3. Edwards persuasively makes the case 
for a scientifically engaged Milton, against the tradition of, ex., Kester Svendson Milton 
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knowledge that Augustine condemned under the name curiositas. 227  The desire for 
knowledge of the heavens—frequently an emblem of the vain knowledge sought for by the 
intellect guided by curiosity—is given a certain warrant in Paradise Lost, since Adam 
expresses it in a sinless, unfallen way. But the “modernity” of this desire is ambiguous, 
since it also signifies a return to a lost prelapsarian state, a step along the way toward a 
restoration of ideal humanity, rather than a striking out toward unexplored horizons of 
thought.  
 The single biggest obstacle standing in the way of a fulsome reading of Paradise 
Lost as a poem allied with the scientific revolution is Raphael’s speech to Adam in Book 
8, where the archangel tells our universal parent to “be lowly wise,” seeming to deride the 
attempt to assay celestial mechanics as vanity and proud curiosity. Even though John 
Leonard and Dennis Danielson have persuasively shown—contravening some two hundred 
years worth of scholarly consensus on the subject—that Milton’s epic does not take place 
within and reflect a Ptolemaic cosmos, this passage equivocates in such a way that it has 
become impossible to see the Paradise Lost declaring support for the renovation of 
astronomical theory—and hence in theory itself—undertaken by Copernicus and 
Galileo.228 Ultimately the question of whether Paradise Lost espouses “heliocentrism” or 
																																																								
227  Odo Marquard, “Unburdenings: Theodicy Motives in Modern Philosophy,” in In 
Defense of the Accidental: Philosophical Studies, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Oxford: 
Oxford Univeristy Press, 1991), 18, writes that among the “theodicy motives” in modern 
philosophy is the process whereby “Gnoseological evil is rendered no longer evil. 
Curiosity, which had been a vice, becomes the central scientific virtue” [emphasis in 
original].  
228 John Leonard, Faithful Labourers: A Reception History of Paradise Lost, 1667-1970, 
Vol. 2: Interpretive Issues (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2013), 705-819. Leonard lays 
bare a process, begun in the nineteenth century, whereby a mishandled reading of the 
Paradise of Fools section of PL Book 3 becomes established as a critical commonplace 





“Copernicanism” is inconsequential to the poem’s modernity or lack thereof. There are 
better litmus tests for determining whether its attitudes toward astronomy are compatible 
with the flowering of modern astronomical theory—namely, its attitude toward theory 
itself, its description of the potentialities and limitations of seeing-as-knowing. Looking to 
questions of theodicy as they were discussed above, as having to do with the intelligibility 
of the world as a whole, as justifying God’s good intentions toward humankind by proving 
an essential consonance between God’s reasons for creation and the reason of the human 
creature, illuminates better the question of Paradise Lost’s modernity.  
 Before embarking on an interpretation of Adam and Raphael’s exchange in Book 
8, I would like to return to Hans Blumenberg’s account of the Copernican turn, briefly 
discussed in the introduction of this chapter. The more detailed exposition will help to 
secure the connection between astronomy, theodicy, and curiosity, and will elucidate the 
role played by this constellation of concepts in the epochal shift into the modern age. In 
The Genesis of the Copernican World, Blumenberg relates an apocryphal story about the 
Castilian King Alfonso X, called the Wise, a legend that “became a topos that was varied 
in many ways” in Renaissance-era and modern histories of the transition from Ptolemaic 
to Copernican astronomical theories. Alfonso earned his sobriquet partly through his 
patronage of astronomical science, which resulted in the creation of the Alfonsine tables, 
an aid to astronomical computation—extremely popular throughout the middle ages and 
well known to Copernicus—based on the geocentric system of Ptolemy. But he was to 
become most famous for a remark he perhaps never made, namely, “Si a principia 
creationis humanae Dei altissimi consilio interfuisset, nonnulla melius ordinatiusque 





of the creation of man, man would have been better and more properly fashioned in many 
respects]. (This, at least, is how the comment is recorded by Pierre Bayle in the Dictionairre 
historique et critique). The remark—originally restricted to the formation of human 
beings—quickly came to be applied more widely to the heavens as well, precisely because 
“the king’s posthumous fame as a stimulator and promoter of astronomy […] survived the 
centuries and at the same time made the inadequacy of the theory underlying those tables 
increasingly manifest” (Blumenberg 260). In its cosmic form, Alfonso’s 
anthropocentrically indignant rebuke of the apparently disordered state of the starry 
heavens is supposed by later writers to give expression to the “crisis of geocentric 
astronomy” that led to the Copernican turning. Concluding his discussion of Alfonso’s 
remark, Blumenberg writes:  
It is true that Alfonso is anything but a forerunner of Copernicus; but he is 
nevertheless a significant pre-Copernican figure. He grasps for the first time 
the whole offensiveness of the fact that the God of the Middle Ages was 
supposed to have created the heavens in such a way that man is only able to 
perceive confusion in them. For this is the dilemma that Copernicus will 
aim to remove by relieving the Creator of the reproach that it is the object 
that confuses cognition, rather than cognition that fails when faced with its 
object. Seen in this way, the modern age begins with an act of theodicy. In 
it we are called upon not to rest satisfied with a state of theory that renders 
questionable God’s intentions with the world and with man.  
 
Most important here is the cooperation of theodicy with theory in the formation of 
modernity. Ptolemaic astronomical theory inscribed disorder into celestial mechanics, a 
disorder that only increased through further observations. The more Ptolemaic astronomers 
looked at the night sky, the less sense it made; the astronomers responded by redoubling 
their commitment to theoretical resignation, saying in effect that the objects of 
astronomical theory were created to be resistant to, perhaps even hostile to, the human 





represents the moment at which resignation turns to indignation, when the dogmatic 
certainty that God’s ways are unsearchable turns to suspicions regarding such imperious 
high-mindedness. Blumenberg’s careful reconstruction of the pre-Copernican lifeworld 
shows that arriving at such a moment is neither purely accidental nor purely inevitable. But 
once arrived at, the unintelligibility of the heavens were less and less capable of serving as 
a curb to human reason, and more and more came to be viewed as a scandal requiring some 
theodical resolution. No matter how much resignation the astronomers exercised, the 
confusion occasioned by the starry heavens increasingly came to be a stumbling block, 
leading human beings into the sin of intellectual pride expressed in the Alfonso episode. 
What was needed was a theodicy: some form of reason-giving that makes the world 
intelligible, and by doing so removes the growing enmity between the mind of man and the 
mind of God.  
 The Copernican turn supplied a theodical resolution to this situation in the form of 
a new model of the heavens. But more important, both for the Copernican turning itself 
and for Paradise Lost’s approach to the debate over the order of the heavens, was that the 
theodical solution depended absolutely on renouncing the old resignation in the face of the 
baffling stars, and claiming instead that human beings could in fact understand the noble 
objects of the firmament, even if they had not done so before. If God was to be relieved of 
the accusation of indifference or hostility toward human beings in his framing of the world, 
then theory, the outgrowth of human reason, must be able to access truth. Put differently, 
the question of whether the sun or the earth sits at the center of the universe is a second-
order question with respect to the Copernican turn. Blumenberg writes: 
The dispute about the world-systems is not of the same rank as the dispute 





world through Copernicus and was to become disturbing for the century 
after him is not originally an antithesis of cosmological schemes but rather 
one of anthropological preconditions for the possibility of truth. The 
important thing for Copernicus, in his changes in the world-system, was to 
register reason’s claim to truth; and the object of the anti-Copernican 
reaction, just as soon as it was fully formed, was to reject that claim.  
 
One can begin to see that accusing Paradise Lost of backwardness when it comes to 
astronomy because it does not express a partisan devotion to heliocentrism is misguided. 
More important—for the poem and for Copernicus—is the status of human reason, and the 
issue of “anthropological preconditions for the possibility of truth.”  
 Turning back to the poem now, in the passage from Book 8 in which Adam and 
Raphael discuss the heavens, Adam has just heard Raphael’s account of the creation, and 
has sat transfixed by the story. Coming back to himself “as new waked,” Adam replies as 
follows: 
What thanks sufficient, or what recompense  
Equal have I to render thee, divine 
Historian, who thus largely has allayed  
The thirst I had of knowledge, and vouchsafed 
This friendly condescension to relate 
Things else by me unsearchable, now heard 
With wonder, but delight, and, as is due,  
With glory attribúted to the high 
Creator; something yet of doubt remains, 
Which only thy solution can resolve. 
 
Adam’s pious expression of thanks here also reemphasizes the conditions under which 
natural philosophy can be pursued: not for its own sake, but always with the intent of giving 
“glory […] to the high / Creator.” This moment puts us back in mind of the beginning of 
Book 7, when Adam asks Raphael to reveal the story of creation “not to explore the secrets” 





curiositas is once again in play as Adam begins to express his “doubt” about celestial 
mechanics. The passage runs: 
When I behold this goodly frame, this world 
Of heaven and earth consisting, and compute 
Their magnitudes, this earth a spot, a grain, 
An atom, with the firmament compared 
And all her numbered stars, that seem to roll 
Spaces incomprehensible (for such 
Their distance argues and their swift return 
Diurnal) merely to officiate light 
Round this opacous earth, this punctual spot, 
One day and night; in all their vast survey 
Useless besides, reasoning I oft admire, 
How nature wise and frugal could commit 
So many nobler bodies to create, 
Greater so manifold to this one use, 
For aught appears, and on their orbs impose 
Such restless revolutions day by day 
Repeated, while the sedentary earth 
That better might with far less compass move, 
Served by more noble than herself, attains 
Her end without least motion, and receives, 
As tribute such a sumless journey brought 
Of incorporeal speed, her warmth and light; 
Speed, who to describe whose swiftness number fails. (8.15-38) 
 
Adam’s Edenic knowledge—unaided by any telescopic intervention, and not yet the 
product of progressively elaborate computation and modeling of the heavens—has brought 
him to the point of doubt about celestial mechanics, and in particular doubt about whether 
the earth’s motion provides a better explanatory framework for the observed motion of the 
stars. Is it fair to say that Milton here projects back into Paradise the very astronomical 
controversy exercising seventeenth-century natural philosophy? The representation of 
Galileo in the epic seems to show that this is not quite true: Adam’s doubts are much closer 
to the doubts of King Alfonso—albeit still expressed piously, without the taint of sinful 





seventeenth century astronomers. It would be more accurate to say that it represents a 
recurrent problematic in the history of thought. That the problem of deciding between 
geocentric and heliocentric world systems occurs here in the primal scene of knowledge-
giving implies perenniality rather than topicality. This is not to suggest that the exigency 
of the problem is suppressed: the presence of Galileo attests to this, as does the passage in 
Book 4 when Uriel, after having met with Gabriel, returns to stand guard over Eden: 
[…] Uriel to his charge  
Returned on that bright beam, whose point now raised 
Beneath the Azores; whether the prime orb, 
Incredible how swift, had thither rolled 
Diurnal, or this less volúble earth 
By shorter flight to the east, had left him there (4.592) 
 
Here the voice of the epic poet-speaker introduces the same doubt Adam later expresses, 
bringing the recurrent problematic of heliocentric and geocentric cosmic pictures directly 
into the moment of the poem’s composition. 
 Paradise Lost, then, treats the problem of heliocentrism and geocentrism as a 
perennial one in the history of natural philosophy that has occasionally become a topic of 
urgent discussion, but has never been quite resolved. But the question of what is at the 
center of the cosmos is not at all in question within the poem: the cosmic center is God, 
although there “center” cannot be understood in physical terms, but must be thought of 
metaphysically. To confuse the physical with the metaphysical “center” is to repeat the 
error made by Eve in physicalizing the location of heaven after her fall. Or witness Satan 
making a similar error in the context of the seven days of uncreation episode, in his 
peroration to the earth:  
O earth, how like to heaven, if not preferred 
More justly, seat worthier of gods, as built 





For what god after better worse would build? 
Terrestrial heaven, danced roung by other heavens 
That shine, yet bear their bright officious lamps, 
Light above light, for thee alone, as seems, 
In thee concentring all their precious beams 
Of sacred influence: as God in heaven 
Is centre, yet extends to all, so thou 
Centring reciev’st from all those orbs; in thee, 
Not in themselves, all their known virtue appears 
Productive in herb, plant, and nobler birth 
Of creatures animate with gradual life 
Of grown, sense, reason, all summed up in man. (9.99-103) 
 
Satan here gives voice to a geocentrism and an anthropocentrism, similar to one of the 
alternatives that Raphael holds out to Adam in the cosmological discourse in Book 8. The 
difference, as Fowler notes, is that Satan’s version of geocentric theory is tainted, 
characteristically, by pride.229 Satan’s fundamental error involves not anthropocentrism, 
nor geocentrism, but a catachrestic understanding of center: the confusion of divine 
centrality with the physical centrality of sun, of earth, or of any created thing. Replying to 
Adam in Book 8, Raphael points out “that great / Or bright infers not excellence” (9.90-1), 
i.e., the size and luminosity of heavenly bodies does not signal spiritual rank. Satan makes 
a similar mistake—though in the manner of a self-serving error rather than an Adamic 
blunder—by assuming that something’s being created temporally “before” or “after” has 
some essential bearing on its value. In the same way, the question of whether something is 
physically “centric” or “eccentric” is indifferent; the only centrality that serves a genuinely 
orienting function with respect to reality is the centrality of God, who is not physically but 
metaphysically and spiritually central. Though its depiction of Satan’s confusion about the 
importance of centrality, Paradise Lost accuses the whole debate between heliocentric and 
																																																								





geocentric, “Copernican” and “Ptolemaic” cosmic systems, of pride, insofar as it associates 
physical centrality or eccentricity of this or that heavenly body with divine significance. 
 Yet the question remains as to why Adam frame his question to Raphael in terms 
of a “doubt,” a word that seems already to suggest a certain skepticism, a certain latent 
accusation of unintelligibility directed toward the heavenly order, if not toward its author? 
About the appearance of doubt here, Alastair Fowler writes: “Proleptically, Adam treats 
the paradox about little earth’s centrality as a matter for doubt rather than wonder.” 
“Proleptically” is doing some very heavy lifting there, and leaves open the question of what 
Adam’s doubt signifies in the moment it is phrased. The appearance in this context of the 
phrase “reasoning I oft admire” (8.25) suggests a consonance of intellect and visual 
aesthesis in Adam’s celestial theorization, rather than the projecting backward of a fallen 
hiatus between them. As I read it, the word “doubt” is itself used proleptically at line 13, 
functioning as a Miltonic “anti-pun” (Leonard), evoking while excluding its fallen sense. 
Not only Adam’s inquiry, but also Raphael’s response is described, in the Argument to 
Book 8, as an example of doubt (i.e., Adam “is doubtfully answered” by the archangel) 
which seems to further indicate that “doubt” in this passage means rather an innocent state 
of being of (at least) two minds about a situation that admits of (at least) two interpretations. 
In other words: in the prelapsarian discussion about astronomy, the “doubt” occasioned by 
celestial phenomena has not yet come to be a “doubt” about God’s intentions toward man, 
or the rationality of the world system, or the harmony of faith and reason. It has not yet 
become a question or a scandal needing some theodical satisfaction, but is merely puzzling.  
Yet by means of the anti-pun, and the proleptic bent of the passage in general as it 





such a situation—a situation that is not only dependent on the impiety of fallen human 
knowledge seekers, but is irrevocably bound up with the complication of the cosmic 
structure as a result of the fall. Adam’s doubt is not the impious doubt of King Alfonso, or 
of the seventeenth century natural philosopher meditating on the competition among world 
systems. It does not yet bespeak an existential pressure requiring proof of intelligibility, a 
theodical reassurance of God’s intentions with regard to humankind. If Raphael’s answer 
fails to satisfy our expectations of what a “forward-looking” poet of the seventeenth 
century should say, if it does not seem to indicate that Milton is on “this side of modernity,” 
that is because this answer is first of all an answer for Adam. It is not intended to answer 
directly to a modern doubt about the heavens—it answers such a doubt, only indirectly.  
While it might seem to suggest that desiring reassurance of the world’s 
intelligibility—that is, desiring a theodical proof—amounts to sinful curiosity, we do well 
to bear in mind that this is not what Adam is after at all. His innocent inquiry cannot have 
the structure of a theodical demand, though it proleptically looks forward to that structure. 
We can read this passage not as a straightforward rehearsal of the traditional prohibition of 
vain philosophy or curiosity as applied to fallen human beings who ought better to mind 
their eternal salvation, but rather as a proleptic gesture toward a situation in which what 
once counted as curiosity and vanity has become, after the invention of the telescope, a 
search for theodical satisfaction that cannot immediately be called illegitimate or sinful. 
Here there is a prospect—albeit somewhat indistinctly drawn, hinted at only through the 
trace evoked by the anti-pun—of a specific “gnoseological evil” being rehabilitated. We 
may not be able to say that Paradise Lost overturns the negative association of curiosity 





it is used pejoratively. Yet we find here that astronomical speculation—which had been 
cited as the preeminent example of vain curiosity, of the search for useless knowledge at 
the expense of that self-knowledge essential to salvation—is reconsidered in light of the 
postlapsarian need for theodicy to which the poem itself also responds in its attempt to 
“justify the ways of God to men.” If the figure of Galileo in the poem serves, as Paul 
Guillory has suggested, as a “cryptic self-portrait” of Milton, here then is one way they are 
unified: both are positively engaged in the search for theodical satisfactions “unattempted” 
in previous epochs. 
 Now to Raphael’s reply. The archangel’s response to Adam’s celestial “doubt” 
tends to turn his question about the nature of heavenly mechanics into a question about the 
ethical and divine significance of creation. We read that one of Adam’s errors lies in the 
belief that the brighter bodies must be the nobler ones, since “bright infers not excellence” 
(8.91). Raphael points out that the bright sun is “barren” compared to the “solid good” of 
the earth (8.93-4). The archangel thus corrects Adam’s evaluation, without declaring his 
description of the facts false. A similar idea guides the response to Adam’s question about 
scale: Raphael advises Adam to let the unintelligible scale of the heavens compared to earth 
“speak / The maker’s high magnificence, who built / So spacious, and his line stretched out 
so far; / That man may know he dwells not in his own” (100-3). The unfathomably rapid 
diurnal movement of the sphere of fixed stars, Raphael says, should be attributed to “his 
omnipotence / That to corporeal substances could add / Speed almost spiritual” (108-10) 
and goes on to compare the swiftness of the stars with the celerity of Adam himself who in 





inexpressible / By numbers that have name” (113-4). Finally, Raphael underlines all these 
points and expresses the principle of his intervention into Adam’s doubt: 
[…] But this I urge,  
Admitting motion in the heavens, to show 
Invalid that which thee to doubt it moved; 
Not that I so affirm, though so it seem 
To thee who hast thy dwelling here on earth. 
God to remove his ways from human sense, 
Placed heaven from earth so far, that earthly sight, 
If it presume, might err in things too high, 
And no advantage gain. (8.114-22) 
 
Raphael explicitly refuses to affirm that heavenly bodies really move around a static earth, 
and in the lines that follow he suggests the alternative possibility, that the apparent 
movement of the sun, stars, and planets is an effect produced by the “three different 
motions” of the earth. The principle of Raphael’s response is clear: he is urging Adam 
toward obedience. Where Adam asks for explanations of natural phenomena, Raphael 
instructs him as to the meanings of the phenomena for him. 
 We return at this decisive point to the idea of the “intelligibility of the world as a 
whole” that we took at the outset as the hallmark of modern philosophical theodicies. 
Recall that Leibniz postulates two parallel regimes of explanation, each in principle 
complete in itself: the “kingdom of power,” God’s governance through the immutable 
rational laws of nature, and the “kingdom of wisdom,” God’s governance through a 
sometimes mysterious providence. This program of theodicy set out by Leibniz, which 
takes as its fundamental guiding axiom and as its most important result the idea that ours 
is the best of all possible worlds, consists of harmonizing these two explanatory 
frameworks, suggesting a fundamental consonance between the realm of nature and the 





explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient cause; and all the 
phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final 
cause” (Labyrinth, 253). The principle of sufficient reason extends to every natural 
phenomenon, and can be expressed in either mechanical or in providential terms; either 
way is complete in itself. This is the dream of “intelligibility” that guides and misguides 
modern philosophical theodicy.  
 Paradise Lost does not share this dream. The fall of Adam and Eve bring about the 
fall of the cosmos as well; the fallen cosmos is more complex than Adam could have 
foreseen in Book 8, and the fallen human intellect tends to let doubt about the world bloom 
into doubt about its author’s intentions. Yet there is still a demand for justification, for 
rationalization in the heart of Paradise Lost. Ours may not be the best of all possible worlds, 
but it needs to be good enough, despite its fallen character. Raphael’s speech to Adam in 
Book 8 also speaks to Milton’s contemporaries and to us, but we must take care not to think 
that our own obedience can be best served by practicing the same kind of theoretical 
resignation recommended to our first parents. If this section of Paradise Lost constitutes 
an episode in the centuries-long “trial of theoretical curiosity” charted by Hans Blumenberg 
in Legitimacy of the Modern Age, its outcome is ambiguous. Curiosity is a sin, and it is a 
sin that consists of prying into that which is hidden from us. It is linked with surveying in 
one way, in that both wide surveying and curious probing of phenomena seek forms of 
knowledge outside of human view. But the most celebrated emblem of vain knowledge—
knowledge of heavenly motions—is partly rehabilitated as a legitimate area of inquiry. In 
our fallen state, within a cosmos of broken hierarchies and eccentric orbits, Milton opens 





to be given a hearing and is in principle able to be satisfied, perhaps by a restoration of the 
sensory capabilities lost in the fall. The presence of Galileo in the poem reminds us that 
such a restoration might be possible. Yet the telescopic survey and the diabolical survey 
have points of commonality, and astronomers run the risk of the same error regarding 
physicalizing the spiritual center that the fallen Eve shares with Satan.  
 I have tried to highlight in this chapter a certain tension in Paradise Lost concerning 
the theoretical impulse of modernity in its relation to theodicy, here understood as the 
search for assurances of intelligibility of the order of things. On the one hand, the poem 
disparages theorizing that seeks to exceed perspectival limitations, to take up a “high” 
position from which to survey the world as a whole. Such attempts, on the part of angels 
and humans, run the risk of confusing creation and Creator, of falling into idolatry, and of 
conflating true knowledge with vain philosophy. On the other hand, the poem seems to 
recognize—through the device of Adam’s proleptic doubt and Raphael’s dialectical 
response—that the desire for theodical satisfaction may indeed push humans to seek truths 
that can only be attained by exceeding the natural human scale, by augmenting the human 
sensorium, and by relying on explanatory frameworks that seem to pry into the nature of 
things. This recognition is mostly negative; it appears only in the recognition that what 
Raphael tells Adam cannot suffice for us, and through a reading of Raphael’s speech that 
sees God’s laughter at the astronomers’ theories directed primarily toward the old 
astronomy of Ptolemy, with its multiplication of epicycles and ascription of increasingly 
scandalous complexities to the heavenly motions. Though the poem does not go so far as 
to rehabilitate curiosity, it does seem to participate in the process of rolling back 





Paradise Lost what had been considered gnoseological evils—areas of forbidden 
knowledge—are rendered inert. By portraying ‘forbidden’ knowledge as, instead, ‘lost’ 
knowledge, the poem suggests that the search for theodical satisfactions through the 
technological amplification of astronomy, may in fact be praiseworthy, recuperating 
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